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Abstract
Today information can be seen as a basic commodity that is crucial to the
continuous well-being of modern organizations. Many modern organizations
will be unable to do business without access to their information resources.
It is therefor of vital importance for organizations to ensure that their infor-
mation resources are adequately protected against both internal and external
threats. This protection of information resources is known as information
security and is, to a large extent, dependent on the behavior of humans in
the organization.
Humans, at various levels in the organization, play vital roles in the pro-
cesses that secure organizational information resources. Many of the prob-
lems experienced in information security can be directly contributed to the
humans involved in the process. Employees, either intentionally or through
negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, can be seen as the greatest
threat to information security. Addressing this human factor in information
security is the primary focus of this thesis.
The majority of current approaches to dealing with the human factors in
information security acknowledge the need to foster an information security
culture in the organization. However, very few current approaches attempt
to adjust the ”generic” model(s) used to define organizational culture to be
specific to the needs of information security. This thesis firstly proposes,
and argues, such an adapted conceptual model which aims to improve the
understanding of what an information security culture is.
The thesis secondly focuses on the underlying role that information security
educational programs play in the fostering of an organizational information
security culture. It is argued that many current information security edu-
cational programs are not based on sound pedagogical theory. The use of
learning taxonomies during the design of information security educational
ii
ABSTRACT iii
programs is proposed as a possible way to improve the pedagogical rigor of
such programs. The thesis also argues in favor of the use of blended and/or
e-learning approaches for the delivery of information security educational
content. Finally, this thesis provides a detailed overview demonstrating how
the various elements contributed by the thesis integrates into existing trans-
formative change management processes for the fostering of an organizational
information security culture.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the research problem, research questions and research
objectives of the thesis.
1.1 Background
In today’s business world information is a valuable commodity and as such
needs to be protected. It affects all aspects of today’s businesses, from top
management right down to operational level. In order to stay competitive
in this information age, organizations typically make large investments in
terms of time, money and energy to streamline the processes of capturing,
generating and distributing vital information resources throughout the or-
ganization. Unfortunately, this distribution of mission-critical information
throughout the company also increases the likelihood of misuse or damage to
information resources (Haag, Cummings, & Dawkins, 2000). Such misuse or
damage could have devastating effects on an organization’s overall well being
(B. Von Solms, 2000).
It is therefor of vital importance for organizations to ensure that their
information resources are adequately protected against both internal and
external threats. The protection of organizational information resources is
typically accomplished through the implementation of various information
security controls. These controls are usually selected with the aid of inter-
nationally accepted standards such as ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) and ISO/IEC
TR 13335-1 (2004).
Information Security controls can generally be sub-divided into three cate-
1
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gories: physical controls, technical controls and operational controls. Physical
controls deal with the physical aspects of security, for example; a physical
control might state that an office containing sensitive documents should have
a lock on the door. Technical controls are controls of a technical nature; for
example, forcing a user to authenticate with a unique username and pass-
word before allowing the user to access the operating system would be a
technical control. The third category, operational controls, consists of all
controls that deal with human behavior (M. Thomson, 1998). Humans, at
various levels in the organization, play a vital role in the processes that secure
organizational information resources. Many of the problems experienced in
information security can be directly contributed to the humans involved in
the process. Employees, either intentionally or through negligence, often due
to a lack of knowledge, can be seen as the greatest threat to information
security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). Addressing this human factor in
information security will be the primary focus of this thesis.
Information security standards, such as ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) and ISO/IEC
TR 13335-1 (2004), recommend the use of information security awareness
campaigns to help address the human factor in information security. Ac-
cording to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) all employees of the organization and,
where relevant, third party users, should receive appropriate training. This
training should include security requirements, legal responsibilities and busi-
ness controls, as well as training in the correct use of information processing
facilities before access to information or services is granted (ISO/IEC 27002,
2005, p. 11 section 6.2.1). The standard does not provide any guidance as
to how this training should be done.
Exactly how to educate organizational users regarding their information
security related roles and responsibilities has been the focus of many studies.
Chapter 4 provide an in depth overview of such studies. However, education
alone cannot completely address the human factor in information security.
As shown in section 4.3, the majority of current research studying the hu-
man factor in information security acknowledges that behavioral aspects are
equally important when dealing with the role(s) humans play in information
security. In fact, many recent studies have shown that the establishment of
an information security culture in the organization is necessary for effective
information security (Eloff & Von Solms, 2000)(B. Von Solms, 2000).
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A lot of knowledge exits in the management sciences regarding organi-
zational culture in general (Schein, 1999a)(Alpander & Lee, 1995)(Woodall,
1996), but very little knowledge exists regarding the applicability of this
knowledge to information security specifically. It is, however, clear that a
user education program will have to play a major role in the establishment
of such a culture. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the field of infor-
mation security by improving the understanding of the concept of an infor-
mation security culture, and by addressing the role that education would
play in the fostering of such a culture in a holistic way.
The rest of this chapter will provide a brief outline of the research aims
of this thesis. This outline will be presented according to the format recom-
mended by Hofstee (2006, pp. 80-90).
1.2 Fields of Study
The work in this thesis falls primarily in the fields of information security
education and organizational culture.
1.3 Problem Statement
As mentioned earlier, information security is dependent on the behavior of
humans in order to be effective. It has been argued that the establishment of
an organizational culture of information security would be the ideal way to
ensure desirable user behavior. A lot of knowledge exits in the management
sciences regarding organizational culture in general, but very little knowledge
exists regarding the applicability of this knowledge to information security
specifically. It is, however, clear that a user education program will have to
play a major role in the establishment of such a culture. An extensive analysis
of current approaches towards dealing with the human factor in information
security has been performed as part of this thesis. This analysis is presented
in chapter 4. A summary of the results of this analysis is presented in section
4.3. This analysis has shown that:
• Most current approaches recognize the importance of the behavioral
aspects in dealing with the human factor in information security
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• Most current approaches acknowledge the need to foster an information
security culture in the organization
• Very few current approaches attempt to adjust the ”generic” model
used to define organizational culture to be specific to the needs of infor-
mation security
• Less than a quarter of current approaches uses a formal, pedagogical
approach to information security educational programs
• Only one current approach mentions the use of learning taxonomies
to improve the design of information security educational programs,
none provides guidance on how to use such a taxonomy for information
security education
• Less than a third of current approaches mentions the use of e-learning
and/or technological platforms to improve the delivery of information
security education
This analysis of current literature addressing the human factor in infor-
mation security has shown that current approaches, which focus on the fos-
tering of an organizational information security culture, rarely modify exist-
ing theory to be specific to the needs of information security. Furthermore,
current approaches towards educating organizational users regarding infor-
mation security are mostly not based on sound pedagogical principles. The
problem which this thesis will address can thus be summarized as follows:
Most current approaches towards dealing with the human factors in infor-
mation security do not have a sound theoretical basis.
1.4 Thesis Statement
Theory from the human and social sciences can be adapted and/or used to
address the human factors in information security.
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1.5 Delineation
The human factor in information security consists of two closely inter-related
dimensions, namely knowledge, and behavior. These dimensions are dis-
cussed in depth in section 3.4. The establishment of an organizational culture
of information security will address both of these dimensions. In order to es-
tablish such a culture organizational users should be educated and motivated.
This thesis will firstly focus on the overall concept of an information security
culture, and will secondly deal with the requisite information security edu-
cational programs to establish such a culture in depth. However, to address
the requisite motivational aspects in equal depth would require an in depth
knowledge of the underlying psychological factors that could play a role.
This thesis will not attempt to address these psychological factors in depth.
Instead, motivational aspects will be dealt with only in sufficient detail to
highlight their relative role(s) during the fostering of an information security
culture, and to highlight the closely inter-related nature of the dimensions of
the human factor in information security.
1.6 Research Questions
The primary research question this thesis will answer is:
How can existing theory be adapted and/or used to address the human
factors in information security?
In order to answer this primary research question, the following sub-
question will be answered:
1. How can the generic definition of organizational culture be adapted
to be specific to the needs of information security?
2. How can a learning taxonomy be used to plan the contents of an infor-
mation security educational program?
3. How should information security educational activities be delivered to
organizational learners?
4. How can the various theoretical and technical elements be integrated
into transformative change management processes in order to foster an
organizational information security culture?
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1.7 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how existing theory
can be modified and/or used when addressing the human factor in information
security.
In order to achieve this objective, the following secondary objectives have
been identified:
1. Adapt the generic model which defines organizational culture, as pre-
sented by Schein (1999a, pp. 15-16) to be specific to the needs of
information security.
2. Demonstrate how the use of a learning taxonomy can be used to add
pedagogical rigor to information security educational programs.
3. Demonstrate the suitability of e-learning as a delivery medium for or-
ganizational information security educational programs.
4. Provide a detailed overview demonstrating how the various elements
contributed by this thesis integrates into existing transformative change
management processes for the fostering of an organizational information
security culture.
1.8 Layout of the Thesis
This thesis has been laid out in accordance to the general guidelines provided
in (Hofstee, 2006, pp. 35-43). Figure 1.1 provides a graphical overview of
the thesis layout.
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Chapter 2
RESEARCH PROCESS AND
PHILOSOPHY
This chapter provides a high level overview of the research process followed
in this study. Philosophical considerations which influenced the choice of the
research paradigm and methodologies are briefly discussed.
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to describe the research process that was followed
during the work conducted in this thesis, and to provide insight into the
philosophical assumptions of the author in order to ensure the trustworthiness
of the results of the work. The chapter will not attempt to provide a treatise
on various research methodologies. As such the discussion of methodological
considerations will focus on material that provides insight into the underlying
factors that influenced the decisions that were made during the choice of
appropriate methodologies. The chosen research methodologies themselves
are briefly introduced in the specific chapters where each methodology is
used. For more detail the reader should refer to the relevant authors of
methodological texts referenced for each of the used methodologies.
In order to choose a suitable methodological approach for the work in this
thesis, the author conducted an extensive investigation into research meth-
ods used by other researchers in the field of information security. The author
examined publications over a three year period ranging from the beginning of
2006 to the end of 2008, in both the journal ”Computers & Security” and the
8
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH PROCESS AND PHILOSOPHY 9
”Proceedings of the IFIP TC 11 International Information Security Confer-
ence”. These two publication forums were chosen since, in the author’s opin-
ion, they represent the foremost research in the field of information security.
The methodology for this examination can be described as interpretive con-
tent analysis, as described in Krippendorff (2004, pp. 87-88). The analysis
was not exclusively empirically grounded, like some forms of content analy-
sis, but rather examined the literature with a specific goal in mind, namely
to determine the methodologies espoused by the published articles and pa-
pers. However, since this analysis was largely a process of systematic content
analysis of large bodies of text, it still has some clearly quantitative, hence
empirical, roots.
The analysis examined a total of 284 articles and papers. This included
all papers and articles over the three year period but excluded editorials. Of
the analyzed articles and papers 216 were found to be primarily positivist,
design orientated, or empirical based. The remaining 68, equal to 23.9% of
the total, were deemed to be interpretive and/or qualitative in nature.
Based on this analysis design science was chosen as an appropriate method-
ology for the development/adaptation of the generic model which defines
organizational culture, as presented by Schein (1999a, pp. 15-16) to be spe-
cific to the needs of information security (the first research objective of this
thesis). However, the remainder of the work in this thesis is primarily of
a qualitative nature. The research was primarily conducted in an induc-
tive way during which research questions were continuously evolved (refer
to section 2.6 for a discussion of this process) as increased understanding of
the subject matter/research needs were gained. Due to the interpretive na-
ture of qualitative work, it is important to ensure the trustworthiness of the
research by providing either guarantors of objectivity, or via reflexive meth-
ods (Easterby-Smith, Golden-Biddle, & Locke, 2008)(Meyrick, 2006)(Mays
& Pope, 2000).
This thesis used a continuous process of publication/presentation of re-
sults at relevant, peer-reviewed, subject specific conferences as its primary
guarantor. Research work was continuously updated and/or improved based
on feedback received from such peer-review. This process of verifying re-
search results via publication will continue for all sections of this thesis that
have not yet been published. A full outline of all publications that have thus
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far stemmed from the work in this thesis is presented in section 9.4 of chapter
9.
The rest of this chapter will briefly outline the philosophical assumptions
that led to the choice of a qualitative research paradigm. Secondly, considera-
tions which could influence the quality of such qualitative work will be briefly
examined, followed by an explicit overview of the researcher’s philosophical
and methodological choices. Finally an outline of the actual research process
according to which the work was conducted will be presented.
2.2 Research Philosophy and Paradigm
All research begins with philosophical assumptions. Even if the researcher
him/her self is unaware of these assumptions, they still exist. Every person
has a certain world view or philosophy and to a certain extent this world
view will influence his/her research. The choice of a research paradigm and
methodology will also be influenced by this philosophy. Figure 2.1 shows the
core ontological assumptions which might stem from a researcher’s primary
choice of philosophy.
Reality as a
concrete
structure
Reality as a
concrete
process
Reality as a
contextual
field of
information
Reality as a
realm of
symbolic
discource
Reality as a
social
construction
Reality as a
projection of
human
imagination
Positivist/
Quantitative
Phenomenologist/
QualitativeApproach to social sciences
Figure 2.1: Continuum of core ontological assumptions (adapted from (Collis
& Hussey, 2003, p. 51))
Researchers whose primary philosophy leans towards the quantitative side
of the continuum view reality as a concrete structure and believes that it is
possible to objectively measure this reality. This extreme of the philosophical
continuum has been widely used and accepted in the natural sciences. At
the other extreme, researchers leaning towards the qualitative side interpret
reality as a projection of human imagination. In such a qualitative world
view the subjective nature of the human doing the research is acknowledged
and this form of research tends to focus more on the interpretation of the
research than on the measurement of results (Collis & Hussey, 2003, p. 53).
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Even though it is widely accepted that qualitative research can help infor-
mation systems researchers to understand human thought and action in both
social and organizational context (Klein & Myers, 1999), researchers study-
ing such phenomena in an organizational context might still choose to not
use such methods if they clash with their own research philosophy.
The following five categories of philosophical assumptions can lead to
an individual’s choice to do qualitative work (Creswell, 2007, pp. 16-19),
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, pp. 11-23):
1. Ontological: The researcher believes in ”multiple realities”. In other
words, the researcher believes that even supposedly objective studies
are still influenced by the person doing these studies’ subjective inter-
pretation of the results. There can thus be more than one interpre-
tation of the same reality. Research subjects being interviewed might
also experience the same reality in different ways.
2. Epistemological: The researcher believes that getting as close as possi-
ble to the subjects being studied will result in a ”better” study.
3. Axiological: The researcher tries to make his/her ”values” explicit. In
other words, the researcher admits to being subjective, and tries to
”actively report their own values and biases as well as the value-laden
nature of the information gathered from the field” (Creswell, 2007, p.
18).
4. Rhetorical: Qualitative researchers tend to write in a more personal and
literary form. They might employ terms such as ”credibility” instead
of ”objectivity”. The language used in the study is often based on
definitions that evolved during the study, as opposed to definitions the
researcher him/her self brought to the study.
5. Methodological: Qualitative researchers use inductive logic, as opposed
to the deductive logic used by quantitative researchers. They usually
study the topic within its context, and continually revise questions
based on experience gained.
The above philosophical assumptions might lead to a researcher doing
qualitative work. As mentioned earlier many research works make no clear
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH PROCESS AND PHILOSOPHY 12
distinction between ”qualitative” and ”interpretive” work (Klein & Myers,
1999). However, these terms are not synonymous; qualitative work may
or may not be interpretive and will generally fall into one, or more, of
the following four main research paradigms (Creswell, 2007, pp. 19-23)
1. Postpositivism - This is mainly a scientific approach and the researcher
will likely view inquiry as a series of logically related steps. This re-
search usually espouses rigorous methods of data collection and analy-
sis. Postpositivst approaches strongly resemble quantitative approaches.
2. Constructivism (Interpretivism) - In this form of research, subjec-
tive meanings are formed through interaction with others. ”Rather
than starting with a theory (as in postpositivism) inquirers generate or
inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning” (Creswell, 2007,
p. 21). These researchers often address processes of interaction among
individuals. The findings of these researchers are ”shaped” by their
own interpretations.
3. Advocacy/Participatory - This type of research contains an action
agenda that might change the lives of participants. Action research
as a methodology is probably the best known example of work in this
paradigm.
4. Pragmatism - Pragmatism focuses on the outcomes of the research
more than the antecedent conditions. In other words, in pragmatism
the application(s) of the research is more important than focusing on
rigorous methods. In practice, the researcher will often employ multiple
methods to best answer the research question (Creswell, 2007, p. 23).
From the above paradigms and philosophies it should also be clear that
qualitative methods are not always easy to classify. However, it should be
clear that ”the criterion of confirmation through data should be played down
relative to what books on method normally suggest, and conceptions of the
nature of empirical material should be changed as compared to traditional
epistemology” (Alvesson & Sko¨ldberg, 2000, pp. 275-276). That does not
imply that empirical material is unimportant. But it should be consigned
a considerably less clear-cut and robust character. Empirical data is still
”an expression on negotiable, perspective-dependent interpretations” and is
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conveyed in an ambiguous language. ”Empirical material should be seen as
an argument in efforts to make a case for a particular way of understanding
social reality...” (Alvesson & Sko¨ldberg, 2000, pp. 275-276).
The above philosophies and paradigms can lead to many distinct ap-
proaches towards qualitative studies. Some of these methodologies have
strong empirical grounding, e.g. postpositivist, while others might be more
interpretive. It is even possible for one methodology to borrow from more
than just one of the qualitative paradigms. This wide array of choices avail-
able to qualitative researchers not only makes it difficult for the researcher
him/her self to choose a specific philosophy, ontological stance and method-
ology, but also makes it very difficult for future researchers who want to build
on such a researcher’s work to judge the compatibility of published work with
their own philosophies and methods.
To fully evaluate the applicability of another researcher’s work to his/her
own work, a researcher must be able to understand the philosophical choices
made by that prior researcher. This is especially true in qualitative work,
which is inherently biased. Without insight into the prior researcher’s possi-
ble biases a future researcher might be unable to ascertain the applicability
of the prior work as a basis to his/her own work.
2.3 The Researcher’s Dilemma
All researchers are to varying degrees dependent on the work done by other
researchers before them. Sir Isaac Newton, one of the foremost scientists of
the last few centuries, is often quoted as having said: ”If I have seen further it
is only by standing on the shoulders of giants”. This is true of most research.
A researcher’s work is often judged by the credibility of his/her argument,
which is based on a specific philosophical stance and which is supported by
the arguments of earlier researchers (included as citations in his/her work).
Even the best research results might be discredited if they were based on
prior research of doubtful integrity, or if they were based on prior work from
an incompatible philosophical stance. Learning how to judge the credibility
of sources is one of the first skills a new researcher has to master.
When faced with a publication that could potentially support his/her
own work, a researcher has to ask him/her self two basic questions in order
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to judge the ”value” of the work for his/her own research,
1. ”Can I trust the integrity of this research?”
2. ”Can this research be integrated with, or used in support of, my own
research?”
To a certain extent it has become the norm to answer the first of the
above questions based on the reputation of the forum on which the research
was published. Obviously, the forum of publication is not the only important
factor when answering this question, but it is one of the most useful overall
indicators. Usually the integrity of any work published in a credible and
peer-reviewed journal can be viewed as trustworthy. Similarly the integrity of
work referenced from a forum like Wikipedia is often distrusted. Thus, even
though the actual information provided about a specific topic on Wikipedia
might in fact be correct, a credible researcher would still avoid using it as a
primary reference because the integrity of the forum in general is distrusted.
Answering the second question can be more difficult and requires a lot
of insight into the research work’s underlying philosophical, ontological and
methodological assumptions. It is especially important to ascertain whether
the methodologies used in the different studies are compatible. According
to Mason (1996, pp. 34-36) the following factors should be considered when
determining the compatibility of different methods:
1. Technical integration: Are the units of analysis used in the research
similar or complimentary? In other words, will you be ”comparing
apples with apples”?
2. Ontological integration: Are the works based on ”similar, complemen-
tary or comparable assumptions about the nature of social entities and
phenomena?” (Mason, 1996, p. 35).
3. Integration at the level of knowledge and evidence: Do the differ-
ent methods or forms of data stem from the same epistemologies?
”Are they based on similar, complementary or comparable assump-
tions about what can legitimately constitute knowledge or evidence?”
(Mason, 1996, pp. 35-36).
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4. Integration at the level of explanation: Integration at this level also
depends on the epistemologies but focuses on the ways in which theories
are constructed or the ways in which results can be generalized. Can
the ”different data sources and methods usefully contribute to some
kind of coherent and convincing argument...?” (Mason, 1996, p. 36).
According to (Collingridge & Gantt, 2008) ”qualitative studies that do
not follow a coherent qualitative framework and are poorly executed
lack generalizable results”.
It might be tempting to disregard, or under-estimate, the seriousness of
such concerns regarding the compatibilities of various methods. However,
researchers whose own philosophical stances lie at one of the extremes of the
continuum shown in Figure 2.1 often question the validity of the work of
researchers operating at the opposite extreme. Such concerns regarding the
validity of work done by researchers with a different philosophical or onto-
logical stance are not restricted to researchers at one of the extremes of the
continuum only. All researchers have to be able to make critical judgements
regarding the validity of work done by other researchers. Because quanti-
tative and positivistic work have a long standing tradition of adhering to
the ”scientific method” and are less prone to interpretive biases of the re-
searcher, this is less of a problem at the quantitative end of the continuum.
Certain fields of study, especially those where most researchers adhere to
the same, clearly established, methodological traditions, might also be less
prone to the effects of such compatibility concerns. However, in information
security this is not the case. Information security researchers often use meth-
ods varying from the quantitative/positivistic side of the continuum all the
way through to the qualitative/phenomenological side. It is therefor vital
that researchers in information security not only accurately assess the gen-
eral validity of research sources, but also pay specific attention to questions
regarding methodological compatibility. As argued earlier, this is especially
true when dealing with qualitative work. Many studies have addressed the
general issues researchers face to assess the validity of qualitative work .
These issues will be briefly examined.
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2.4 Assessing the Validity/Quality of
Qualitative Research
Many authors have focused on issues regarding the assessment of research
quality, or validity, in qualitative research. This section will provide a very
brief overview of this issue. Meyrick (2006) provides a step-by-step framework
to enable readers to make a ”value judgement about rigour and quality” for
qualitative research. The following steps are listed (Meyrick, 2006):
• Researcher epistemological and theoretical stance. ”Good qual-
ity research ensures that the epistemological and theoretical stance of
the researcher is stated clearly in the study” (Meyrick, 2006)(Amis
& Silk, 2008). The distance between the researcher(s) and the sub-
ject(s) need to be clearly established via either guarantors of objectivity,
or reflexive methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008)(Meyrick, 2006)(Mays
& Pope, 2000).
• Methods. The research objectives and the methods used to reach
these objectives should be stated clearly in order to enable the reader
to ”make judgements on the appropriate selection of methodology and
whether they meet the criteria” (Meyrick, 2006). The reader should be
able to answer the question ”would a different method have been more
appropriate?” (Mays & Pope, 2000). According to Collingridge and
Gantt (2008) the entire concept of reliability in qualitative research
revolves around the adoption of ”research methods that are accepted by
the research community as legitimate ways of collecting and analyzing
data” (Collingridge & Gantt, 2008).
• Sampling. The rationale and theory behind sampling techniques used
should be clearly established (Meyrick, 2006). It is also important, if
appropriate, to demonstrate that efforts were made to obtain contra-
dictory data (Mays & Pope, 2000). Sampling should also be done in a
fashion that ensures results can be generalized (Collingridge & Gantt,
2008).
• Data Collection. How data was collected should be described with
sufficient transparency for the reader to ”judge if the methods used
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and decisions made during data collection were reasonable” (Meyrick,
2006). A future researcher should be able to repeat the same data
collection process (Mays & Pope, 2000).
• Analysis. It is important to provide sufficient insight into the route
that was followed from the data to the conclusions (Meyrick, 2006).
The exact ”route” might vary from study to study but the reader should
have sufficient information to ”follow the process and judge how fair,
reasonable or regular the process or steps taken were” (Meyrick, 2006).
• Results and Conclusions. In order to reinforce the link between the
data and the conclusions, insight should be provided on exactly how
the data shaped the conclusions (Meyrick, 2006).
To a certain extent, the utility of most research depends on how general-
izable the research results are. According to Collingridge and Gantt (2008)
”qualitative studies that do not follow a coherent qualitative framework and
are poorly executed lack generalizable results”. In order to be generalizable,
qualitative studies should ”build on existing theoretical concepts through
comprehensive literature reviews, employ theory-based sampling procedures,
follow well-defined data analysis procedures, clearly define how the findings
apply to other contexts, and integrate results into existing research in a co-
herent fashion” (Collingridge & Gantt, 2008). In light of the above listed
step-by-step framework for ascertaining the quality, or validity, of qualita-
tive research it should be clear that a reader of qualitative research will be
unable to judge whether or not a coherent qualitative framework was fol-
lowed, if the researcher’s epistemological and theoretical stance, as well as
the research methods, have not been explicitly espoused. One possible guide-
line for researchers who wish to publish work based on qualitative research
methods is to describe their research approach with the help of a construct
like the ”research onion” presented by Saunders et al. (2007)
2.5 The Research Onion
Saunders et al. (2007) provide a layered approach towards explaining research
choices known as the ”research onion”. This is a popular way (and perhaps
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one of the easiest) to understand, and present, the plethora of choices a
researcher has to make. Figure 2.2 depicts this research onion.
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Figure 2.2: Research Onion. Adapted from (Saunders et al., 2007)
When using the research onion the research would start at the outer layers
and proceed inwards in the espousing of their research choices. At the first
layer lies the philosophical stance of the researcher. To a certain extent,
the choice of philosophy will determine whether the researcher’s work will
be primarily deductive (in which a theory and hypothesis is developed), or
inductive (in which data is collected and a theory developed as a result of the
data analysis). This choice will in turn lead to the choice of research strategy
which could include case studies, action research, surveys, etc. Research
strategy choices lead to an overall research approach, including mono method,
multi-method, or mixed method approaches. The research approach helps to
determine the time horizons of the research (longitudinal or cross-sectional),
which in turn leads to specific techniques and procedures (including focus
group research, interviewing, questionnaires, etc). It is not the author’s
intention to recommend the use of the research onion as the solution to the
discussed problem of determining the quality/validity of qualitative work.
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The use of a construct similar to this research onion, as a form of checklist,
could ensure that the necessary information is available to allow the reader
to make an informed judgement of the validity and/or applicability of the
research to his/her own research needs. Such a list does not necessarily have
to include all aspects outlined by the research onion. Instead it should
only list all aspects which are applicable to the specific study. The
following list serves to espouse the philosophical choices made for this thesis,
in terms of the general framework provided by the research onion:
• Philosophy: The work in this thesis was conducted based on a prag-
matic philosophy. The author does not prescribe to either a strict
positivist, or a strict interpretive viewpoint. Instead, the author be-
lieves that methods should be chosen based on their suitability for the
specific task at hand.
• Choices: The work in this thesis is primarily of an inductive nature.
Research questions were continuously evolved as increased understand-
ing of the subject matter/research needs were gained. The process of
this ”evolution” is discussed in the next section.
• Strategies: Design science was selected as the primary research strat-
egy. The guidelines for this research strategy, as presented by Hevner,
March, Park, and Ram (2004), are discussed in more depth in chap-
ter 5. This strategy was extensively supported by evidential and
narrative argumentation.
• Approaches: A triangulated approach was used. Various methods,
techniques and procedures were used to establish the validity of results.
• Techniques and Procedures: The research methods, techniques, and
procedures used for specific elements of this study are espoused in the
specific chapters to which those methods, techniques and procedures
apply.
As mentioned earlier, the primary method of verification of results used
for the work in this thesis was a process of extensive peer-review and
publication (this also meets guideline 7 for design science as specified by
Hevner et al. (2004) and discussed in section 5.2). The following section will
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briefly describe the research process that was followed during this study in a
narrative manner.
2.6 Research Process
The work in this thesis was preceded by a Master’s degree dissertation in the
field of information security education. Initially the author focused on the
possible role(s) that e-learning, and specifically adaptive technologies, could
play in information security education. This initial work led to the publica-
tion of Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2006a) at the E-learn 2006 conference.
Feedback stemming from this initial work, and extensive additional literature
work, led the author to belief that the use of e-learning on its own would not
solve the problems associated with the human factor in information security.
Education on its own cannot address all behavioral aspects related to this
human factor. Instead, the focus of attempts to address this human factor
should be on the fostering of an organizational information security culture.
The need for an adaptation of the existing generic model defining orga-
nizational culture, in order to make it more suited to the specific needs of
information security, was determined. This led to an initial version of the
conceptual model presented in chapter 5. This initial version was published
as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2006b). During the next three years this
initial version of the conceptual model defining information security culture
was subjected to several cycles of peer-review and eventually refined into the
final version presented in chapter 5. This conceptual model is seen as one of
the primary research contributions of this thesis and has been published in
the journal ”Computers & Security” as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010).
The education of employees regarding their information security related
roles and responsibilities plays a major role in the fostering of an organiza-
tional information security culture. Due to the importance of information
security educational programs for the fostering of such a culture, these edu-
cational programs have to be dealt with as an integral part of the fostering
of such a culture. Concurrent to the further development of the concep-
tual model, the work in this thesis therefor focused on the underlying educa-
tional programs. An extensive investigation into current information security
awareness, training, and educational approaches was conducted and a need
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for more pedagogical rigor in current approaches was identified. Extensive
examination of pedagogical theory identified the important role learning tax-
onomies could play in information security education. This work was pub-
lished at the Information Security South Africa conference as Van Niekerk
and Von Solms (2008). After extensive peer-review and feedback, a sec-
ond paper focusing more on the actual use of the taxonomy in information
security was published at the World Information Security Education confer-
ence as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2009).
Finally, the above elements were integrated into existing and transforma-
tive change management process to show how these elements could form part
of a holistic approach towards the fostering of an organizational information
security culture. Further publication of work in this thesis is ongoing.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the philosophical assumptions which influenced the
work in this thesis. A discussion of the nature of qualitative research was pre-
sented with the specific purpose of demonstrating how the author of this the-
sis ensured research rigor in the work in this thesis. Finally, a brief overview
of the research process that was followed during the work in this thesis was
presented. The work in this thesis is based on a pragmatic and inductive
approach towards design formulation through qualitative methods, which is
supported by peer-review and publication as its primary verification methods.
The next chapter will provide a broad overview of the field of information
security in general, in order to highlight the importance of the specific area
on which the work in this thesis focuses.
Chapter 3
INFORMATION SECURITY
This chapter discusses information security in general. It defines information
security and discusses the different elements and services required for effective
information security. It will then examine the process of information security
with specific emphasis on the role humans play in this process. The purpose
of this chapter is to provide additional background information in order to
establish the overall context of the primary literature study in the following
chapter. The chapter also aims to further clarify the need to address the
human factors in information security.
3.1 Introduction
Humans today live in an emerging global information society. This society
has a global economy that is increasingly dependent on the creation, man-
agement, and distribution of information resources (O’Brien, 1999, p. 11).
Information and its use permeate all aspects of modern society. Today, most
organizations need information systems to survive and prosper (Laudon &
Laudon, 2002, p. 4). Information has become such a valuable commodity
in modern society that a large part of the workforce in many nations con-
sists of knowledge workers (O’Brien, 1999, p. 11). These knowledge workers
spend most of their time communicating and collaborating in teams and work
groups creating, using, and distributing information (O’Brien, 1999, p. 11).
Today information can be seen as a basic commodity, similar to electricity,
without which many businesses simply cannot operate (Carr, 2003). In the
interconnected world we live in, information is a lot more vulnerable than
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many other basic commodities. It is highly unlikely that the actions of a
discontent teenager on another continent can affect a company’s electricity
supply. The same cannot necessarily be said about the supply of information
resources. It is vital for organizations to ensure their continued access to this
commodity by protecting their information assets. Many of these information
assets reside in information systems.
Information is typically stored on computers in systems known as infor-
mation systems. An information system (IS) is an organized combination
of people, hardware, software, communications networks, processes and data
resources that collect, transform, and disseminate information in an organi-
zation (O’Brien, 1999, p. 9),(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p. 14). The advent
of information technology has had a profound impact on modern society. It
affects all aspects of today’s businesses from top management right down
to operational level. In order to stay competitive in this information age,
organizations typically make large investments in terms of time, money and
energy to streamline the processes of capturing, generating and distributing
vital information resources throughout the organization. Unfortunately, this
distribution of mission-critical information throughout the company also in-
creases the likelihood of misuse or damage to information resources (Haag et
al., 2000). Such misuse or damage could have devastating effects on an orga-
nization’s overall wellbeing. In order to avoid loss or damage to this valuable
resource, companies need to be serious about protecting their information.
The technologies and processes used to provide this protection of information
resources is collectively known as information security.
3.2 Information Security Defined
The aim of information security is to ensure business continuity and mini-
mize business damage by preventing and minimizing the impact of security
incidents (Von Solms, 1998). Information security can be defined in more
than one way, as highlighted below.
3.2.1 Information Security
The international standard ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) defines information security
as the preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
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information (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 1). Information, in the context of the
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) standard, can take on many forms. It can be printed
or written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted by post or electronic
means, shown on films, spoken in conversation, etc. (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005,
p. 1).
Whitman and Mattord (2009) define information security as ”the pro-
tection of information and its critical elements, including the systems and
hardware that use, store, and transmit that information” (Whitman & Mat-
tord, 2009, p. 8). Whitman and Mattord (2009) also identify several critical
characteristics of information that give it value in organizations. The identi-
fied characteristics include the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of information, as mentioned in the definition provided in ISO/IEC 27002
(2005), but are not restricted to only these three characteristics. Accord-
ing to Whitman and Mattord (2009, p. 8) ensuring the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information, which is also known as the CIA
triangle in information security, has traditionally been the industry standard.
”The security of these three characteristics of information is as important to-
day as it has always been, but the CIA triangle model no longer adequately
addresses the constantly changing environment of the computer industry”
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p. 8). Whitman adds the characteristics of ac-
curacy, authenticity, utility, and possession to the list of characteristics
of information that needs to be protected.
A few concepts in the above definitions need closer examination. Firstly,
it should be clear that information security is not a product or a technology.
Information security is a process (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 4). This
process might require the use of certain products, but it is not something
that can be bought off the shelf.
The second important factor to note about the above definitions is that
information security is commonly defined in terms of the properties, or char-
acteristics that secure information should have. These usually include the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, but sometimes also
include additional characteristics.
It is also important to note that there is a difference between information
security and information technology security.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION SECURITY 25
3.2.2 Information and Communication
Technology Security
Information and communication technology security deals with the protec-
tion of the actual information technology based systems on which infor-
mation is commonly stored and/or transmitted. The international standard
ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004) defines information and communication technol-
ogy security, or ICT security, as all aspects relating to defining, achieving and
maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information resources
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 3). Since information security also includes
the protection of the underlying information resources, it can be argued that
information technology security is a sub-component of information security.
The definition of information technology security is thus very similar to the
one for information security. However, additional characteristics, which in
this context could also be better described as services that should be pro-
vided by secure information resources, are added to the definition. These
include non-repudiation, accountability, authenticity, and reliability.
Dhillon (2007, p. 19) also refers to the concept of data security to refer to
the protection of the actual data in an information system. Since the given
definition in Dhillon (2007, p. 19) includes most of the characteristics from
the definition for information technology security, and because the security
of underlying data is to a large extent reliant on the overall security of the
information system on which the data resides, it can be argued that the
term data security was in fact used in Dhillon (2007) to refer to the same
concept which ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004) calls information and communi-
cation technology security.
From the definitions discussed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 it should be
clear that there is a difference between secure information resources and se-
cure information technology resources. A secure information resource could
include any entity from which information was received or to which infor-
mation was sent. A secure information technology resource is a secure infor-
mation resource that happens to reside on an information technology system.
It is also important to note that, in terms of information technology based
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systems, the information alone cannot be deemed secure unless all resources,
and processes, dealing with that information, are secure as well. Although
the work in this thesis is conducted within the School of Information and
Communication Technology at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University,
the term information security, as used in this thesis, does not refer only to the
security of information technology resources. Instead, the term information
security, as used in this thesis, is meant to deal with the all encompassing
field of information security which covers both information technology based,
as well as non-technological, information resources.
All the definitions discussed thus far in this chapter define secure infor-
mation in terms of its underlying characteristics. As mentioned earlier,
the first three characteristics, confidentiality, integrity and availability, are
commonly known as the CIA triangle and has been considered the indus-
try standard for computer security since the development of the mainframe
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p. 8). The additional characteristics were added
to the definition to address the additional security needs of organizations in
today’s inter-networked business environment. A clear understanding of the
meaning of all the above mentioned characteristics (and/or services) is essen-
tial to an understanding of information-, and information technology security,
and consequently the following sub-sections will briefly discuss each of these
characteristics individually.
3.2.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is defined by both ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004) and ISO/IEC
27002 (2005) as the property that information is not made available or dis-
closed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes (ISO/IEC 27002,
2005, p. 1)(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 2). Confidentiality is about
ensuring that only those who have the rights and privileges to access a par-
ticular set of information are able to do so, and that those who are not
authorized are prevented from accessing the information (Whitman & Mat-
tord, 2009, pp. 10-11). Confidentiality deals with privacy, or the ”for your
eyes only” property of information. Confidentiality should apply equally to
information residing in a system, or during the transmission of data between
systems (Dhillon, 2007, p. 19). If a person, entity, or process, gains access to
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information that he/she/it is not authorized to access, the confidentiality of
that information has been compromised. It is important to realize that, due
to modern encryption techniques, gaining unauthorized possession of infor-
mation does not necessarily breach the confidentiality of the information
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p. 13).
3.2.4 Integrity
Both ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004) and ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) define in-
tegrity as the property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets
(ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 1)(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 3). Another
definition would be that the integrity of information is the quality or state
of being whole, complete, and uncorrupted (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p.
12). According to Dhillon (2007, p. 20) ”integrity refers to an unimpaired
condition, a state of completeness and wholeness, and adherence to a code of
values”. If information has integrity, it means that the user(s) can ascertain
that this information is in its original state and has not been altered (Laudon
& Laudon, 2002, p. 447). All data is present and accounted for, irrespective
of whether or not the original data was accurate or correct (Dhillon, 2007,
p. 20). The integrity of information is threatened when the information is
exposed to corruption, damage, destruction, or other disruption of its au-
thentic/original state. Many computer viruses and worms have been created
with the specific purpose of corrupting data. Loss of integrity could also
result from internal sources, such as data transmission errors (Whitman &
Mattord, 2009, p. 12).
3.2.5 Availability
Availability, the third part of the CIA triangle, is defined in ISO/IEC TR
13335-1 (2004) and ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) as the property of being accessible
and usable upon demand by an authorized entity (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000, p.
3, Section 2.1),(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 2). Availability enables users
who need to access information to do so without interference or obstruction,
and to receive it in the required format (Whitman & Mattord, 2009, pp.
9-10). However, availability, as defined above by the two international stan-
dards, does not imply that the information should be accessible to any user
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(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, pp. 9-10). It requires that the user be verified as
an authorized entity. Thus, provided the user is allowed to access the infor-
mation, availability implies that the information should be available when
and where needed, and that it should be in the correct format (Whitman
& Mattord, 2009, pp. 9-10). Loss of availability could result from several
factors. For example, a power failure could cause network downtime, which
in return would cause information to be unavailable. Denial of Services at-
tacks, a type of malicious attack usually aimed at an organization’s Internet
services, are directly aimed at compromising the availability of information.
To a certain extent it can be argued that availability of information in an
information system is dependent on the reliability of the information system
itself (Dhillon, 2007, p. 21).
3.2.6 Non-repudiation
With the advent of e-commerce, and the increasing use of information tech-
nology as a tool for business communications, it became necessary to add
non-repudiation to the definition of secure information. Non-repudiation is
the ability to prove that an action or event has taken place, so that this
event or action cannot be repudiated later (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004,
p. 3). Thus, non-repudiation should be seen as a service provided by an
information source, rather than a property of the information itself. Non-
repudiation is vital if the information in question is to be used as evidence in
a court of law. Usually, non-repudiation is achieved through cryptographic
means (Dhillon, 2007, p. 22). The South African standard SABS ARP 057
(2002) defines the following sub-categories of non-repudiation services (SABS
ARP 057, 2002, p. 28):
• Non-repudiation of delivery token (NRD token): A data item, which al-
lows the originator of a piece of information to establish non-repudiation
of delivery for a message. Thus, a token issued to the sender of infor-
mation, which proves that the information was received by the intended
recipient.
• Non-repudiation of origin token (NRO token): A data item, which al-
lows recipients to establish non-repudiation of the origin for a message.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION SECURITY 29
Thus, a token issued to the receiver of information, which proves that
the sender of the information is who he/she/it claims to be.
• Non-repudiation of submission token (NRS token): A data item, which
allows either the originator or the delivery authority to establish non-
repudiation for a message (information) having been submitted for
transmission. Thus, a token issued to both the sender of information
and the entity responsible for delivering the information, which proves
this information was ”handed over” to the entity responsible for deliv-
ery, by the sender.
• Non-repudiation of transport token (NRT token): A data item, which
allows either originator, or the delivery authority, to establish non-
repudiation of the transport for a message. Thus, a token issued to
both the sender of information and the entity responsible for delivering
the information, which proves this information was transported by the
entity responsible for its delivery to its intended destination.
Non-repudiation services are especially important in an electronic-commerce
context. For example; if an email is to be used to negotiate a legally binding
contract, the following tokens would be needed during the process of send-
ing and receiving such an email. Firstly, the sender of the message would
receive an NRS token, which proves that the message has been submitted for
delivery. The delivery authority would receive a similar token, which proves
the identity of the sender for this message. Once the message arrives at its
destination the sender would receive an NRT token. This proves to both
the sender and the delivery authority that the message has arrived at its
destination. When the recipient now receives this message from the delivery
authority, the recipient is issued with an NRO token, which proves the iden-
tity of the sender of this message. At the same time, the sender is issued
with an NRD token, which proves that the recipient has indeed received the
message. Clearly, in e-commerce, these non-repudiation services play an inte-
gral role in establishing trust between parties who have never met in person.
Furthermore, non-repudiation services are dependent on the confidentiality
(privacy), where applicable, of the underlying non-repudiation tokens. Thus,
in a digital signature scheme, the use of a private key relies on the owner of
that key maintaining the privacy of the key (Dhillon, 2007, pp. 22-23).
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3.2.7 Accountability
Accountability as a property of a secure information resource goes hand
in hand with the property of non-repudiation. The ISO/IEC TR 13335-1
(2004) defines accountability as a property that ensures that the actions of
an entity may be traced uniquely to the entity (SABS ARP 057, 2002, p. 1).
Without the ability, for example, to trace the actions of a person uniquely
to that person, it would not be possible to hold such a person accountable
for his/her actions. Accountability in this sense should not be confused
with accountability for information security. Accountability for information
security deals with the role(s) individuals play in the information security
process and will be discussed in more detail in a later section.
3.2.8 Authenticity
The authenticity of an information resource is a property that is closely linked
to the integrity of the information itself. The ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004)
defines authenticity as a property that ensures that the identity of a subject
or resource is the one claimed. Authenticity applies to entities, such as,
users, processes, systems and information (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p.
2). The authenticity of information depends on the ability to authenticate
the information. Authentication is the ability of each party in a transaction
to ascertain the identity of the other party (Laudon & Laudon, 2002, p.
447). If a user or entity is fooled into believing the wrong information is
the right information, for example mistaking a spoof-site on the Internet for
the real site it is mimicking, the authenticity of the information resource
has been compromised and the integrity of the information itself would thus
be lost. Clearly, non-repudiation services would also depend on the ability
to authenticate all entities involved in a transaction. During an ongoing
information exchange between two parties authentication would take place
at two levels. Firstly, to determine that both entities are who they claim to
be, and secondly to ensure that no third party starts to masquerade as one
of the parties during the exchange (Dhillon, 2007, p. 21).
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3.2.9 Reliability
Reliability is defined in the ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004) standard as the prop-
erty of consistent intended behavior and results (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004,
p. 4). This property basically means that an information resource should
be consistent (predictable), in terms of both its integrity and availability.
It also means that the results to a particular query against the information
should be consistent. In other words, if the same question is asked, with the
same parameters given, the answer returned should be the same, otherwise
the reliability of the information is questionable.
3.2.10 Accuracy, Utility, and Possession
The remaining three characteristics of secure information were identified by
Whitman and Mattord (2009). It might be argued that these characteristics
will automatically be ensured if all characteristics identified by the standards,
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) and ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004), have been ensured.
However, since the purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive
overview of the concept of information security, and insight into these char-
acteristics might improve the overall understanding of information security,
these characteristics will be briefly examined. Firstly, Whitman and Mat-
tord (2009, p. 10) defines accuracy as how correct (free of mistakes) the
information is. If information is modified, whether intentionally or uninten-
tionally, it might no longer be accurate. Inaccurate information is of less use
to the user than accurate information. Secondly, the utility of information is
a characteristic that deals with it having some value or purpose (Whitman
& Mattord, 2009, p. 12). Information does not only have to be available,
it often also has to be in a specific format in order to be useful. The fi-
nal characteristic of secure information identified by Whitman and Mattord
(2009) is possession. The possession of information deals with the state of
ownership, or control, one has over the information (Whitman & Mattord,
2009, p. 21). As mentioned earlier, the confidentiality of information is not
necessarily breached when possession is compromised.
Without the confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of information resources,
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information cannot be deemed secure. All of the above (also including the
accuracy, utility, and possession of information) play an integral role in infor-
mation security, and should be deemed equally important. It is, however,
possible for one or more of these characteristics or services to seem to be
more applicable in specific scenarios than the other characteristics. This
applicability would depend on the nature of the information itself. For ex-
ample, the integrity of inflationary statistics is of obvious importance for
economists, whilst the confidentiality of the same data appears to be unim-
portant. Everyone would probably be allowed to have access to such infor-
mation, thus the confidentiality seems to be unimportant. However, by defi-
nition, a breach of confidentiality would only occur if an unauthorized entity
obtained the information. Since everyone would be an authorized user of in-
flationary statistics, in this case, the confidentiality of the information would
actually be maintained.
In an organizational context, ensuring the security of the organization’s
information is thus not a case of deciding which characteristics or services
are applicable, but rather a case of defining the authorized entities, and other
parameters for any given piece of information correctly. In order to define
these parameters, a structured process is required. Without such a structured
process, important parameters might easily be overlooked.
3.3 Information Security - The Process
The ultimate aim of the information security process is the protection of
all information assets. These assets could have vulnerabilities to both
internal- and external threats. The information security process attempts
to reduce the risk posed by such vulnerabilities through the selection, im-
plementation and maintenance of security controls. These controls serve to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level. A control can be defined as ”the use
of interventions by a controller to promote a preferred behavior of a system
being controlled” (Dhillon, 2007, p. 5). In other words, through the use of
controls an organization can intervene and thereby reduce the risk posed by
a certain threat to one or more of its information assets. Various risk man-
agement approaches exist to guide the selection of a specific set of controls to
protect the information assets of an organization. An in-depth examination
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION SECURITY 33
of these processes falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, when se-
lecting the security controls to implement in an organization, it is important
to refer to accepted international standards (Von Solms, 1999). The set of
information security controls used by an organization will be contained in
an information security policy. Such a policy can be supported by a hier-
archical system of sub-policies and procedures outlining various lower-level
controls. Basing the organizational information security policy on interna-
tionally accepted standards is especially important for organizations wanting
to prove to their trading partners that their information resources are safe
(Von Solms, 1999). Several internationally accepted standards and codes of
practice exist to assist organizations in the implementation and management
of an organizational information security strategy. Some of the better known
examples would include the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) and the ISO/IEC TR
13335-1 (2004). These standards and codes of practice provide organizations
with guidelines specifying how the problem of managing information security
should be approached (Von Solms, 1999).
The controls listed in these information security standards can generally
be sub-divided into three categories: Physical controls, Technical controls
and Operational controls, the last of which collectively includes business con-
trols, administrative controls, managerial controls, and procedural controls
(M. Thomson, 1998, p. 29) (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004). An under-
standing of the interrelationships between these three categories of controls
is needed in order to understand the role(s) humans play in the information
security process. Each of these categories will thus be briefly examined.
3.3.1 Physical Controls
Physical controls deal with the physical aspects of security, for example; a
physical control would be the lock on the door of an office containing sensi-
tive documents. Physical controls constitute the oldest form of information
security. It began in the early days of computing, almost immediately after
the first mainframes were developed and put to use. In those days the pri-
mary threats to security were physical theft of equipment, espionage against
the products of the systems, and sabotage (Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p.
4).
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION SECURITY 34
3.3.2 Technical Controls
With the introduction of computer networks, databases, shared memory, etc,
physical controls alone were no longer deemed sufficient protection (Whitman
& Mattord, 2009, p. 6). Security was needed to protect not only the physical
location of the computer or information resource, but also the integrity of the
data (Whitman & Mattord, 2009, p. 7). This protection was implemented in
the form of technical controls. Technical controls are controls of a technical
nature, usually software based, for example; forcing a user to authenticate
with a unique username and password before allowing the user to access the
operating system would be a technical control. According to B. Von Solms
(2000) these controls constituted the ”first wave” of information security.
This first wave, primarily mainframe based, approached information security
as something which can be addressed by using the ”built-in” facilities of
the mainframe operating systems - facilities like access control lists, user-
IDs and passwords (B. Von Solms, 2000). At this stage, aspects like infor-
mation security policies, information security awareness of users etc., were
not deemed important (B. Von Solms, 2000). However, even at this early
stage, the technical professionals responsible for implementing information
security, started to realize that management would have to get involved at
some time (B. Von Solms, 2000). This management involvement eventu-
ally came, with the advent of distributed computing, in the form of infor-
mation security policies (B. Von Solms, 2000). Information security policies
were introduced because technical controls alone could not provide sufficient
security. It became necessary for people to take responsibility for security.
Those responsibilities were outlined in policies, which form part of the third
category of controls, namely, operational controls.
3.3.3 Operational Controls
Operational controls (also referred to as; business-, administrative-, managerial-
, and/or procedural controls) consist of all controls that deal with human
behavior. These controls would include those that deal with the creation
of information security policies and procedures, and administration of other
controls. Both physical and technical controls, even though they do not
deal directly with operational issues, usually require some form of human
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involvement. In an organizational context, these controls would thus have
to be supported by procedures outlining the employee’s involvement in the
use of these controls. The introduction of operational controls, in the form
of security policies and procedures, hence operational controls, heralded the
start of the second wave in information security (B. Von Solms, 2000).
This wave is characterized by management involvement in information
security, and generally improved information security (B. Von Solms, 2000).
The above-mentioned three categories of controls, together with the infor-
mation security policy, form the basis upon which the process of information
security is built. In this process the security policy, and possible sub-policies,
outline a set of controls that should be implemented in order to secure the
organization’s information. These controls are in turn supported by opera-
tional procedures, which ensure the effective deployment of the controls, as
outlined in the policy. Conceptually, these procedures can be seen as further
operational controls.
The interaction between the three broad categories of controls, as well
as the dependence on human involvement during this process, is of vital
importance for the purposes of this thesis and will thus be examined in more
detail.
3.4 Information Security - The
”Human Factor”
As mentioned above, both physical and technical controls, even though they
do not deal directly with operational issues, usually require some form of
human involvement. This means that these controls have to be supported by
procedures outlining the employee’s involvement in the use of these controls.
Employees, whether intentionally or through negligence, often due to a lack of
knowledge, are the greatest threat to information security (Mitnick & Simon,
2002, p. 3). Operational controls rely on human behavior. Both physical
and technical controls, in turn, rely to some extent on operational controls
for effectiveness. It should thus be clear that humans play a very important
role in the information security process.
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As an example, an operational control might state that a user leaving
his/her office must logoff from the operating system and lock his/her office
door. If a user was to ignore this procedure, both the technical control
forcing authentication and the physical control of having a lock on the door
would be rendered useless. Thus, anyone who thinks that security products,
i.e. technical and physical controls, alone, offer true security is settling for
the illusion of security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 4). Without adequately
addressing the human factor in information security, organizations cannot
be sure that their information resources are safe.
Without an adequate level of user co-operation and knowledge, many
security techniques are liable to be misused or misinterpreted by users. This
may result in even an adequate security measure becoming inadequate (Siponen,
2001). It is important to note that there are two primary dimensions to the
human factor in information security, namely knowledge and behavior.
The first dimension to the human factor in information security is a re-
quirement for the humans involved to have adequate knowledge. Each and
every human involved in the security process not only needs knowledge re-
lating to what they should do, but also knowledge as to how to perform
their security related functions. This requirement for adequate knowledge is
very important for the purposes of this thesis and will be examined in depth
in the next section.
The second dimension to the human factor in information security is the
requirement for humans to have the desired behavior. This means that
information security depends, to a degree, on the attitude, beliefs and val-
ues, and/or cooperation of humans involved in the security process. With-
out a proper attitude, or the desired beliefs and values, towards information
security on the parts of the humans involved, there cannot be sufficient co-
operation. It is thus necessary to ensure that the attitude, and beliefs and
values, of the humans are such that they lead to the desired behavior. How-
ever, even if the humans involved have a positive attitude, and the desired
beliefs and values towards security, an organization’s information will not be
secure if the same humans do not also possess the necessary knowledge. The
two dimensions to the human factor are, to a large degree, closely related to
each other but will be discussed separately in order to clarify the different
emphasis of each.
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3.4.1 Knowledge
Organizations cannot protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability
of information in today’s highly networked systems environment without en-
suring that each person involved understands his/her roles and responsibil-
ities and is adequately trained to perform them (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 3).
Individual users should be made aware of the specific operational controls
that are dependant on his/her behavior in order to be effective. In order
to ensure this required level of knowledge, extensive awareness, training and
educational programs will be needed. The first step in the creation of such
programs would be to determine exactly what users should be taught.
ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) states that all employees of the organization and,
where relevant, third party users, should receive appropriate training. This
training should include security requirements, legal responsibilities and busi-
ness controls, as well as training in the correct use of information processing
facilities before access to information or services is granted (ISO/IEC 27002,
2005, p. 9, section 6.2.1). This statement, even though it greatly clarifies
some issues relating to what should be taught in an information security
educational program, raises another question namely, what is appropriate
training? Determining exactly how much knowledge a user requires can be
a daunting task.
It would make sense for an organization’s security educational program
to cover all the controls specified by the specific information security stan-
dard used by the organization. However, it is clearly unreasonable to expect
each and every end-user to be educated about all the controls specified by a
standard such as the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005).
According to ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004, p. 25) each employee should
know his or her role and responsibility, his or her contribution to ICT
security, and should be entrusted to achieving the organization’s ICT security
goals. It is therefore necessary to tailor the educational material used to the
needs of the individual user.
Creating a user education program that is tailor-made to the training
needs of each and every individual user, although theoretically possible, is in
practice very difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Furthermore such an
awareness program would be extremely costly to create and thus not feasible
for the average organization. It is, however, possible to have some distinc-
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tion between the different levels or profiles of users in an information security
awareness program. Since the training needs of individuals are heavily de-
pendant on the actual role that an individual plays inside the organization,
and forms of role-based schema’s are already widely used for the implemen-
tation of access control, it would be logical to create a form of role-based
awareness education. Such a system would solve the dilemma of creating a
customized educational program for every individual by reducing the number
of customizations to a manageable, and affordable, level. NIST 800-16 (1998)
presents such a role-based approach towards information security awareness,
training and education.
According to M. Thomson (1998) there are essentially three categories of
users that need to be educated in information security awareness, namely:
• The End User: including anyone using information resources.
• IT Personnel: including anyone responsible for the technical side of
information technology resources and in this case, the technical imple-
mentation of security controls.
• Top Management: including anyone responsible for providing high-
level direction and leadership in an organization. In a security context,
top management provides the leadership via security policies and by
committing the organization to the security process. Top management
users are also end-users.
A further distinction can be made between different categories of end-
users based on their actual role in the organization. For example the role
played in terms of information security by human resources (HR) end-users
would differ from the role played by users from the manufacturing depart-
ment.
The knowledge, and thus educational, needs in terms of information
security for these different profiles of users, would be very different. Not
all users would need to be educated about all the controls specified by the
information security standard used by the organization. For example:
• A typical end-user would at the very least need training in password
management and would probably need to be educated about computer
viruses and the safe usage of email.
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• A top management user’s training needs would include those of an end-
user but would probably also include extensive coverage of corporate
information security policies.
• An IT personnel member would probably need information security
education about some of the more technical controls that neither of
the other categories would need.
• An HR end-user would in addition to ”normal” end-user awareness
training also need training specific to the role of the HR department in
information security. For example, the need to notify the IT depart-
ment when a personnel member resigns so that that person’s access to
sensitive information resources can be revoked.
It can thus be summarized that the knowledge needed by, and thus, what
should be taught to, a specific individual user would depend on a variety of
factors. These factors would probably include the user’s category and the
specific departmental role which that user plays within the organization, but
would not necessarily be limited to only these two factors. It should be
clear that the determination of the exact content for an information security
user education program should not be done in an unplanned, or haphazard,
fashion. A lack of relevant information security knowledge amongst organi-
zational end-users could compromise the security of information assets. It is
vital that organizations ensure that the humans in the information security
process have the requisite information security knowledge. The design of
information security educational content should thus be done in a systematic
and/or formal way in order to ensure that the content addresses the specific
educational needs of the intended target audience. The extent towards which
current approaches to the human factor in information security utilize such
a formal, pedagogically sound, approach in user education programs will be
examined in depth in chapter 4.
Once the appropriate content for an organization’s information security
user education program has been determined, this content needs to be deliv-
ered. Simply providing information security training to individuals does not
necessarily ensure that learning has occurred (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 6). It
is therefor necessary to take special care to ensure the success of the user ed-
ucation programs used. For educational programs this would mean ensuring
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adherence to proper pedagogical principles in both the creation and deliv-
ery of these programs. The user education programs needed for information
security purposes differ from traditional educational programs. Unlike tra-
ditional educational programs, these programs will primarily be aimed at
teaching adults. Adults have well established, not formative, values, beliefs,
and opinions (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 20). The educational methodology used
should thus be suitable for adult education. The educational approach should
also be practical, affordable and should meet all other possible requirements
for organizational end-user education.
Few, if any, modern organizations can afford to send each and every
staff member on extensive classroom based information security educational
courses. In today’s organizations it is crucial to maximize return on in-
vestment. Through its very nature classroom training requires the avail-
ability of highly trained specialists to present the courses. It also requires
that the learners take time off from their regular duties to attend classes.
These factors make classroom training very expensive. One alterative to
traditional classroom training is to provide employees with e-learning alter-
natives. Chapter 4 will examine the extent towards which e-learning is being
used and/or recommended in current approaches dealing with the human
factor in information security. The specific suitability of e-learning as an
educational delivery channel for information security education will be dealt
with in depth in a later chapter.
Through properly designed and delivered educational programs organiza-
tions can address the need for organizational end-users to have the requisite
information security knowledge relevant to their jobs. However, as mentioned
earlier, there are two dimensions to the human factor in information security.
Once the users have sufficient knowledge about their roles in the security pro-
cess, there is still no guarantee that they will adhere to their required security
roles. It is possible that users understand their roles correctly but still don’t
adhere to a security policy because it conflicts with their beliefs and values
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). It is thus imperative to also ensure that the
users have the correct attitude, beliefs and values, and thus desired behavior,
towards information security.
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3.4.2 Behavior
As mentioned earlier, ensuring that employees have the requisite knowledge
does not guarantee that the employees will use the knowledge to act more
securely. In fact, studies have shown that users might disregard a specific
control because they disagree with the control, or disagree about the ne-
cessity of adhering to the control (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). ”Even the
simplest security procedure demanded by security guidelines, such as the
correct use of a password, is often ignored” (Siponen, 2000). Information
security policies can also be misinterpreted by employees as attempts to in-
terfere with their way of getting the job done (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.2). It thus
becomes necessary to not only educate employees about their information
security roles and responsibilities, but to also address the underlying factors
which could influence their behavior. Layton (2005, pp. 46-54) identifies six
psychological factors that can contribute towards an individual’s behavior.
These factors include motivation, attitude, beliefs, personality, morals, and
ethics.
In order to ensure the desired user behavior, it is thus necessary to also
consider behavioral theories. Most current user education programs fail to
pay adequate attention to behavioral theories (Siponen, 2001). Section 4.5
of this thesis clearly shows that the importance of behavioral theories in
dealing with the human factors in information security is widely recognized.
However, most current approaches that do deal with the behavioral aspects,
only do so at an abstract level (Siponen, 2000). One approach towards
addressing the behavioral aspects of the human factor in information security
is to foster an organizational sub-culture of information security.
According to B. Von Solms (2000), the emphasis of user education pro-
grams should be to build an organizational culture of security awareness, by
instilling the aspects of information security in every employee as a natural
way of performing his or her daily job. Recent studies have indicated that
the establishment of an information security ”culture” in the organization
is desirable for effective information security (B. Von Solms, 2000). Such a
culture should support all business activities in such a way that information
security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activities of every employee
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). According to The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language (2000) a culture is:
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• The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs,
institutions, and all other products of human work and thought.
• The predominating attitudes and behavior that characterize the func-
tioning of a group or organization.
In terms of information security, a corporate culture of information security
can thus be seen as the predominating attitudes towards information security
and security related behavior that characterize the functioning of the employ-
ees within the organization. Thus, in an organization that has a culture of
information security, the employees would adhere to proper security practices
during execution of their day-to-day functions because that is simply the way
things are done. In other words, employees would have the correct attitude
towards information security. It is obvious that in order for employees to be
able to adhere to proper security practices the employees would have to know
what proper security practices are. Therefore, information security education
would have to play a key role in the establishment of such a culture.
Even though user education is essential for the establishment of a suc-
cessful corporate culture of information security, education on its own cannot
change a corporate culture. To ensure the successful protection of infor-
mation assets, a formalized approach towards establishing and maintaining
a corporate culture needs to be taken. Since the aim of such a process would
be to change employee behavior, it would be sensible to ”borrow” the neces-
sary theory from the behavioral sciences. This approach has become widely
accepted in current approaches towards the human factor in information
security. Section 4.5 will show that the majority of current approaches recog-
nize the need for the establishment of an organizational information security
sub-culture. However, section 4.5 will also show that very few of these cur-
rent approaches have made any efforts at adapting the generic model used
to define organizational culture to be specific to the needs of information
security.
The two dimensions to the human factor in information security, knowl-
edge and behavior, are tightly interwoven. Without adequate knowledge it
is not possible to behave correctly. Even if a user has the desired attitude
and is properly motivated, a lack of the requisite knowledge would prevent
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that user from behaving securely. Similarly, having the requisite knowledge
still does not guarantee the desired behavior. A user who has the requisite
knowledge but who views security as a hindrance to performing his/her job,
or as not being very important, might still behave insecurely. Any attempt to
address the human factors in information security should thus address both
these dimensions holistically.
It is also imperative to realize that approaches intent on addressing the
knowledge dimension of the human factors in information security, would
have to consider pedagogical theory. Similarly, approaches towards fostering
an information security culture would have to consider organizational culture
theory from the management sciences. When dealing with the human factor
in information security, information security researchers need to take cogni-
sance of relevant theories from the human and social sciences. This thesis will
address various components of such an holistic approach towards the human
factor in information security through the integration of both the relevant
theory and, where appropriate, technology.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter information security was introduced. A definition for infor-
mation security was given and discussed. From the definition several char-
acteristics that information has to have in order to be called secure, were
identified. It was also stated that security is a process, not a product. Infor-
mation security serves to protect an organization’s information assets from
both internal- and external threats. This protection is typically implemented
in the form of various security controls. These controls serve to reduce the
risks posed by vulnerabilities to threats against information assets. Three
main categories of controls exist, namely, physical-, technical-, and opera-
tional controls. The first two of these categories of controls depend to a
large degree on the third category, operational controls, in order to be ef-
fective. Operational controls, in turn, depend on human cooperation, hence
behavior, as well as knowledge in order to be effective. These two dimensions,
knowledge and behavior, constitute the human factor in information security.
Humans involved in the security process need to possess the required knowl-
edge about their security related roles, and thus need to be educated. They
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also need to have the desired attitude towards security. Organizations thus
need to establish a corporate sub-culture of information security compliance.
Both the education of users, and the establishment of an information security
sub-culture in the organization, need to be done in a way that is theoretically
sound. The next chapter will provide an overview, and perform a detailed
analysis, of current approaches towards dealing with the human factor in
information security. This detailed analysis will clearly show the specific
areas where current approaches are still lacking. It is the intention of this
thesis to address some of these areas in a theoretically sound way.
Chapter 4
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews existing information security awareness, training and
educational approaches. The aim of the chapter is to provide both an overview
of existing programs, and to perform a qualitative content analysis on existing
approaches. The purpose of the qualitative content analysis is to demonstrate
the relevance of, and need for, the specific research objectives of this thesis.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of existing approaches to dealing with
the human factor in information security. These approaches include all cur-
rent work dealing with either information security awareness, training and
education, or with the fostering of an organizational culture of information
security. The primary purpose of the review is twofold. Firstly, the review
aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of approaches
dealing with the human factor in information security. Secondly, a qualitative
content analysis will be conducted in order to establish the relevance of the
specific research objectives of this thesis, as discussed in section 1.7.
The aims of the qualitative content analysis is thus to determine the
extent towards which:
• reviewed literature recognizes the importance of dealing with the be-
havioral aspects of information security education (including dealing
with user attitude and/or motivation), as opposed to exclusively fo-
cussing on the transfer of skills and/or knowledge. This could also be
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interpreted as a focus on the so-called ”content category” of awareness
education programs (Siponen, 2001).
• current literature acknowledges the need for an information security
culture.
• current approaches have adapted the more generic definition(s) of
organizational culture used in the human and social sciences to be
specific for the needs of information security.
• formal, pedagogically sound, methods were followed in the creation of
actual information security learning content.
• learning taxonomies were used to plan the learning activities in infor-
mation security awareness, training, and education approaches.
• technology based channels (e-learning) are used in order to deliver
learning content.
The following sections will briefly discuss what a qualitative content anal-
ysis is and will clearly delineate the scope of the conducted literature review
and content analysis. A comprehensive overview of existing approaches to
dealing with the human factor in information security will then be presented.
Finally the chapter will present and discuss the results of the qualitative con-
tent analysis performed on the reviewed sources.
4.2 Methodology
Content analysis ”is a research technique for making replicable and valid in-
ferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). Content analysis is essentially an empirically
grounded method. However, the main focus of content analysis is to exam-
ine data, texts, images, etc, in order to interpret or understand what they
mean to people. Content analysis tries to determine what the information
conveyed by the content does, and what it enables or prevents people from
doing. ”Contemporary content analysis transcends notions of symbols, con-
tents, and intents” (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. xvii-xviii). A researcher making
use of content analysis usually starts with data sources that was meant to
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 47
be read, interpreted and understood by people other than the analysts. This
methodology differs from techniques such as hermeneutics in that the analyst
usually starts the reading with a specific research question in mind. Content
analysts who start the research with a specific question in mind read the text
for a purpose, not for what the author might lead them to in an abstract
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 33)
This method is often employed because direct observable evidence and/or
validation might be difficult or unfeasible in practice. In such a case the texts,
and other data sources, provide the empirical grounding for the researcher’s
work (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 39-40). However, it is important to note that
content analysis is not necessarily empirical in nature, it could be seen as ei-
ther quantitative or qualitative, depending on how the techniques are used.
Qualitative researchers will often support their interpretations by weaving
quotes from the analyzed texts and literature into their arguments and con-
clusions, by constructing parallelisms, by engaging in triangulations, and by
elaborating on any metaphors they can find (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 87-88).
4.3 Scope of the review and content analysis
One of the aims of this review of current approaches to dealing with the
human factor in information security is to provide as comprehensive an
overview of these current approaches as possible. It was deemed essen-
tial to attempt to include every current source that could be deemed rel-
evant in this review. Source material for the review was collected using a
careful and systematic process. This process included the exploration of
as many information systems and information security journals as possible.
The search process included extensive searching through the contents of on-
line electronic databases, including: ACM digital library, EBSCOhost, El-
sevier Science Direct, Emerald Library, IEEE/IEE Electronic Library, and
Springer Link. Secondly, international information security standards were
evaluated, and where relevant content which focused on information security
awareness, training and education was found the standards were included in
this review. Standards that simply stated the importance and/or scope of
such information security awareness, training and education programs (for
example (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005)) were not included in the review, but were
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considered throughout the rest of the thesis.
Specific attention was also given to the journal ”Computers & Security”
and the ”Proceedings of the IFIP TC 11 International Information Security
Conference”. These two publication forums were emphasized since, in the au-
thor’s opinion, they represent the foremost research in the field of information
security. Additional searches were conducted using online search engines. Fi-
nally, as many academic textbooks dealing with information security related
topics as possible were obtained and, where relevant content was found, were
included in this review.
In order to ensure the currency of the results, all sources older than
ten years (published pre 1999) were excluded from the review and
content analysis. These sources were, however, considered throughout the
rest of thesis.
4.4 An overview of existing approaches to deal-
ing with the human factor in information
security
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) examine the divergence between how infor-
mation security managers view and interpret information security related is-
sues, and how organizational users view and interpret these issues. The study
identifies and explores the ”digital divide” between information security users
and information security managers and describes this digital divide as be-
ing either social, socio-technical, or both. A social digital divide is defined as
”differences in self-efficacy, individual skills and perceptions, cultural aspects,
and interpersonal relationships”. A socio-technical digital divide is defined as
”differences with regard to information security skills and knowledge, percep-
tions of information security, social norms, and interpersonal relationships,
any or all of which can result in differences in information security per-
formance between individuals” (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009). The study
explores various aspects relating to the management of human aspects in
information security. According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) infor-
mation security managers surveyed prefer to deal with technological solutions
to prevent users from taking insecure actions, whether intentional or unin-
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tentional. Technology is seen as more sound and reliable than users. Most
managers agree that users should be kept informed regarding security poli-
cies and guidelines. However, the surveyed managers believe that few users
actually read the documents and that such policy documents contributed
little towards overall information security awareness. Several popular forms
of awareness campaigns, including use of the intranet, e-mail, leaflets, screen
savers and interactive training were found to be mostly ignored by users due
to lack of motivation, or a lack of awareness of the need for information
security awareness. Both managers and users believe that user participa-
tion in security work (ranging from dialogue during policy creation to active
involvement in risk analysis, etc) is the most effective way to improve user
adherence to information security principles (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009).
Alnatheer and Nelson (2009) focus on information security culture in the
Saudi environment. The paper briefly discusses information security in gen-
eral and then provides some insight into the Saudi environment. Specific
attention is given to the Saudi government’s national IT plan which aims to
transform the country into an information society and digital economy. The
adoption of an information security culture within this national context is
the main focus of the paper. Several issues and factors that should be con-
sidered for the adoption of such an information security culture are briefly
examined. These issues includes corporate citizenship, the legal and regula-
tory environment, corporate governance, and cultural factors (including an
overview both national and organizational cultures). A conceptual frame-
work for using these factors in the cultivation of an information security
culture is briefly outlined. The future aims of the authors are to use the
presented framework in the examination of information security culture in
Saudi. In its current form the research lacks depth.
Ashenden (2008) examines the extent of the ”human challenge” in infor-
mation security. The study specifically focuses on the management of the
human aspects of information security. The paper argues that this challenge
goes beyond the management of just the organizational role(s) of the hu-
mans involved and should also include the individual’s attitudes, beliefs and
perceptions. This holistic view of humans in the organization is described as
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organizational culture. A brief definition of organizational culture, and the
role it plays is then examined. The paper discusses the management of infor-
mation security in general and then provides more detail on specific challenges
when dealing with the human aspects of security. These include the changing
of organizational culture (which is briefly discussed), the development of the
information security manager’s identity, effective communication, and skills
development (Ashenden, 2008). The discussion of skills development focuses
on the skills needed for the effective management of humans in information
security, as opposed to the skills needed by humans in information security.
The ability to manage culture change is emphasized as essential in the man-
agement of the human aspect in information security (Ashenden, 2008). The
definition of organizational culture used by Ashenden (2008) does not adapt
the generic definition of organizational culture to the specific needs of infor-
mation security.
Atkinson, Furnell, and Phippen (2009) focus on the raising of young peo-
ple’s awareness regarding security whilst online. The paper firstly outlines the
risks associated with the quick adoption of new technologies by young peo-
ple. The authors then point out that the parents or other older role-models
like school teachers, who in other situations would have been expected to
provide guidance to the younger generation, often themselves lack awareness
or do not have the technological know-how to help ensure e-safety awareness.
Purely technological solutions, which mainly restrict the range of online ac-
tivities young people can engage in, are briefly examined and found to be
inefficient. Peer education, where learners ”build upon the knowledge and
sophistication that they already have, thus making the encouraging of safe
online behaviors much more likely”, is cited as a possible solution and dis-
cussed as the primary focus of the paper (Atkinson et al., 2009). The paper
outlines the results of a research project which evaluated such peer education
initiatives within UK secondary schools. The paper discusses perceptions
that exist regarding online safety amongst young people. This is followed by
an examination of the dominant threats as perceived by the young people
in the study. An important concept in the research was the introduction of
E-safety ambassadors, who were recruited from amongst the young people
to provide peer support. The E-safety ambassadors were given the freedom
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to develop their own materials, or to tailor existing material to their needs.
A forum was provided online to assist these E-safety ambassadors by allow-
ing them to communicate with each other and to disseminate information.
The study found that this peer-driven approach did not improve the security
related knowledge of the young people (who was already fairly technologi-
cally ”savvy”) much, but was still successful in changing their actual online
behavior. It is also noted that this ”peer support approach” should not be
used in isolation. ”Peer ambassadors may be effective agents for influencing
behaviors, but they are not the only mechanism and should be viewed as
forming part of a wider toolkit” (Atkinson et al., 2009).
Aytes and Connolly (2003) present a model of user behavior relating to
information security. The paper firstly emphasizes the role(s) humans play
in the implementation/support of technical information security measures.
Aytes and Connolly (2003) secondly state that many existing approaches to
dealing with humans in information security only focus on two primary fac-
tors, namely awareness of a specific security threat and having adequate
training in the use of the security counter measure to such a threat. It
is then argued that this ”somewhat simplistic approach to human behavior
ignores the fact that in many situations, users may choose to not implement
countermeasures” (Aytes & Connolly, 2003). It is thus deemed necessary
to pay adequate attention to behavioral theories. The paper then presents
a model of user behavior based on various literature sources. The model’s
primary focus is both the factors that contribute to the users perception of
risk and the factors relating to the subsequent choices users make based on
the perceived risk. In the presented model various information sources can
contribute to the user’s knowledge. These sources includes training received,
news/media, friends and coworkers, policies and procedures and personal
experience. The user subsequently has knowledge regarding threats and vul-
nerabilities, countermeasures, potential consequences to him/her self and/or
others as well as the cost of secure behavior in terms of time, effort, etc.
The user’s knowledge leads to the user’s perception of the availability and
usability of safe practices, the probability and significance of negative conse-
quences, the ease of recovery and the user’s beliefs regarding peer behavior.
Perception, in combination with the individual’s attitude towards risk, leads
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to the user’s behavioral choice (i.e. to use, or disregard, the appropriate
security counter measure) (Aytes & Connolly, 2003). The outcome of the
user’s choice, whether positive or negative, in turn feeds back and influences
future behavior as an information source. This model does to a certain ex-
tent adapt behavioral theories for use in information security. However, its
primary focus is to assist in predicting user behavior and the study thus does
not make use of pedagogical theories. It should also be noted that this paper
focuses only on one aspect of behavior and not on the more holistic concept
of an information security culture.
Bryce and Klang (2009) examine online practices of young people with
regards to the disclosure of private information. The research examines a
variety of types of personal information, as well as the risk perceptions and
associated disclosure practices existing amongst young people in an online
environment. It is suggested that educational strategies should more clearly
focus on encouraging young people to protect their online privacy. These
strategies should also focus on raising awareness with regards to both com-
mercial and non-commercial use of their private information amongst young
people. A call is made for more empirical research towards the development
of such educational strategies.
Chang and Lin (2007) examine the relationship between organizational
culture and information security management (ISM). The research presents
a model of the influence that organizational culture traits (including cooper-
ativeness, innovativeness, consistency, and effectiveness) have on information
security management principles (including confidentiality, integrity, availabil-
ity, and accountability) (Chang & Lin, 2007). These traits and principles
are selected after conducting a review of current literature. The influence of
each cultural trait on each information security management principle is then
measured empirically via regression analysis. It is concluded that ”there are
significant relationships between organizational culture and ISM” (Chang &
Lin, 2007). The evidence provided in Chang and Lin (2007) strongly supports
the importance of fostering an information security culture to help address
the human factors in information security.
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Chen, Medlin, and Shaw (2008) study the effect that cultural perspectives
might have on situational information security awareness. The study focuses
specifically on situational awareness, which makes users aware of various el-
ements and their contextual meanings in their own working environments.
This form of awareness allows the users to ”form a mental model to both un-
derstand the current risks of a situation and to predict and possibly prevent
the potential adverse effects of these risks” (Chen et al., 2008). The effects
of four cultural traits (as described by Hofstede (1991)) individualism, power
distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance are studied. The research
uses a computerized animated information security awareness program that
was developed based on ”Endsley (1995)’s Situational Awareness Dynamic
Decision Making Model and Situation Awareness Global Assessment Tech-
niques” (Chen et al., 2008) to present the awareness material. It is found
that the individualism cultural trait has a particularly strong influence on
the effectiveness of situational information security awareness.
Choi, Kim, Goo, and Whitmore (2008) provide empirical evidence that
managerial information security awareness influences managerial action to-
wards information security. The study builds on previous theoretical work
done by other authors and specifically tries to provide empirical support
for theories regarding this relationship as proposed by Straub and Welke
(1998). The study validates that, not only does higher levels of information
security awareness amongst management lead to improved managerial ac-
tion towards information security, but also that improved managerial action
towards information security leads to improved organizational information
security performance (Choi et al., 2008). The study thus does not address
how awareness should be increased, but rather provides additional reasons
why awareness is important.
Cohen (1999) presents an argument that awareness is only effective if the
intended target audience of the awareness already is favorably predisposed
to the subject matter. This argument is backed by anecdotal evidence based
on the author’s own experiences. The paper indirectly highlights the impor-
tance of the motivational aspects of awareness campaigns.
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Cone, Irvine, Thompson, and Nguyen (2007) present a video game that is
successfully being used in information security training and awareness cam-
paigns. The use of a video game for information security awareness and
training is briefly justified. It is argued that the ”tacit knowledge gained
by applying concepts in a virtual environment can significantly enhance stu-
dent understanding” (Cone et al., 2007). A brief overview of several current
training and awareness techniques is provided, followed by an overview of the
discussed video game itself. This overview presents the major components
of the game as well as information on how it was developed and tested. The
paper also explains how scenarios for the game are constructed. An in depth
view of the process of analyzing awareness and training requirements and
creating game scenarios based on the gathered requirements is presented.
The presented process provides clear insight and justification for the specific
content created, but does not make use of an explicitly espoused learning
taxonomy. It can be argued that the video game itself can be a form of
E-learning.
Da Veiga and Eloff (2009) present a framework for an information security
culture. This framework is supported by validating statistical analysis which
is also published as Da Veiga, Martins, and Eloff (2007). Current research
into information security culture is briefly examined, and it is noted that ex-
isting information security research does not integrate organizational culture
and organizational behavior into an holistic framework for the cultivation
and assessment of such an information security culture. The presented frame-
work attempts to address this shortcoming. The framework is presented in
three levels of increasing detail. The first level provides an overview of how
information security components (for example policies) influence information
security behavior, and how behavior, in turn, eventually leads to the cultiva-
tion of an information security culture (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2009). The second
level breaks these three major elements of the framework down into further
levels of granularity. The information security components are split into
groupings that influence one of three major behavioral groupings, namely;
organizational, group or individual behavior. These behavioral groupings in
turn cultivate information security culture by influencing basic assumptions,
values, or artifacts and creations. The final level presented further decom-
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poses the framework into seven categories of information security compo-
nents. Each of these categories once again is classified as being at an organi-
zational, group or individual tier in terms of its influence on the information
security culture. These tiers indicate the main sphere of the control’s influ-
ence. However, components can also influence other tiers to a lesser extent
(Da Veiga & Eloff, 2009). The influence of specific information security com-
ponents at each of the tiers themselves is also broken down into more detail
to further clarify the framework. The presented framework not only uses
established theory relating to organizational culture, but also adapts it for
the specific needs of information security.
Dhillon (2007, pp. 219-237) discusses information security culture from
various perspectives. Information security culture is firstly discussed accord-
ing to Schein’s model (Schein, 1999a) for organizational culture. Information
security specific interpretations of the three levels of Schein’s model are pro-
vided (Dhillon, 2007, p. 223). Dhillon (2007) secondly explores security
culture as a web of communication processes, as proposed by Hall (1959).
In this view of culture Hall (1959) identified ten streams of culture (inter-
action, association, subsistence, gender, territoriality, temporality, learning,
play, defense, and exploitation) and argued that the interaction between
these streams leads to a pattern of behavior (Dhillon, 2007, pp. 224-229).
The third view of culture presented is a framework by Cameron and Quinn
(1999). This framework organizes Hall’s ten streams along two dimensions.
The first dimension differentiates flexibility, discretion and dynamism from
stability, order and control. The second dimension differentiates internal
orientation, integration and unity from external orientation, differentiation
and rivalry (Dhillon, 2007, pp. 229-233). According to this framework an
organization’s culture can fall into one of four primary classes. An orga-
nizational culture could be an adhocracy culture (individual initiative and
freedom is stressed, fewer security controls might actually improve security),
hierarchy culture (a formalized and structured organization, security privi-
leges models the same hierarchy ), clan culture (a strong focus on people,
security is largely ensured via ethics and loyalty), or market culture (focuses
on achieving long-term goals and targets, security is seen as a hindrance)
(Dhillon, 2007, pp. 230-231). The perspective of an information security
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culture provided is based on the nine principles presented by OECD (2002).
The four presented perspectives are seen as being complimentary in terms of
providing insight into an organization’s culture. Despite interpreting these
perspectives from an information security viewpoint, Dhillon (2007) does not
adapt any of the models to be specific to information security.
Dodge, Carver, and Ferguson (2007) use phishing e-mails to test the level
of awareness amongst learners. The results of the study indicate that learners
”continue to disclose information that should not be disclosed to an unautho-
rized user and expose themselves to malicious code by opening attachments”
(Dodge et al., 2007). The methods used in this study could conceivably be
used in other awareness campaigns to help assess the success of specific as-
pects of such campaigns. One could argue that the focus of this research is
on the behavioral aspects of information security. However, for the purposes
of the qualitative content analysis this focus will be disregarded because the
authors intended to focus on user knowledge. There was no attempt to di-
rectly measure, or address, concepts like user attitude and/or motivation.
Drevin, Kruger, and Steyn (2007) introduce a value-focused thinking ap-
proach to information security awareness. Value focused thinking starts with
the identification of stakeholders that will be impacted by a decision. The
values and principles, in the context of the specific scenario, of these stake-
holders are then determined. These values are converted into objectives,
which can be either fundamental or means objectives. A means objective is
one which helps to achieve another objective. The inter-relationships be-
tween objectives are then analyzed for cause-effect relationships, and to gen-
erate possible decision opportunities. This approach is used by Drevin et al.
(2007) to help ”identify key areas of concern to ICT security awareness”. The
study also briefly discusses the positive influence such an approach can have
on an organization’s information security culture. It can be argued that
this approach incorporates formal theory into the creation of information
security awareness material. However, for the purposes of the qualitative
content analysis conducted in this thesis, this value based approach will not
be viewed as a formal pedagogical approach.
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 57
Du, Shang, and Xu (2006) focus on computer security education as part
of formal tertiary education. The Minix operating system is used as a basis
for laboratory exercises to provide students with ”hands on” practice. Du
et al. (2006) provide brief insight into the pedagogical approach used in the
course. The paper firstly describes the features of the Minix OS that makes
it favorable for use in computer security education, and then describes how
these features were used to form the basis of laboratory exercises. Finally
the results of a brief teaching experiment by the authors are presented. Since
Du et al. (2006) focus on computer security in a formal tertiary education
environment, as opposed to information security in an organizational envi-
ronment, the applicability of their work to this thesis is debatable. However,
it was decided to include the work in this review based on the rigorous ap-
proach to the instructional design described in this paper.
Finne (1996) describes the entire chain of ”elements” in organizational
information security (ISEC). Part of this chain is the element of ”personnel
security”. Information security education for personnel is briefly mentioned,
and it is suggested that each employee should have a written information
security manual. Finne (1996) also addresses the element of ”attitudes to-
wards ISEC issues”. To address employee attitudes it is necessary to es-
tablish an information security culture (Finne, 1996). According to Finne
(1996) it should be possible to measure employee attitudes towards, and ad-
herence to, information security policy. These measurements could be used
to include ”security accountability” in job descriptions and performance ap-
praisals. Such accountability ”is the only sustainable motivator and then
only if managers strongly support and carry out this provision” (Finne,
1996). The paper also briefly introduces the idea of rewarding employees
for good security behavior in order to help maintain such an information
security culture.
Furnell (2008) examines the ”insecure” online behavior of end-users. The
paper argues for the utilization of more channels in order to reach the users
with awareness messages. It also argues that relevant awareness needs should
be more actively pushed to the relevant user communities in both domestic
and workplace contexts (Furnell, 2008). The paper does not specifically focus
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on organizational information security culture, or on organizational infor-
mation security awareness. Instead, the focus is on the wider societal need
for information security awareness and the establishment of an information
security culture in society as a whole.
Furnell, Gennatou, and Dowland (2001) and Furnell, Gennatou, and Dow-
land (2002) both describe a prototype implementation of a software tool that
allows self-paced information security training. Furnell et al. (2002) appear
to be a more comprehensive version of Furnell et al. (2001). This overview
will thus focus on the second paper only. The research first outlines the need
for appropriate information security training and awareness in order to help
establish an information security culture. Various ways in which security
awareness could be promoted in organizations are briefly examined and it
is pointed out that many of the current approaches would be inappropri-
ate for smaller organizations. Smaller organizations have less staff capacity
and less financial resources available for information security training and
awareness programs. It is argued that computer based training solutions
for information security training and awareness would be of particular im-
portance for smaller organizations. Such tools would allow for flexible and
personalized information security training. Employees could determine their
own training schedule according to individual training needs. A prototype
computer based training tool for information security training and awareness
is then presented. Neither paper provides empirical evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the presented tool.
Furnell and Thomson (2009a) provide an in depth examination of corpo-
rate culture and how it influences information security compliance within an
organization. The paper firstly discusses Schein’s (see also (Schein, 1999a))
model of corporate culture and how the three levels of this model interact
to govern employee behavior. It then categorizes employee behavior with
regards to information security according to an eight step scale reflecting the
extent to which the employees are committed to security. The scale ranges
from active non-compliance, through ignorance, to active compliance (secure
culture). According to this scale employee behavior is either compliant or
non-compliant with security policy, and this compliance or non-compliance
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could be either conscious (active choice), or unconscious. The scale does not
represent clear boundaries but should rather be viewed as a ”useful frame of
reference” (Furnell & Thomson, 2009a). The various levels of the presented
scale are related directly back to interactions between the three levels Schein’s
corporate culture model. Furnell and Thomson (2009a) next examine how
information security compliance can be influenced by management, through
the fostering of an information security culture. Senior management should
not only espouse the importance of information security, but should also con-
sistently behave in a way that supports this message (Furnell & Thomson,
2009a). The paper also examines the importance of awareness programmes
and suggests that the success of such programmes could be improved by
providing such training and education in a context sensitive fashion. It is
suggested that factors such as the role of the user, the current task in
which the user is engaged, the user’s ”normal” behavior patterns, psychol-
ogy, and current events within the organization should all be considered
when deciding on the applicability of specific information security awareness
messages.
Furnell and Thomson (2009b) deal with people’s perception of security
and how the need for security compliance should be promoted. The paper
first introduces the idea of ”security fatigue”. It is argued that staff will
become prone to disobeying security policy as the ”novelty” of taught secure
behavior wears off. The research then examines specific information security
controls and the potential for ”security fatigue” inherent in each of these
specific controls. It is suggested that the potential for ”security fatigue”
could be estimated through examining the effort needed by users to achieve
compliance, the degree of difficulty to provide this effort in practice, and
how important the user deems the securing of the specific information as-
set to be (Furnell & Thomson, 2009b). The argument is made that a highly
motivated employee, for example a person with a higher degree of loyalty
to an organization, could potentially behave more secure than one who is
more educated about information security. ”Security fatigue” is identified
as just one of many possible reasons for a lack of motivation to behave se-
curely. Furnell and Thomson (2009b) do not directly mention the concept of
an information security culture; however, the work clearly focuses on some
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of the same behavioral aspects such a culture should help address.
Gaunt (1998) describes the ”installation” of an information security pol-
icy in a large hospital. The paper describes an initial risk analysis during
which surveys revealed a lack of information security awareness. In order
to counter this problem, an approach was followed that included ”extensive
user consultation and involvement in the preparation of the security pol-
icy and proposed countermeasures” (Gaunt, 1998). This involvement also
helped to obtain user buy-in into the security process and assisted in the
gauging of the training needs of users. Users were given guidance in the
form of self-administered questionnaires and leaflets. The policy included
a contractual obligation on staff to adhere to the information security pol-
icy. All staff must complete appropriate training before being given Internet
access. Gaunt (1998) argues that proper emphasis on the human factors
in information security during such a project is vital to the success of the
project. Furthermore, it is argued that continual education and reinforce-
ment of security best practices will eventually lead to the formation of an
information security culture.
Gaunt (2000) examines various practical ways in which an information
security culture could be fostered in a health care environment. The paper
starts by elaborating briefly on the various stakeholders in the health care
system’s need for information security. It then examines various factors that
could prevent a change towards a more secure culture. These include staff
attitudes, ignorance of security measures (lack of awareness), conflicts
between the demand for direct access to patient data to improve health care
versus the need to protect data, inadequate (poorly designed) security sys-
tems and controls, and inconsistent policies. Gaunt (2000) proceeds by
examining some problems in establishing a security culture which could help
address security problems caused by the aforementioned factors. Finally a
list of recommendations is given to address these problems. The recommen-
dations were made by a committee after examining various information flows
in the health care environment. Gaunt (2000) concludes by stating that the
ideal of attaining a ”genuine security culture” is still a long way off.
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 61
Goucher (2008) briefly outlines common mistakes that are made with
information security awareness training and presents a strong argument in
favor of non-traditional training methods for information security education.
Common mistakes listed include having long, expensive training sessions,
confusing a lack of enthusiasm for the security awareness training with resis-
tance to security awareness, irrelevant (or out of context) security training,
inappropriate (too much technical jargon) training delivery, and including too
many people in a single training session (Goucher, 2008). The paper does not
elaborate in depth on any topic but the use of e-learning for security training
is briefly advocated. The paper does not deal directly with the behavioral
aspects of information security, but it does deal with behavioral aspects dur-
ing information security education.
Grimson et al. (2000) present a campaign to raise awareness about infor-
mation and communication technology in general amongst health care profes-
sionals. The campaign makes extensive use of multimedia and web technol-
ogy in the presentation of the information. Information security awareness
is incorporated as part of the overall campaign. Since security is not a major
focus of the presented research this paper is of limited importance for the
purposes of this overview. However, it is of importance to note that infor-
mation security is not dealt with as an afterthought, but rather incorporated
in the general user education programmes from the start.
Guenther (2001) presents an actual social engineering awareness cam-
paign in the form of a slide presentation. The presentation contains clearly
defined instructional outcomes, as well as an example case study. Due to the
publication format, and probable lack of formal review, this work is consid-
ered to be of limited importance to this study, although the use of technology
in the presentation of the material is noted. It is also important to note that
the overall structure of the work does imply some adherence to formal peda-
gogics. However, in view of the lack of more explicit evidence, this probable
adherence to formal pedagogics will be disregarded for the purposes of the
content analysis conducted in this chapter.
Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009) present empirical evidence regarding the
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effectiveness of an e-learning based information security campaign. The study
documents and compares pre- and post-training assessments of employee
knowledge about information security, as well as employee attitudes towards
information security. The paper first justifies the need for awareness and
then introduces the e-learning awareness program itself. A theoretical model
is provided, showing how the specific content to be presented to an employee
was chosen, for the purpose of influencing employee behavior, based on the
employee’s current attitudes and knowledge. This is followed by the de-
sign and results of the empirical experiment itself. The research conclusively
shows that the e-learning awareness program ”had a significant short-term
effect on employee security knowledge, awareness and behavior” (Hagen &
Albrechtsen, 2009). Finally it is argued that individual information security
awareness training, such as the presented e-learning program, is a ”good
starting point for building a corporate security culture based on common
values and attitudes” (Hagen & Albrechtsen, 2009).
Hentea (2005) discusses issues in the security education model that need
attention. The paper first discusses the need for an information security
culture ”in all aspects of information systems, from designing and planning
through to everyday use, and among all participants, from government down
through business to consumers” (Hentea, 2005). The paper then examines
several issues with current information security awareness education in ter-
tiary educational institutions. These issues include, firstly, the fact that
information security education is not integrated with other aspects of infor-
mation technology education. Learners should not be taught how to use
computers without being taught how to do so securely and ethically. Ac-
cording to Hentea (2005) it is ”becoming obvious that information security
awareness has to be provided to students at an earlier age”. The second
issue examined is the fact that information security education is still not
seen as a part of basic computer literacy skills, but is usually offered as an
optional extra course. Thirdly, both end-users and IT professionals have a
need for continuing information security education in order to remain se-
cure in the fast changing IT arena. Fourthly, there is currently no standard
integration between information security and other computer related sub-
jects. A final identified issue is the fact that industry expects newly qualified
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security experts to be progressively more able in terms of both knowledge
and skills (Hentea, 2005). Hentea (2005) proceeds by providing some guide-
lines that could assist in the addressing of the mentioned issues. The need
for both information technology graduates and non-IT professionals to have
information security knowledge is once again highlighted. It is argued that
introductory information security should become a mandatory subject in all
curricula. Several other recommendations regarding the teaching of infor-
mation security in formal tertiary education is briefly argued. These argu-
ments focus on the need to integrate security into other curricula and to
ensure the teaching of ”ethics and social responsibility in the information
age” to all students.
Herold (2005) presents a very comprehensive framework for information
security awareness and training. The book starts by establishing the im-
portance of information security training and awareness and also provides a
comprehensive overview of legal and regulatory requirements for such train-
ing and awareness. This overview covers both US and European regulatory
requirements and lists, and briefly discusses, seventeen different laws and
regulations that might be applicable. This is followed by a discussion on the
incorporation of information security training and awareness into job respon-
sibilities and appraisals (Herold, 2005, pp. 35-53). Herold (2005) also rec-
ommends rewarding employees for meeting the information security training
and awareness goals specified for them. Common mistakes made in corpo-
rate education programs are discussed (Herold, 2005, pp. 55-60). Herold
(2005) presents a detailed step-by-step approach to the development of an
information security training and awareness program. These steps include
(Herold, 2005, pp. 61-303):
• reviewing current awareness activities,
• establishing a baseline,
• getting executive support,
• identifying information security training and awareness methods,
• identifying information security training and awareness topics and au-
diences,
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• defining specific messages,
• budgeting and obtaining funding,
• designing and developing training activities,
• designing and developing awareness material,
• communicating,
• delivering in-person training,
• launching awareness activities,
• and evaluating education effectiveness
Herold (2005) concludes with an overview of current leading practices. The
primary weakness of the approach presented by Herold (2005) is lack of sup-
porting references. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to judge the validity
of the framework without insight into the underlying theories used and/or
prior research on which the framework was based. The work does appear to
adhere to a formal pedagogical approach towards the design and creation of
content, however the specific theoretical basis of the approach is not explic-
itly mentioned. No mention is made of the fostering of a security culture. A
brief but extensive overview of e-learning options as delivery mechanism for
learning content is provided.
Hu and Meinel (2004) present an e-learning tool to teach IT security as
part of formal tertiary education. The target audience of this e-learning tool
is IT students and the primary focus of the subject matter is on the technical
side of security. However, some of the material, for example how to digitally
sign email, would also be of use in end-user information security education.
The tool is provided to students on a CD which implements both a tutoring
system and provides a virtual environment for hands-on laboratory exercises.
All tools needed by students to complete the exercises are also provided on
the CD. Though not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that some degree of
formal pedagogics form the basis of the content developed on this tool.
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Johnson (2006) provides a comprehensive overview of factors that should
be considered in an information security awareness program. These include
the direct and indirect costs of such a program, the benefits of a security
awareness program, and the role(s) of other organizational functions and/or
departments in the support of an awareness program. These identified other
functions and/or departments, whose role(s) in support of an awareness cam-
paign is discussed, includes executive management, the help desk, safety
department, public relations, facilities, privacy, audit, and legal. Johnson
(2006) also briefly discusses which topics should, as a minimum, be discussed
and how to determine the appropriate target audiences for such topics. The
paper briefly looks at various methods of delivering the awareness training,
these include both traditional methods (i.e. posters) and technology based
methods (i.e. online learning modules). How to measure the effectiveness of
campaigns is briefly discussed. The paper concludes with a brief examination
of IT governance principles.
Kabay (2002) discusses the use of social psychology to improve infor-
mation security by changing the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, of both in-
dividuals and groups. It is argued that rational arguments are not enough to
convince people of the need to change behavior and that ”people can get very
angry about what they perceive as interference with their way of getting the
job done” (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.2). Kabay (2002) provides social psychologi-
cal explanations to explain certain types of insecure behavior amongst users.
These include schemas (to explain why people would share sensitive infor-
mation with co-workers), theories of personality (interpersonal conflict might
lead to resistance to conforming to a security culture), explanations of be-
havior (to help interpret employee behavior during culture change), errors of
attribution (misinterpretation of other’s behavior might prevent acceptance
of a new culture), intercultural differences (people from different cultural
backgrounds might behave differently in the same scenario), and framing
reality (information security has to become part of people’s framework of re-
ality) (Kabay, 2002, pp. 35.3-35.8). Kabay (2002) also presents some practi-
cal recommendations for information security awareness program instructors
and facilitators. In order to change employees’ schemata when presenting
security information, Kabay (2002) discusses the importance of initial expo-
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sure, counterexamples, and choice of wording (Kabay, 2002, pp. 35.9-35.10).
A distinction is made between employee beliefs (”cognitive information that
need not have an emotional component”) and attitudes (”an evaluation or
emotional response”) (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10). Kabay (2002) argues that the
current structure of beliefs amongst employees and managers must be ex-
plored if security practitioners wish to foster an information security culture
(Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10). It is also suggested that employees should be praised
for exhibiting ”secure attitudes” and should be challenged (in private) about
attitudes that dismiss the importance of security (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10).
Some evidence is presented in favor of rewarding employees for secure behav-
ior, as opposed to only focusing on punishment of insecure behavior. Kabay
(2002) also discusses how to change attitudes using persuasion, the use of
various communication channels, the encouragement of initiative, and the
impact of conformity, compliance and obedience on changing the views of in-
dividuals (Kabay, 2002, pp. 35.11-14). The role of group behavior is briefly
dealt with. Kabay (2002) concludes with a very detailed summary providing
specific, practical ideas on how these social psychology theories could be in-
corporated into information security awareness approaches. These ideas will
be further explored in a later chapter. In terms of addressing the behav-
ioral aspects of humans in information security the work published in Kabay
(2002) is deemed very significant for the purposes of this thesis.
Katsikas (2000) discusses a methodology to identify the awareness train-
ing needs of health care staff. The presented methodology sub-divides security
learning into awareness, training and education. This is similar to the security
learning continuum presented in NIST 800-16 (1998). The presented method-
ology uses a training matrix to identify the specific educational needs of the
target learners. A current security awareness education program in use in
the health care environment is evaluated against the derived learning needs
of the specific target audience. The course was found to be mostly sufficient,
however, several small gaps in the content of the current course are high-
lighted.
Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, and Ford (2006) use a combination of qualita-
tive and quantitative methods to provide evidence of the influence top man-
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agement support has on both the level to which information security policy
is enforced as well as the overall organizational information security culture.
The studys results indicate that ”top management support positively im-
pacts security culture and policy enforcement” (Knapp et al., 2006). Both
the rigorous methods followed in this research, as well as the research instru-
ment developed in this study, could be of possible future use for assessing
beliefs and attitudes regarding information security.
Kraemer, Carayon, and Clem (2009) identify and describe how human
and organizational factors could cause computer and information security
vulnerabilities. The study uses two focus groups to map out various ”path-
ways” that could lead to vulnerabilities using causal network analysis. The
paper first examines existing research regarding human and organizational
factors in computer and information security. This literature overview is done
from a multidisciplinary perspective. Secondly, the design of the research is
described. The methods used are of a qualitative nature and make use of
red teaming, an advanced form of assessment, to identify weaknesses with
the help of focus groups consisting of experts. The results of this process are
described in two causal network analysis and via examples. These results are
further discussed and categorized. Categories include external influences, hu-
man error, management, organization of computer and information security,
performance management, resource management, policy issues, technology,
and training. The results indicate that vulnerabilities are often the result of
not just one, but rather a combination of organizational conditions, such as
management support or decisions made by designers. The study does not
focus solely on awareness issues, however, several vulnerabilities that stem
from problems in awareness programs are identified. The study could be use-
ful to ensure adequate, and comprehensive coverage of specific topics during
a formal approach to designing learning content in an information security
educational program.
Kritzinger and Smith (2008) present a conceptual model for information
security retrieval and awareness. The purpose of the conceptual model is to
enhance information security awareness amongst employees. The first ”build-
ing block” of the presented model is the collection of information security doc-
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umentation, such as standards, best practices, etc. However, these contain
too much detailed information to be used as a basis for information security
awareness in industry. Kritzinger and Smith (2008) argue that there is a
need for a common (global) body of information security knowledge aimed
at the less technical end-users, as opposed to such bodies of knowledge aimed
at technical information security experts. This common body of knowledge
forms the second ”building block” of the model. The third ”building block”
is the various IT authority levels. Each of these these authority levels con-
sists of a grouping of stakeholders who have a role in ensuring the continued
survival of the organization. The three ”building blocks” combine to form a
set of three information security retrieval and awareness dimensions. These
dimensions collectively form the first part of the model. The second part
of the model consists of various methods of retrieving information from the
underlying dimensions, and using this information to enhance information
security awareness. The final part of the model consists of methods to mon-
itor and measure the current state of information security awareness in the
organization.
Kruger and Kearney (2006) present a prototype model for measuring
information security awareness in an international mining company. The
paper first describes the current information security awareness program be-
ing used within the mining company. This program was developed after
identifying six critical information security risk areas during an in depth
risk analysis. The program focuses on these six areas and presents aware-
ness content to the end-users using a variety of media formats. The model
to measure the success of this information security awareness program was
based on techniques from the field of social psychology which ”proposes that
learned predispositions to respond in a favorable or unfavorable manner to
a particular object have three components: affect, behavior and cognition”
(Kruger & Kearney, 2006). The model attempts to measure user knowledge,
attitude and actual behavior. This measurement is done via the use of a sim-
ple scorecard approach. A prototype of the model was implemented in the
above mentioned company and results were categorized according to a three
category awareness scale. The overall awareness according to this scale, good,
average, or bad, is derived through the combination of percentage scores for
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the underlying categories of knowledge, attitude, and behavior. The results
of this prototype implementation were regarded as successful. However, it
is recommended that future implementations develop a more comprehensive
question bank, weigh specific underlying factors according to their relative
importance, use practical system data, and make use of an automated tool.
Kruger and Kearney (2008) investigate the application of two existing
management science methodologies to obtain consensus ranking from var-
ious role-players regarding priorities in an information security awareness
program. Both a distance-based approach and a heuristic approach is used
to perform the consensus ranking. These methodologies are applied in a large
international mining company. The work in this paper supports earlier work
published in Kruger and Kearney (2006). A simple questionnaire is used as
a data collection instrument to obtain the various importance rankings re-
garding awareness priorities. It was found that this technique not only saves
time and money in determining awareness priorities, but also provides better
understanding of the relative importance of specific factors influencing the
information security awareness program. The use of the technique described
in this paper could assist educators in answering the so-called learning ques-
tion, i.e. ”what is the most important for learners to learn in the limited
time available” (Anderson et al., 2001, pp. 6-10). The learning question,
as well as the rest of the four so-called organizing questions in education, is
discussed in depth in chapter 6.
Layton (2005) focuses on six key psychological aspects of people’s behavior
and how these ”phenomena relate to, and impact, an information security
program” (Layton, 2005, p. vii). Layton (2005) examines motivation, atti-
tude, beliefs, personality, morals, and ethics and combines these aspects into
a psychological-based framework for information security awareness. Layton
(2005) starts by presenting arguments to establish why psychology is rele-
vant to information security. These arguments are followed by an overview of
information security awareness from the organization’s perspective. Layton
(2005) argues that most organizations currently ”tell” users what to do via
policy and then ”push” these policies at the users without further explanation
(Layton, 2005, p. 24). It is argued that information security awareness should
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rather be treated as an attitude. Users should be asked to change behavior,
and should understand the risks, if they are to consistently behave in the
desired way without supervision (Layton, 2005, pp. 24-25). Layton (2005),
to a large extent, bases his theoretical model on organizational citizenship
behavior theory. Organizational citizenship behavior is used to explain the
connection between behavior and motives (Layton, 2005, pp. 30-45). User
motivation is examined in depth in chapter 5 of Layton (2005) through an
examination of various theories dealing with motivation. This includes need
theory, two-factor theory, the operant model, goal-setting theory, expectancy
theory, and equity theory (Layton, 2005, pp. 46-73). The in-depth examina-
tion of motivation is followed by an examination of user attitude, personality,
and beliefs. Attitude is examined as a psychological phenomenon which can
be defined as the ”feelings, beliefs, and predispositions forcing our behaviors”
(Layton, 2005, p. 75). Layton (2005) does not relate these to an underlying
discussion of corporate culture like most other information security research
reviewed in this chapter, but rather relates these concepts to organizational
citizenship behavior theory. Finally, the influence of morals and ethics on
a user’s information security behavior is discussed, before an approach to
awareness which builds on the underlying psychological aspects is briefly
introduced. The insight provided by Layton (2005) on the underlying psy-
chological phenomena’s influence on information security behavior is very
valuable. Layton’s (2005) summary, and discussions, of various theories re-
garding these phenomena could also be of great value to future researchers
in information security awareness.
Leach (2003) discusses factors that influence user security behavior and
how organizations can improve user security behavior. The paper first ex-
amines the threat posed to information security by organizational insiders.
The various factors that influence user information security behavior is then
investigated. These factors include what employees are told, what the see in
practice around them, the user’s security common sense and ability to make
decisions, personal values, the user’s sense of obligation, and how easy or
difficult compliance is (Leach, 2003). The paper next discusses various ”keys
to better user security behaviour”. These includes the behavior of other
employees (principles, policies and procedures will be negatively influenced
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if employees see behavior contrary to these espoused values around them),
the user’s own security common sense and decision making ability (organi-
zations should focus on improving the users ability to make security related
decisions), and the user’s psychological contract with their employer (the or-
ganizational culture). Leach (2003) concludes by stating that leadership is
key to successfull behavior change; ”After all, if senior management can’t be
bothered, then why should staff?” (Leach, 2003).
May (2008) provides seven guidelines for the development of more ef-
fective information security awareness programmes, the first of which is to
”make it personal”. The premise of this guideline is that staff members need
to identify with information security messages if they are to remember them.
The second guideline is to match the message to the target audience. Both
the amount of technical detail, and the delivery style itself should be matched
to the intended target audience’s preferences. Thirdly May (2008) recom-
mends that awareness messages should be short. Presentations should not
exceed ten to fifteen minute sessions. Fourthly awareness education should
be made interesting. The fifth guideline which ties in with the fourth is
that examples should as far as possible be confined to real-life examples and
should avoid speculation on what might happen if security is breached. The
sixth guideline presented is that awareness sessions should be made part of
a daily routine. A ten to fifteen minute daily awareness ”break” is recom-
mended. It is also argued that such a daily awareness session would help with
the fostering of an information security culture in the organization. The final
guideline is to use the right delivery method. These could include e-learning,
informative (yet entertaining) leaflets, or even personalized presentations.
Mitchell, Marcella, and Baxter (1999) report on a study into corporate
information security management. The paper first discusses information
security in general. This discussion includes an overview of different types
of threats, as well as an examination of certain baseline information security
controls. The study gathered data through the use of both telephonic inter-
views and a questionnaire. Amongst other findings, it was found that half
the respondents viewed information security as an IT function and thus not
their responsibility. A large portion of respondents viewed themselves, or
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their employees, as ”not very aware” of information security. And a ”very
low” portion of the surveyed companies had ongoing information security
awareness, training and education programmes. ”Statistically, there was no
connection between training provision and whether or not a company had
an information security policy document. In other words, the existence of
a formal policy document did not mean that the company was translating
policy into action” (Mitchell et al., 1999). The paper briefly discusses survey
results regarding employees’ perception of threats. More detail on attitudes
towards information security is provided by the discussion of the telephonic
interviews which found that four primary factors influenced these attitudes.
The factors included whether or not the company was owned by a foreign
parent company, a lack of perceived cost benefit in investing in information
security, a lack of resources, and the (false) assumption that not having had
major information security incidents in the past is an indication that none
will happen in the future.
Mitnick and Simon (2002) argue that an ongoing information security
awareness campaign is needed by organizations in order to protect the or-
ganizations against social engineering attacks. According to Mitnick and
Simon (2002, p. 4) security products only offer the illusion of security unless
these products are supported by a human firewall. Mitnick and Simon (2002)
provide extensive insight into the roles humans can play in an organization’s
information security efforts through the use of example scenarios. Accord-
ing to Mitnick and Simon (2002) a successful information security awareness
campaign should start with an understanding of how attackers take advan-
tage of humans (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, pp. 246-249). It is important
that everyone in the organization receives awareness education and that this
education focuses on influencing employees to change their behavior and at-
titudes by motivating employees to want to protect the information assets of
the organization (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, pp. 249-250). Mitnick and Simon
(2002) recommend the use of role-playing, exposure to, and discussion of,
recent media reports of information security incidents, as well as the use of
videos as possible training methods. Mitnick and Simon (2002) also argue
that information security should be made a part of every employee’s job re-
sponsibility (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 256). Finally, the use of rewards
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and punishments to help change behavior, as well as widely publicizing ac-
tual security incident is advocated (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, pp. 257-258).
Mitnick and Simon (2006) present detailed discussions of numerous actual
computer security incidents. These discussion are in many cases based on
interviews with the actual perpetrators of the ”crimes”. Mitnick and Simon
(2006) reiterate the message presented in Mitnick and Simon (2002), namely
that humans are the weakest link in information security. Mitnick and Si-
mon (2006) concludes by presenting guidelines, similar to those presented
in Mitnick and Simon (2002), for the training of employees in order to help
prevent future information security vulnerabilities.
NIST 800-16 (1998) is published by the American National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). This document provides an information
security specific training model.This model provides a framework that serves
as the American standard for information security training. The NIST model,
entitled: ”Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Role-
and Performance-Based Model”, together with the complementary document
”Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Pro-
gram” (NIST 800-50, 2003) (NIST 800-50 (2003) will be discussed as the
next item in this overview), forms the only standard that currently focuses
exclusively on the learning needs related to information security. As such
this model is seen as extremely important for the purposes of this litera-
ture review and will be dealt with in depth. The NIST model is based on
the premise that learning is a continuum. Specifically, learning in this con-
text starts with awareness, builds to training, and evolves into education
(NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14). Furthermore the model is role-based, meaning
that it defines the IT security learning needed as a person assumes different
roles within an organization and different responsibilities in relation to IT
systems (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14).
The premise that information security learning is a continuum consisting
of awareness, training and education is fairly widely accepted and several
other publications reviewed are based on this continuum. The three levels of
learning in the NIST continuum can be described as follows:
• Awareness: The purpose of awareness programs is simply to focus at-
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 74
tention on security issues. In awareness activities, the learner is simply
the recipient of information and does not actively participate (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 15). Awareness campaigns often make use of tools
such as posters, videos and promotional slogans.
• Training: The learner has to know how he/she can behave securely.
This level strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and
competency by practitioners of functional specialities other than IT
security (e.g., management, auditing). Training of special security tools
or features within applications must be offered (NIST 800-16, 1998, p.
16).
• Education: The ”Education” level integrates all of the security skills
and competencies of the various functional specialities into a common
body of knowledge. It also adds a multi-disciplinary study of concepts,
issues, and principles (technological and social). This level strives to
produce IT security specialists and professionals capable of vision and
pro-active response (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 16). An important charac-
teristic of education is that the employee must understand why infor-
mation security is important for the organization.
The model in NIST special publication 800-16 deals primarily with the
training part of this learning continuum. The NIST document uses this con-
tinuum to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities an individual needs to
perform the IT security responsibilities specific to each of his or her roles in
the organization. According to this model all employees would need aware-
ness. Training would only be required by individuals whose roles in the
company indicate a need for specific knowledge of security threats and risks,
as well as the safeguards against these threats and risks. Lastly, according to
this model, education would only be needed by information security special-
ists. Thus, the type of learning that individuals need, starts simplistically
and then becomes more comprehensive and detailed towards the top of the
continuum (NIST 800-16, 1998, pp. 13-14).
In addition to the three levels of the learning continuum, NIST 800-16
(1998) defines six generic categories into which most organizational roles can
be categorized, namely: Manage, Acquire, Design and Develop, Implement
and Operate, Review and Evaluate, and Use. The NIST model also has a
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seventh category, Other, that acts as a place holder, to accommodate any
additional functional roles identified in the future (NIST 800-16, 1998, p.
43).
Once the specific information security related roles of an employee have
been determined, the NIST document can be used to identify the specific
learning requirements of that employee. These are sub-divided into a further
three levels, beginner, intermediate and advanced. Finally, the document
provides a framework for the planning of information security training cur-
ricula and the evaluation of training effectiveness. This framework consists
of a ”training matrix” that is used to determine the specific training needs
of individuals based on their organizational roles, the level of training they
require (beginner, intermediate or advanced), and the applicable training ar-
eas, which could vary depending on the organization’s information security
policy and supporting procedures.
NIST 800-16 (1998) does not make use of a learning taxonomy, however,
the approach to content development specified in this document is very for-
mal and clearly adheres to sound pedagogical principles.
NIST 800-50 (2003) is a companion to NIST 800-16 (1998) and provides
a higher, strategic level discussion than NIST 800-16 (1998). The focus of
NIST 800-50 (2003) is on how to build an information security awareness and
training program, whilst the focus of NIST 800-16 (1998) is on the mechanics
of the specific role-based information security training model. NIST 800-50
(2003) thus focuses on the overall program whilst NIST 800-16 (1998) focuses
on how the content of the program should be developed. NIST 800-50 (2003)
outlines four stages in the development life cycle of an information security
awareness and training program. These include a design, development, im-
plementation, and post-implementation phase. The document firstly briefly
discusses the role an information security policy plays in the establishment
of an information security awareness education program. This is followed by
the identification of the various organizational structures/role players who
should be responsible for the task of establishing such a program. The doc-
ument clearly establishes the roles and responsibilities of the ”agency head”
(board of directors), the chief information officer, the information security
manager, various line managers, and end users themselves. The introduction
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is followed by a brief discussion of the same learning continuum as described
in NIST 800-16 (1998), after which each of the various stages in the life-cycle
of an information security awareness program is discussed individually. The
first stage in the life-cycle of an information security awareness and training
program is a program design phase. This section discusses the structure of
an awareness and training program, how to determine specific awareness and
training needs, the development of an awareness and training strategy/plan,
the setting of priorities, how to determine an appropriate level of complexity
for learning material, and finally issues around the funding of an aware-
ness and training program. The second life-cycle phase discussed by NIST
800-50 (2003) is the development phase. According to NIST 800-50 (2003)
awareness specific material should be developed with a focus on the desired
employee behavior, whilst training material should focus on the specific skill
the target audience would need in order to have the ability to behave se-
curely (NIST 800-50, 2003, p. 23). The development section of the docu-
ment provides guidance on the selection of specific awareness topics, possible
sources for awareness material, the development of training material (which
focuses primarily on the use of NIST 800-16 (1998)), and possible sources for
training courses and material. The implementation phase of an awareness
and training program as discussed by NIST 800-50 (2003) starts with the
communication of the awareness and training plan to various organizational
role players. The document then discusses techniques for delivering aware-
ness material (posters, screen-savers, video, etc) and techniques for deliver-
ing training (ranging from face-to-face instructor led training, to web-based
training and other forms of e-learning). None of the training and aware-
ness delivery mechanism is discussed in depth. The post-implementation
phase is the final phase in the life-cycle of an information security awareness
and training program. This phase consists of the monitoring of compliance,
formal evaluation and feedback mechanisms, change management,and con-
tinuous program improvement. NIST 800-50 (2003) also briefly discusses
various indicators for a successful program (NIST 800-50, 2003, p. 39).
OECD (2002) presents ”Guidelines for the Security of Information Sys-
tems and Networks: Towards a Culture of Security”. The OECD consists
of more than 30 member countries and adopted OECD (2002) ”as a Rec-
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ommendation of the OECD Council at its 1037th Session on 25 July 2002”.
The adoption of this guideline by the OECD clearly shows the importance
of developing an information security culture. The document presents sev-
eral aims, including the promotion of an information security culture ”as a
means of protecting information systems and networks”, to raise risk aware-
ness, to foster confidence in information systems (due to better security),
to create a frame of reference for the understanding of security issues, to
promote sharing of information in the creation of information security poli-
cies, practices, measures, and procedures, and to promote the consideration
of information security in the development and implementation of standards
(OECD, 2002). In order to help achieve these aims nine guiding principles
are provided, namely; awareness, responsibility, response, ethics, democracy,
risk assessment, security design and implementation, security management,
and reassessment. Each of these principles is briefly discussed.
Power and Forte (2006a) present a ”powerful, unique and comprehen-
sive awareness and education program for a global entity” in the form of a
case study. The case study outlines how a mandate from a large global entity
resulted in a very successful awareness and education campaign aimed at fos-
tering a culture of information security in the organization. The campaign
took place in three phases. During the first phase it was attempted to engage
all staff in a manner which is both economic and effective. During this phase
an awareness and education task force with roll-players from various depart-
ments was formed, a bi-monthly security newsletter was launched, a security
responsibility presentation was incorporated into the orientation sessions for
new staff, a global annual security day was established, and an e-learning
module for both new staff and remedial training was created. The second
phase focused on technical security training seminars for IT staff. The third
phase entailed the deliverance of vital security related intelligence and early
warning regarding threats to executives. The program in the case study was
very successful and Power and Forte (2006a) provide evidence of this success.
However, due to a change in top-level attitudes the ”mandate shriveled up
and blew away” (Power & Forte, 2006a). The success of the program made
top-management realize that they would prefer an environment which is less
aware of all the information security threats and risks out there.
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Power and Forte (2006b) discuss social engineering and countermeasures
to social engineering. The paper sub-divides social engineering attacks into
two categories; technology-based deception or human-based deception. The
paper provides brief case study examples of actual social engineering attacks
and then proceeds to discuss how such attacks should be handled. The dis-
cussion includes how to recognize elicitation, how to handle the caller, and
incident reporting. Finally a brief checklist of how to handle social engineer-
ing attacks is presented.
Puhakainen (2006) introduces three design theories to help improve infor-
mation security related behavior amongst users. The study firstly overviews
and analyzes fifty-nine current approaches towards information security aware-
ness. This analysis clearly shows that a significant lack of theory based ap-
proaches exist amongst current information security awareness approaches.
A large overlap between the sources examined by Puhakainen (2006) and
those reviewed in this chapter exists. However, several of the sources exam-
ined by Puhakainen (2006) were deemed not recent enough (older than ten
years) for the purposes of this study and were thus excluded from the current
study. Most of the approaches reviewed by Puhakainen (2006) lack a theo-
retical basis (Puhakainen, 2006, p. 62). Those approaches that were found
to have a theoretical basis, and were recent enough (published during of after
1999), have all been included in this review. Out of the approaches reviewed
by Puhakainen (2006), only (Aytes & Connolly, 2003), (Banerjee, Cronan,
& Jones, 1998), and (Siponen, 2000), had both theoretical bases and were
published recently enough for inclusion in the current study’s review. The
first of the three new theories presented by Puhakainen (2006) is a design
theory for information security awareness based on the universal construc-
tive instructional theory and the elaboration likelihood model. The universal
constructive instructional theory ”provides a framework for designing situa-
tional instructional theories to be used in creating customized instruction”
(Puhakainen, 2006, p. 71). Puhakainen (2006) combines this framework with
the elaboration likelihood model, which encourages attitude change via both
cognitive processing of persuasive arguments and cues (Puhakainen, 2006, pp.
72-73). Cues are ”non-argument elements of the message that can influence
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attitude change without any active thinking about the issue” (Puhakainen,
2006, p. 72). This theory is verified by Puhakainen (2006) through two ac-
tion research interventions (Puhakainen, 2006, pp. 91-137). This proposed
theory will be examined in more depth in chapter 6.
The second theory proposed by Puhakainen (2006) focuses on the design
of information security campaigns. This theory is based on the convergence
model of communication. The convergence model of communication explains
how information is interpreted by different individuals according to their
own personal perceptions, and how these varying beliefs and understand-
ings can eventually converge through processes of feedback and information
sharing (Puhakainen, 2006, pp. 78-79). Based on this model, Puhakainen
(2006) proposes an approach to information security campaign design that is
based on active communication and information sharing between all parties
(Puhakainen, 2006, pp. 79-80). This theory is verified only via argument.
The final theory proposed by Puhakainen (2006) focuses on reward and
punishment as a means to encourage information security behavior change.
The proposed theory is based on the theory of operant conditioning. The
theory of operant conditioning shows that an individual’s future behavior can
be influenced if environmental variables are manipulated (person is rewarded
or punished) as a consequence of current behavior (Puhakainen, 2006, p.
85). Puhakainen (2006) presents a six step process which outlines how this
theory could be applied in an organization (Puhakainen, 2006, p. 86-87).
This theory presupposes that the current information security behavior of
employees can in fact be monitored.
The theories presented by Puhakainen (2006) have a strong theoretical
basis and are thus deemed very important for the purposes of the current
thesis. However, Puhakainen (2006) does not focus directly on the fostering
of an information security culture, or on the pedagogical basis for deter-
mining the actual contents of an information security educational campaign.
Instead, Puhakainen (2006) focuses on theory dealing with the structuring of
specific information security messages in order to enable learning, theory on
how information should be distributed through the organization, and theory
on how behavior change should be encouraged by the organization. These
theories can play a supporting role in the current thesis but do not overlap
with the primary focus of this thesis.
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Rezgui and Marks (2008) explore factors affecting information security
awareness amongst the staff at a higher education institution. The paper
first examines several known security incidents that occurred at higher edu-
cation institutions and also briefly focuses on risks that are specific to such
institutions. Related publications are briefly examined and the authors sub-
divide current work on information security awareness into two broad cate-
gories, namely; studies where the term awareness is meant ”to attract users’
attention to information security issues” (this is the same meaning assigned
to this term by NIST 800-16 (1998)), or studies where the term awareness
means both the users’ understanding of information security and ,optimally,
the users’ commitment to information security. The paper next presents the
results of an interpretive case-study that was used to explore the levels of
information security awareness at a university. The data for the case study
was collected via questionnaires, interviews, direct observation, and docu-
ments. The study found that many respondents did not believe information
security to be a problem and did not see themselves as part of the solution.
In general staff was uniformed and unaware regarding information security
issues. Most staff believed that manuals and documentation for information
systems are available, yet the study found that the university had poor man-
uals and documentation. The university mostly had contract staff and this
also contributed towards a lack of conscientiousness regarding information
security. Three main awareness issues were identified. Firstly there was a
lack of information security training and staff consequently behaved inse-
curely. Secondly, there was a lack of awareness campaigning. This lead to
most staff being unaware that they lack training, or that there is a prob-
lem. Thirdly, it was found that the university had no security policy, and
hence there were no rewards for secure behavior and also no punishment for
insecure behavior. Rezgui and Marks (2008) conclude by providing some
recommendation that could assist the university in improving information
security awareness.
Rheea, Kimb, and Ryuc (2009) use self-efficacy, a construct from social
cognitive theory, and model and test various aspects of information security
against this construct. Self-efficacy is described as a ”form of self-evaluation
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which is a proximal determinant of individual behavior” (Rheea et al., 2009).
People with a high level of self-efficacy have more confidence in their own
ability to ”mobilize motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action
needed to successfully execute a task” (Rheea et al., 2009). The presented
study extends the use of this social cognitive theory to information security.
The paper contends that the users’ belief in their own ability to perform their
information security related role(s) can explain their actual security practices
and their intention to persist in these practices. The research uses statistical
methods to test whether or not individuals with higher self-efficacy use more
security protection software, demonstrate more security conscious behavior,
and have stronger intentions to improve their information security. Statis-
tical methods are also used to test; whether or not more computer related
experience leads to higher self-efficacy in information security, whether more
security incidents lower self-efficacy in information security, and whether the
perception that security threats are controllable increase self-efficacy in infor-
mation security. The study found that a positive relationship exists in all the
tested cases. Self-efficacy in information security thus leads to both improved
security practice and improved motivation to behave securely.
Roper, Grau, and Fischer (2005) present a comprehensive guideline to
security education, training and awareness in general. The book does not
focus specifically on the needs of information security. However, it is in-
cluded in this review because many of the problems experienced in security
education in general, as well as many of the theories applicable to such ed-
ucation, could be applicable to information security too. The primary focus
of Roper et al. (2005) is on actual security performance (i.e. employee ac-
tions), and all other aspects such as employee knowledge and/or attitude,
are addressed in terms of the possible impact these aspects could have on
actual behavior. Roper et al. (2005) present an educational model consisting
of training (to provide the actuals skills needed to perform security roles),
education (to allow people to understand the underlying security principles),
awareness (to promote the consideration of security aspects during normal
tasks), and motivation (to convince employees that it is worth their effort
to adhere to security requirements). Roper et al. (2005) addresses security
education as an important part of a person’s employment life cycle. They
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 82
stress the importance of ensuring that every employee understands security
as a job responsibility (Roper et al., 2005, p. 41). Roper et al. (2005) also
advise educators to tailor security educational material to specific employee
groups, and to try to understand human behavior in order to establish a
rapport with employees. Guidelines are provided relating to various aspects
of the training, education, awareness, and motivation model presented in the
book. Some information specific to information security, including security
whilst online, is presented as appendixes to the main text.
Rudolf, Warshawsky, and Numkin (2002) start by examining the critical
success factors for an information security awareness campaign. The first
of these critical success factors is having an information security policy that
clearly establishes that everyone must participate in an awareness program,
that ensures everyone is given sufficient time to participate in awareness edu-
cation, and that clearly establishes who is responsible for conducting aware-
ness program activities. The second critical success factor is senior manage-
ment support, which should include sufficient budget allocation, setting an
example, and supporting (backing) security personnel. The third is having
an awareness program that focuses on people (not technology). The fourth
critical success factor is that the awareness program should have specific,
realistic and measurable goals (Rudolf et al., 2002, p. 29.4). The fifth is that
awareness education should be focused according to specific target audience
groups (in terms of needs, roles and interests), and the final critical success
factor listed is that the awareness program should seek to change behavior via
motivation. Rudolf et al. (2002) briefly discuss the general approach towards
a media campaign and plan for awareness activities. This is followed by an
overview of awareness principles, possible content, presentation techniques,
delivery tools, and finally measurement and evaluation. No specific mention
is made of the pedagogical basis of these presented principles. E-learning
based tools are briefly discussed.
Ruighaver, Maynard, and Chang (2007) view the concept of an infor-
mation security culture from a management perspective. The paper adopts
an eight dimensional organizational culture model from the management sci-
ences. Each of the dimensions in this model is discussed in terms of its use
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to model an information security culture. The adoption of this model for
information security culture is performed based on past case studies. The
first dimension in this model deals with the basis of truth and rationality.
The authors argue that the beliefs that decision makers in an organization
have about the organization’s current information security, is more impor-
tant than those of end-users. The ability of both managers and end-users to
be critical of their own existing beliefs is what distinguishes a good culture
from a bad one. The second dimension in the model is the nature of time
and time horizon. It is important to not only focus on immediate concerns,
but also to have a long term strategy to develop security skills. The pre-
sented model’s third dimension is motivation. ”In an ideal security culture,
end-users, security administrators and managers will be motivated to re-
flect on their behavior at all times, to assess how their behavior influences
security and what they can do to improve security” (Ruighaver et al., 2007).
The fourth dimension is stability versus change, innovation, and/or personal
growth. According to Ruighaver et al. (2007) periodic processes of change
and innovation should purposely be built into an information security culture.
This would help the organization to be proactive in its security efforts, rather
than reactive. The fifth dimension of the model is orientation to work, tasks,
and coworkers. This dimension deals with finding the right balance for em-
ployees between information security and the ability to freely perform their
duties. Education of employees can also contribute significantly to this di-
mension. Through information security education employees would be more
able to determine the limits of ’acceptable use’ of information. The sixth
dimension is isolation versus collaboration/cooperation. It is important for
organizations to include people from all facets of the organization in both the
creation of information security policies, and the management of information
security processes on a day-to-day basis. Information security should not
be an isolated process handled by a small group of specialists (Ruighaver et
al., 2007). The seventh dimension is control, coordination and responsibil-
ity. This dimension deals with the need for information security governance
in the organization. The final dimension is orientation and focus - internal
and/or external. This dimension deals with how much focus is given to the
internal (inside the organization) versus the external security environments.
The authors believe that an organization with a secure culture should have a
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balanced focus. This model does not adapt existing theory, but rather uses
theory from the management sciences as is for the purposes of information
security.
Schlienger and Teufel (2003) present a framework for the analysis of the
information security culture of an organization. This framework is discussed
in terms of a case study implementation. The paper firstly provides a defini-
tion for an information security culture based on Schein’s corporate culture
model. This is followed by a discussion on the cyclical nature of managing
such a culture. During this process evaluation of the current culture plays an
important role. The paper briefly discusses the difficulties inherent in per-
forming such an evaluation. The evaluation process should be followed by the
identification of areas that could be improved. Data is provided on the areas
that were identified during the case study implementation. Schlienger and
Teufel (2003) next present the process that was followed to affect the iden-
tified changes. This process started with strategic planning sessions during
which a clear target culture was determined and organizational members were
segmented according to the similarity of their attitudes towards the cultural
targets. Strategic planning was followed by operative planning. During this
phase internal communication, management buy-in, and the security aware-
ness and training program was planned. Proper planning is vital for the
success of security awareness, training and education. ”The security aware-
ness and training program leads from become aware to stay aware and ends
up in be aware, which changes a security culture definitively.” (Schlienger
& Teufel, 2003). This operative planning phase was followed by an imple-
mentation phase. During this final phase an internal marketing exercise was
conducted to ensure buy in from all role-players.
Schultz (2004) calls for more information security training and awareness
research. The argument is made that awareness should not just consist of
posters, or coffee cups and pens with slogans. It is also argued that ”one size
fits all” awareness programs are not suitable.
Sharma and Sefchek (2007) describe a hands-on information systems
security curriculum forming part of formal tertiary education for information
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technology students. The described approach focuses on technical educa-
tion of IT specialists, and not on end-user awareness education. The paper
first justifies the need for information security education and then briefly
overviews applicable literature. The authors sub-divided the curriculum into
three separate under-graduate courses in order to ensure adequate coverage
of the field of information systems security. The structure and content of
the three courses are discussed. It is emphasized that the target learners
are information systems students who wish to specialize in security. Next
Sharma and Sefchek (2007) elaborate on the available lab infrastructure, fol-
lowed by some insight into the underlying pedagogy of the courses. Some
detail of actual content in assignments and tutorials is provided, followed by
a section on lessons that were learned during the creation of the described
curriculum. The authors assert that students performed best in laboratory
exercises where they had some prior knowledge of the subject material, or
where they were able to perform the tasks on their home PCs. One criticism
of the approach mentioned by Sharma and Sefchek (2007) is that one could
argue the same exercise is enabling students to become computer criminals.
No mention is made of e-learning modules, however, technology is used ex-
tensively during the actual courses.
Shaw, Chen, Harris, and Huang (2009) use statistical methods to study
the impact of information richness on the effectiveness of information security
awareness training. The paper briefly discusses the need for information
security awareness and for the fostering of an information security culture.
This discussion is followed by a brief overview of problems with current aware-
ness education. Specific attention is paid to how awareness education should
be delivered and the lack of a fully developed methodology for the deliver-
ance of awareness education is cited as a major problem. The study is based
on various conceptual foundations. The first of these is the growing impor-
tance of security awareness programs in organizations. The second concep-
tual foundation was the major challenges existing awareness programs have
in changing user perception, comprehension, or the ability to anticipate fu-
ture security incidents. The third conceptual foundation was that e-learning
systems is a feasible alternative for the delivery of security awareness, and
the final foundation was the influence of media richness on the effectiveness
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of online information security education. Hypothesis testing was used to
evaluate various theories. The findings indicated that;
• users with a higher perception of security risk are more likely to have
a high comprehension of these risks,
• users with a higher comprehension of security risks are better able to
project these risks (predict future incidents),
• hypermedia-based programs are more effective than multimedia-based
ones in enhancing both users’ comprehension of security issues, and
their projection ability with regards to security incidents, but are not
better than multimedia to enhance risk perception,
• and finally that multimedia-based programs are better than hypertext-
based ones in enhancing both users’ comprehension of security issues,
and their projection ability with regards to security incidents.
Hypermedia is thus better for security awareness education than multimedia,
which in turn is better than hypertext. There is thus clear indication that
media richness plays a significant role in enhancing security related learning.
Siponen (2000) provides a conceptual foundation for information security
awareness. The paper argues that problems with awareness programs can be
classified as either framework related, or content related. The framework cat-
egory consists of issues that can be approached from an engineering discipline
perspective. These issues can be researched in a quantitative and structural
fashion. The content category consist of issues that is better researched from
a qualitative perspective. According to Siponen (2000) there exists a great
need for research in the content category of information security awareness,
for example, ”how to motivate people to comply with security guidelines”
would lie in the content category. Siponen (2000) asserts that most research
in this content category of awareness tend to be descriptive in nature and
hence lacks adequate foundations. It is also argued that many current au-
thors recognize the need for attention to the behavioral aspect of information
security awareness but that the current publications only consider these is-
sues from an abstract viewpoint and lack theoretical basis (Siponen, 2000).
The paper attempts to partially address this problem. Firstly a theoretical
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 87
framework is provided for information security awareness approaches to deal
with motivation and attitude. This framework makes use of the theory of
reasoned action (intention leads to behavior), the theory of planned behavior
(TPB) (intention consists of attitude, subjective norms, and perceived be-
havioral control), the theory of intrinsic behavior (people want to determine
their own choices),and the technology acceptance model (TAM) (the inten-
tion to use ”systems” depends on both its perceived usefulness and how easy
it is to use). It is argued that the ease of use aspect of TAM and the per-
ceived behavioral control issues from TPB should be dealt with via technical
education and thus needs not be considered when trying to persuade users
towards secure behavior. Siponen (2000) also considers the way in which
people respond to awareness methods. Such responses can be either positive
(leading towards more acceptance and internalization of security messages),
or negative (leading towards resistance against the security message). It is
argued that qualitative measurement of such attitudes must be considered
during awareness efforts. A final part of the theoretical basis provided deals
with the reconsideration of current methods in light of the theoretical frame-
work provided earlier. The behavioral issues around current awareness should
be examined in order to ensure these issues are considered. Siponen (2000)
proceeds to argue that information security awareness should be prescrip-
tive: ”users often know the guidelines, but they fail to apply them correctly”
(Siponen, 2000). There should thus be both a role responsibility to apply
security controls, as well as a moral responsibility. This moral states ”this
obligation should be internal, coming from within the individual” (Siponen,
2000), hence an information security culture is needed. Various approaches
that reflect these prescriptive requirements are briefly discussed. It is rec-
ommended that awareness program attempting persuasive strategies should
consider the following principles;
• logic (action should be logical, do not act inconsistently),
• emotions (security measures should aim to appeal to positive emotions),
• morals and ethics (secure behavior should be viewed as the right thing
to do),
• well-being (users should be aware of the threat to themselves, organi-
zations and society),
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• feeling of security (people should want to achieve a feeling of safety by
behaving securely),
• and rationality (people should know why they need to behave in a
certain way (rational explanations)).
This paper is one of the earliest papers to seriously address the behavioral
aspects of information security education.
Siponen (2001) examines information security awareness as more than
just an organizational issue. It is argued that information security awareness
should also be the concern of society at large. Siponen (2001) presents five
dimensions of information security awareness. The first is the organizational
dimension. In the organizational dimension five target groups for awareness
education is identified. These include top management, IT/IS management,
information security staff, computing/IS professionals, and end-users. Third
parties are also mentioned as a possible target group external to the organiza-
tion. It is argued that the information security needs of each of these groups
will be different. Awareness needs for the different categories of organiza-
tional users are briefly examined. The second identified dimension is the gen-
eral public dimension. Two categories of target groups are identified, namely
end users, and IT/computer/IS professionals. It is argued that there are
several central information security issues that every citizen using IT should
be aware of. Hence the need for general public information security aware-
ness. The third dimension discussed is the socio-political dimension. Target
groups in this dimension include lawyers, public relations people, politicians
and other government employees. The need for information security aware-
ness at this dimension is based on the overall well-being of society and its
dependance on proper legislatury frameworks for information security. It
is also important that the moral conceptions underlying IT law is realized
by politicians. The fourth dimension Siponen (2001) identifies is the com-
puter ethical dimension. This dimension should target the (computer) ethics
scholars. Its purpose is to focus on the creation of a body of knowledge such
scholars can draw upon. The final dimension identified is the institutional
education dimension. This dimension deals with society-driven processes of
education that are ”aimed at making individuals proper members of society”
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(Siponen, 2001). This dimension could thus also be interpreted as the need
for the fostering of an information security culture in society at large. The
ideas presented in this paper are, in the opinion of the author of this thesis,
of great importance to the field of information security education. However,
due to the specific focus of this thesis, only the organizational dimension will
be dealt with in this thesis.
Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, and Kiountouzis (2005) examine the
possible enhancements that could be made to the ISO17799 standard (now
the (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005)) through the consideration of criminology the-
ory. The paper specifically focuses on the aspect of an insider threat and
the criminology theories that deal with such a threat. The paper discusses
the possible role(s) of the general deterrence theory, the social bond theory,
the social learning theory, the theory of planned behavior, and the theory of
situational crime prevention. The paper does not specifically address the im-
plications of these theories for information security awareness, training and
education programs. Instead the focus is on an analysis of the ISO17799
standard, to determine the theoretical basis of this standard in terms of
criminology. However, since these theories deal with the behavioral aspects
of information security, the paper is included in this review to ensure that
the possible impact of these theories on information security educational pro-
grams is also considered.
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2005) discuss the commonalities and re-
lationships between the fields of corporate governance, information security
and corporate culture. The role of each of these fields, and how the ”other
two” influences information security, are first discussed individually. Once
the respective roles are identified K. Thomson and Von Solms (2005) exam-
ine the area of ”overlap” between these three fields. The paper advocates
the use of the term information security obedience to describe the area where
all three of these fields overlap in the support of each other and in support
of information security. It is argued that staff would behave in an obedient
way in terms of information security if all three areas support each other.
Firstly top management has to be committed to information security and
must espouse this commitment through policies and procedures. Secondly a
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culture of information security should exist through which employees would
want to behave securely.
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2006) present an information security com-
petence maturity model as a possible method to evaluate the extent to which
information security is entrenched in an organization’s culture. The paper
firstly discusses the significance of corporate culture and then briefly mentions
various methods of knowledge creation. Bloom’s Taxonomy is mentioned but
not discussed. This is followed by the presentation of the conscious com-
petence learning matrix. The conscious competence learning matrix views
learning as a four stage process. At the first stage the learner has uncon-
scious incompetence. In an information security context this would mean
that the users are completely unaware of their security role(s) and respon-
sibilities. The second stage of learning is conscious incompetence. At this
stage users would be aware of the existence and relevance of security tasks
but do not yet have the requisite knowledge or skills to perform these tasks.
The third stage of this learning matrix is conscious competence. At this stage
users will have the necessary knowledge or skills, but would still have to con-
sciously think about it in order to perform security related duties. The final
stage is unconscious competence. At this stage the task will become ”second
nature” to a user. K. Thomson and Von Solms (2006) present a maturity
model which is derived from the conscious competence learning matrix for
information security related knowledge. In the presented maturity model end
users can be moved from unconscious incompetence, through to unconscious
competence through the use of firstly awareness programs (to gain conscious
incompetence), then training (to gain conscious competence), and finally ex-
perience (which will lead to eventual unconscious competence).
K. Thomson, Von Solms, and Louw (2006) present a model for the culti-
vation of an organizational information security culture. The paper starts by
discussing what an information security culture is in depth. Reference is made
to the idea of information security obedience, as discussed in K. Thomson and
Von Solms (2005), as an amalgamation of corporate culture, corporate gov-
ernance and information security. The paper then outlines a Model for Infor-
mation Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values (MISSTEV). The first compo-
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nent of this model is the conscious competence learning model (K. Thomson
& Von Solms, 2006). The second component is Nonaka’s Modes of Knowl-
edge Creation, which identifies existing knowledge and ”converts” it to new
knowledge. This is done through socialization (one person’s tacit knowledge
is transfered to another person), externalization (tacit knowledge is made
explicit), combination (explicit knowledge is transferred through the orga-
nization via documents, etc), and internalization (an individual ”absorbs”
the explicit knowledge). The presented MISSTEV model details the progres-
sion of knowledge from an initial information security policy, via the men-
tioned learning models, to being realized as information security obedience.
K. Thomson et al. (2006) do not significantly modify the commonly used def-
initions of organizational culture to be specific to information security. How-
ever, the presented model does adapt existing theory about culture change
for the specific purposes of information security. Because the concept culture
change, or the establishment of a ”new” culture, forms an integral part of
the theory about organizational culture in general, this will be counted as
a modification of culture theory for the purposes of the qualitative content
analysis done in this chapter.
Valentine (2006) presents a multi-phased methodology for information
security awareness education. The paper firstly discusses, through the use
of specific example cases, some common failures of ”one-size-fits-all” infor-
mation security awareness education programs commonly used by organiza-
tions. The paper then presents the multi-phased methodology which can be
used to tailor information security awareness programs to be more specific
to the need of the intended target audience. This methodology consists of
three phases. The first phase is an assessment phase. During this phases
the organization has to ”scope” exactly what should be protected, and how
educational needs can assist in this protection. Employees need to know
what they are protecting and what the consequences of failure to protect
this resource would be for the organization. The second phase is an iden-
tification phase. All employees who interact with each resource that must
be protected should be identified. Employees should only be educated about
information security roles applicable to themselves. The final phases in the
methodology is an education phase. Due to the preceding assessment and
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identification phases, organizations should now have enough information to
create educational materials that are specific to the needs of the identified
users. Educational material can be partly scenario based and should include
incident response procedures. The approach presented in Valentine (2006)
is definitely a more formal pedagogical approach than most other current
approaches reviewed in this thesis. However, no formal references to cur-
rent pedagogical theories were provided to establish the credibility of this
approach.
Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004) examine the suitability of outcomes
based education as a pedagogical basis for information security education.
The paper firstly discusses the role humans play in information security and
justifies the need for user education. A list of requirements that should be
met by an educational program, specific to the need of information security
education, is proposed. Each of the proposed elements is briefly justified by
means of argument. The requirements include:
• ”Everyone should be able to ”pass” the course.”
• ”Employees must know why information security is important and why
a specific policy or control is in place.”
• ”Learning materials should be customized to the needs of individual
learners.”
• ”Users should be responsible for their own learning.”
• ”Users should be held accountable for their studies.” (Van Niekerk &
Von Solms, 2004)
A comparative analysis between the ”features” of outcomes based educa-
tion and the identified requirements of information security education is per-
formed. The paper concludes that outcomes based education would be a
suitable pedagogical basis for information security education.
B. Von Solms (2000) discusses the various waves characterizing infor-
mation security through the ages and argues that the third wave will be one
where information security becomes institutionalized. One of the aspects of
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institutionalized information security discussed in B. Von Solms (2000) is the
cultivation of an information security culture. B. Von Solms (2000, p. 618)
states that ”a culture of information security must be created in a company,
by instilling the aspects of information security to every employee as a nat-
ural way of performing his or her daily job”.
B. Von Solms (2006) further explores the themes first discussed in B. Von
Solms (2000). A fourth wave in information security is introduced in this pa-
per. The fourth wave is characterized by a relationship between information
security and corporate governance and this amalgamation is termed infor-
mation security governance. One of the aspects that is seen as integral to
information security governance is ”full user awareness and commitment to-
wards good information security” (B. Von Solms, 2006, p. 167). It is argued
that this fourth wave in information security is not a technical wave and that
”other (non-technical) issues like awareness and compliance management, en-
suring that the stakeholders conform to all relevant policies, procedures and
standards” (B. Von Solms, 2006, p. 168) form the core of good information
security governance.
R. Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) present an hierarchical structure to
demonstrate how information security policies could lead to eventual behav-
ioral change amongst employees. The paper firstly examines what a policy is.
Secondly, the concept of corporate culture is examined and the role policies
play in such a culture is discussed. The ten commandments from the Chris-
tian Bible is then used as an analogy to present the hierarchical structure
through which policies could lead to changed behavior. How these command-
ments influenced religious beliefs and led to laws in many countries, which in
turn ultimately provide directives for daily behavior in these countries is dis-
cussed in depth. The paper then argues that the vision of top management
should be structured into a proper policy and procedure framework. This
will ensure that the conceptual ideas of management (vision) are entrenched
in a set of logically structured documents. The contents of these documents
should then be communicated to all employees via a ”well defined process
of education, reminders, refresher courses, etc” (R. Von Solms & Von Solms,
2004, p. 279). If the education is successful it will become entrenched in
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daily behavior which will ultimately change the organizational culture.
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) explore problems an organization would
face if they wanted to audit the information security behavior of employees.
The paper firstly examines auditing in general and then explores IT auditing
and information security auditing. This is followed by a discussion of the
human factors in information security and the possible problems that might
prohibit the auditing of user behavior. After a detailed examination it is
concluded that the auditing of end-user information security behavior would
not be a plausible approach towards ensuring behavioral compliance. Vroom
and Von Solms (2004) proceed to argue that the fostering of an information
security culture in organizations would be a better approach towards ensur-
ing behavioral compliance. The paper briefly presents a definition of such a
culture and finally provides some suggestions on the changing of organiza-
tional culture.
Werlinger, Hawkey, and Beznosov (2008) use empirical methods to iden-
tify and then describe challenges that information security practitioners face.
The study focuses on the interplay among human, organizational, and tech-
nological factors. The paper briefly discusses the need to examine the various
factors and then presents the methodology used to gather the primary data
in the study. Three of the challenges identified are classified by the authors
as forming part of the human factor in information security. These include
a lack of security training, a lack of an organizational information security
culture, and challenges with the communication of security issues. Com-
munication (and education) about information security issues were found to
be particularly problematic where various stakeholders had different percep-
tions of the underlying risks. The paper continues to present a framework to
assist with the understanding of the interplay between various identified fac-
tors. The paper does specifically discuss the need for an information security
culture but does not discuss the underlying motivational/behavioral issues.
White House (2003b) presents a national strategy for information security
training and awareness. The document identifies a lack of familiarity, knowl-
edge and understanding of information security issues, as well as a lack of
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adequately trained IT staff to manage secure systems as major barriers to
the improvement of the USA’s cybersecurity. The document aims to firstly
promote a national information security awareness program amongst all sec-
tors, including home users and small business, large enterprizes, institutes
of higher education, private sectors, state and local governments. Secondly,
the document aims to foster adequate training and educational programs to
support the country’s cybersecurity needs. It also aims to improve the effi-
ciency of existing programs, and finally to promote private sector support for
information security certifications. This document does not directly address
how these aims will be met, it only justifies the need for them. The simi-
larities between this high level strategy and the earlier call for information
security awareness to be dealt with as a problem for society as a whole by
Siponen (2001) is noteworthy. The actions and recommendations in support
of the aims outlined in White House (2003b) is presented in White House
(2003a). Once again these are at a strategic level and primarily deals with
the establishment of various task teams and/or committees, as well as calls
upon various agencies to participate in national strategies.
Williams (2008) examines user needs when dealing with information security
in a health care environment. The paper firstly outlines several information
security related problems in the health care environment. These include the
sensitive nature of the information, a lack of conceptual understanding of
information security amongst health care professionals, the underestimation
of threats (lack of awareness), and too much focus on technological solutions
as opposed to addressing the lack of an information security culture amongst
health care professionals. The study shows that health care professionals are
often trusted with sensitive information, and that they are also trusted to be
aware of the necessary security measures. However, despite this trust there
exists a lack of knowledge, a lack of the capability to perform security related
tasks, and an attitude that security issues are not a day-to-day priority. The
study also found cost and time constraints, inconsistent security practices,
and poorly implemented controls.
Wylder (2004) suggests incorporating information security responsibili-
ties into employees’ job performance criteria (Wylder, 2004, p. 100). From
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a human resource management perspective this would bring the task ensur-
ing compliance into existing policies and procedures. Wylder (2004) elabo-
rates on this idea through the suggestion of creating a personal security plan
for every employee (Wylder, 2004, pp. 100-106). This approach towards
addressing the human side on information security is unique amongst the
approaches reviewed in this chapter in that it directly involves the human
resource department in the management of the human factor in information
security. One of the important aspects of this personal security plan is that
every employee would, on an annual basis, have to ”sign a notice that he
understands and complies with the corporate information security manual”
(Wylder, 2004, p. 103). Wylder (2004) does not elaborate on how this un-
derstanding should be fostered, and is thus of limited use for the purposes of
this thesis. However, the uniqueness of the approach justifies its inclusion in
this review.
4.5 Summary of the content analysis
The results of the qualitative content analysis conducted as part of this lit-
erature review are presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1: Summary of qualitative content analysis regarding the
extent of adaptation of organizational culture theory to the specific
needs of information security.
Study Mentions Specifically Adapts
Importance mentions Existing
of Information Culture
Behavioral Security Theory
Aspects Culture
(Content
Category)
Alnatheer and Nelson (2009) X X
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) X
Ashenden (2008) X X
Atkinson et al. (2009) X
Aytes and Connolly (2003) X
Bryce and Klang (2009) X
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Study Mentions Specifically Adapts
Importance mentions Existing
of Information Culture
Behavioral Security Theory
Aspects Culture
(Content
Category)
Chang and Lin (2007) X X
Chen et al. (2008) X
Choi et al. (2008) X
Cohen (1999) X
Cone et al. (2007)
Da Veiga and Eloff (2009) X X X
Dhillon (2007) X X
Dodge et al. (2007)
Drevin et al. (2007) X
Du et al. (2006)
Finne (1996) X X
Furnell (2008) X
Furnell et al. (2001) X
Furnell et al. (2002) X
Furnell and Thomson (2009a) X X X
Furnell and Thomson (2009b) X
Gaunt (1998) X
Gaunt (2000) X X
Goucher (2008) X
Grimson et al. (2000)
Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009) X X
Hentea (2005) X X
Herold (2005) X
Hu and Meinel (2004)
Johnson (2006) X X
Kabay (2002) X X
Katsikas (2000)
Knapp et al. (2006) X X
Kraemer et al. (2009) X
Kritzinger and Smith (2008) X
Kruger and Kearney (2006) X X
Kruger and Kearney (2008) X
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Study Mentions Specifically Adapts
Importance mentions Existing
of Information Culture
Behavioral Security Theory
Aspects Culture
(Content
Category)
Layton (2005) X
Leach (2003) X X
May (2008) X X
Mitchell et al. (1999) X
Mitnick and Simon (2002) X
Mitnick and Simon (2006) X
NIST 800-16 (1998) X X
NIST 800-50 (2003) X
OECD (2002) X X
Power and Forte (2006a) X X
Power and Forte (2006b) X
Puhakainen (2006) X X
Rezgui and Marks (2008) X X
Rheea et al. (2009) X
Roper et al. (2005) X
Rudolf et al. (2002) X
Ruighaver et al. (2007) X X
Schlienger and Teufel (2003) X X
Schultz (2004)
Sharma and Sefchek (2007)
Shaw et al. (2009) X X
Siponen (2000) X X
Siponen (2001) X
Theoharidou et al. (2005) X
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2005) X X
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2006) X X
K. Thomson et al. (2006) X X X
Valentine (2006)
Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004) X X
B. Von Solms (2000) X X
B. Von Solms (2006) X X
R. Von Solms and Von Solms (2004) X X
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
Study Mentions Specifically Adapts
Importance mentions Existing
of Information Culture
Behavioral Security Theory
Aspects Culture
(Content
Category)
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) X X
Werlinger et al. (2008) X
White House (2003b) and
White House (2003a) X
Williams (2008) X X
Wylder (2004)
Table 4.2: Summary of qualitative content analysis determining the
extent of the use of formal pedagogics in the creation of information
security educational content.
Study Formal Mentions Uses
Approach use Technology
to of a and/or
Creating Learning E-Learning
Learning Taxonomy for
Content content
Pedagogics Delivery
Alnatheer and Nelson (2009)
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) X
Ashenden (2008)
Atkinson et al. (2009) X
Aytes and Connolly (2003) X
Bryce and Klang (2009)
Chang and Lin (2007)
Chen et al. (2008) X X
Choi et al. (2008)
Cohen (1999)
Cone et al. (2007) X
Da Veiga and Eloff (2009)
Continued on next page
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW 100
Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
Study Formal Mentions Uses
Approach use Technology
to of a and/or
Creating Learning E-Learning
Learning Taxonomy for
Content content
Pedagogics Delivery
Dhillon (2007)
Dodge et al. (2007)
Drevin et al. (2007)
Du et al. (2006) X X
Finne (1996)
Furnell (2008)
Furnell et al. (2001) X
Furnell et al. (2002) X
Furnell and Thomson (2009a)
Furnell and Thomson (2009b)
Gaunt (1998)
Gaunt (2000)
Goucher (2008) X
Grimson et al. (2000) X
Guenther (2001) X
Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009) X X
Hentea (2005) X
Herold (2005) X X
Hu and Meinel (2004) X X
Johnson (2006) X
Kabay (2002)
Katsikas (2000) X
Knapp et al. (2006)
Kraemer et al. (2009)
Kritzinger and Smith (2008)
Kruger and Kearney (2006) X X
Kruger and Kearney (2008) X
Layton (2005)
Leach (2003)
May (2008) X
Mitchell et al. (1999)
Mitnick and Simon (2002)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
Study Formal Mentions Uses
Approach use Technology
to of a and/or
Creating Learning E-Learning
Learning Taxonomy for
Content content
Pedagogics Delivery
Mitnick and Simon (2006)
NIST 800-16 (1998) X
NIST 800-50 (2003) X X
OECD (2002)
Power and Forte (2006a) X
Power and Forte (2006b)
Puhakainen (2006)
Rezgui and Marks (2008)
Rheea et al. (2009)
Roper et al. (2005)
Rudolf et al. (2002) X
Ruighaver et al. (2007)
Schlienger and Teufel (2003)
Schultz (2004)
Sharma and Sefchek (2007) X X
Shaw et al. (2009) X X
Siponen (2000) X
Siponen (2001)
Theoharidou et al. (2005)
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2005)
K. Thomson and Von Solms (2006) X
K. Thomson et al. (2006)
Valentine (2006) X
Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004) X X
B. Von Solms (2000)
B. Von Solms (2006)
R. Von Solms and Von Solms (2004)
Vroom and Von Solms (2004)
Werlinger et al. (2008)
White House (2003b) and
White House (2003a)
Williams (2008)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – continued from previous page
Study Formal Mentions Uses
Approach use Technology
to of a and/or
Creating Learning E-Learning
Learning Taxonomy for
Content content
Pedagogics Delivery
Wylder (2004)
A total of 75 sources were included in the review conducted in this chap-
ter. A summary of the results of the qualitative content analysis is presented
in table 4.3. The majority of the reviewed sources acknowledge the impor-
tance of the behavioral aspects of the human factor in information security.
The fostering of an information security culture, as a way to address the
behavioral aspects of the human factor in information security, is also widely
acknowledged. However, only 3 of the reviewed sources adapt the generic
definition of organizational culture to be more specific to the needs of infor-
mation security. This clearly demonstrates the need for the first research
objective of this thesis, namely to provide a model to specifically define an
information security culture, as discussed in section 1.7. The results also
show that less than a quarter of the reviewed approaches is based on, or rec-
ommends the use of, a formal, pedagogically sound, approach for the creation
of information security educational material. One approach which could pos-
sibly improve the quality of information security educational content, is the
use of a learning taxonomy. Only one of the reviewed sources mentioned the
use of such a taxonomy. This demonstrates the relevancy and significance
of the second research objective of this thesis, namely to demonstrate how a
learning taxonomy can be used to design and develop information security
educational material.
Finally, despite the fact that the field of information security has its roots
in technology, very few of the current approaches towards dealing with the
human factors in information security leverages/or recommends the use of
technology in delivering educational content. This demonstrates the rele-
vancy and significance of the third research objective of this thesis, to demon-
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strate how technology can be used in a pedagogically sound way as a channel
for the delivery of learning content.
Topic evaluated Number Percentage
of Sources of Total
Acknowledges the importance of the behavioral aspects
of the human factor in information security 56 74.6 %
Mentions the need for an information security
culture 43 57.3 %
Adapts the generic definition for organizational
culture to be specific for information security 3 4 %
Uses and/or proposes a formal pedagogical approach
to create information security educational content 17 22.7 %
Mentions the use of a learning taxonomy to design
information security educational content 1 1.3 %
Advocates and/or mentions the use of technology based
(e-learning) media channels to deliver information
security educational content 22 29.3 %
Table 4.3: Summary of results for the qualitative content analysis of literature
sources
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed literature review of current approaches to-
wards the human factor in information security. An extensive overview of
current approaches was provided. The purpose of this overview was to pro-
vide insight into current thinking in the field of study. The overview was done
in conjunction with a qualitative content analysis of the reviewed approaches.
The primary purpose of this content analysis was to clearly establish the need
for, and hence the relevance of, the research objectives of this thesis. The
analysis showed a clear need for these objectives. Firstly, it showed that
very few current authors adapted the generic model, as presented by Schein
(1999a, pp. 15-16), which is commonly used to define organizational culture,
to be specific to the needs of information security. Such an adaptation is the
first objective defined in section 1.7. Secondly, it was found that no current
authors used a learning taxonomy during the planning/design of information
security educational programs. The second objective of this thesis, namely
to demonstrate how the use of a learning taxonomy can be used to add ped-
agogical rigor to information security educational programs, is thus relevant.
Thirdly, the analysis showed that less than a third of current approaches
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advocates any form of electronic delivery channel for the delivery of infor-
mation security education. The third objective, which is to demonstrate the
suitability of e-learning as a delivery medium for organizational information
security educational programs, is thus also relevant. It can be argued that
the relevance of the final research objective listed in section 1.7, which is
to demonstrate how the various elements contributed by this thesis integrates
into existing transformative change management processes for the fostering
of an organizational information security culture, is a natural extension of the
first three and would be necessary in order to show the relationship between
the first three objectives. Having established the relevance of the research
objectives, the remainder of this thesis will focus on addressing these research
objectives. The next chapter will address the first of the listed research ob-
jectives, namely, to adapt the generic definition of organizational culture to
the specific needs of an information security culture.
Chapter 5
INFORMATION SECURITY
CULTURE
This chapter firstly examines corporate culture. It defines corporate culture
and then expands the definition of corporate culture towards a specific defi-
nition for information security culture. Finally, a conceptual model of infor-
mation security culture is presented in order to facilitate improved under-
standing of such a culture.
5.1 Introduction
Most current information security user education programs fail to pay ad-
equate attention to behavioral theories (Siponen, 2001). The emphasis of
user education programs should be to build an organizational culture of
information security, by instilling the aspects of information security in ev-
ery employee as a natural way of performing his or her daily job (B. Von
Solms, 2000). Studies have indicated that the establishment of an infor-
mation security culture in the organization is desirable for effective infor-
mation security (B. Von Solms, 2000). Such a culture should support all
business activities in such a way that information security becomes a natural
aspect in the daily activities of every employee (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
In order to better understand exactly what an information security culture
is, it is necessary to first understand the concept of culture in general, and
then the more specific idea of an organizational culture.
As mentioned in chapter 3, The American Heritage Dictionary of the
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English Language (2000) defines a culture as:
• The totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs,
institutions, and all other products of human work and thought.
• The predominating attitudes and behavior that characterize the func-
tioning of a group or organization.
In terms of information security, a corporate culture of information security
can thus be seen as the predominating attitudes towards information security
and security related behavior that characterize the functioning of the employ-
ees within the organization. Thus, in an organization that has a culture of
information security, the employees would adhere to proper security prac-
tices during execution of their day-to-day functions because that is simply
the way things are done. In other words, employees would have the correct
attitude towards information security. It is obvious that in order for employ-
ees to be able to adhere to proper security practices the employees would
first have to know what proper security practices are. Therefore, information
security education would have to play a key role in the establishment of such
a culture.
Even though user education is essential for the establishment of a suc-
cessful corporate culture of information security, education on its own cannot
change a corporate culture. To ensure the successful protection of infor-
mation assets, a formalized approach towards establishing and maintaining
a corporate culture needs to be taken. Such an approach would also require
a formal definition of exactly what an information security culture is. This
thesis already presented an informal definition of such a culture. However,
since failure to pay sufficient attention to behavioral theories is one of the
primary weaknesses of current security education programs (Siponen, 2001),
this thesis will use a more formal definition of corporate culture from the
management sciences, as presented by Schein (1999a, p. 16). The aim of this
chapter is to firstly adapt the ”generic” model which Schein (1999a) uses to
define corporate culture, to a model which is more specific to the needs of
information security culture. Secondly, this chapter will present a conceptual
model, based on the adapted definition, to facilitate improved understanding
of an information security culture. Since, the aim of establishing an infor-
mation security culture would be to manage employee behavior, it would
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be sensible to also ”borrow” the necessary methodologies and/or definitions
from the human and social sciences.
5.2 Research Methodology and Process
This chapter adapts the generic model which is used to define organizational
culture, as presented by Schein (1999a, pp. 15-16), to the specific needs of
information security. The adapted model is then used as basis for a concep-
tual model which aims at to facilitate improved understanding of an infor-
mation security culture. The work in this chapter is based on qualitative,
or phenomenological-, research methods, as described in Creswell (1998), as
well as the guidelines for design science, as described by Hevner et al. (2004).
The process followed should thus be seen as ”an inquiry process of under-
standing based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore
a social or human problem” (Creswell, 1998, p. 15). The research presented
here does not attempt to define new knowledge, but rather to provide a
more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon described as ”information
security culture”.
In order to achieve this aim a conceptual model was developed over a
period of three years. The primary methodology followed in the design of
this model was design science, as discussed by Hevner et al. (2004). Design
science is ”fundamentally a problem solving paradigm” (Hevner et al., 2004).
The following outline demonstrates how the design process followed for the
work in this chapter adheres to the guidelines provided by Hevner et al.
(2004):
• Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact. The developed conceptual
model satisfies all the requirements of a valid artifact as described by
Hevner et al. (2004).
• Guideline 2: Problem Relevance. The need for a model that specif-
ically defines information security culture, as opposed to the generic
model of organizational culture used in most current literature, was
established in section 4.5.
• Guideline 3: Design Evaluation. The design was evaluated by
means of argument, as discussed in Mason (1996, pp. 187-189), and
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the utility of the design has been illustrated by means of examples.
• Guideline 4: Research Contributions. The designed model, which
defines an information security culture, is the primary contribution of
the design process. This model was accepted for publication in the
journal Computers & Security as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010).
• Guideline 5: Research Rigor. Strict adherence to the guidelines
provided by Hevner et al. (2004), as well as adherence to guidelines for
phenomenological research methods, as described in Creswell (1998),
ensured the research rigor of the design process.
• Guideline 6: Design as a Search Process. The process through
which the model was designed occurred over a 3 year period. An initial
design was was created and argued. This initial design was then pre-
sented at the Information Security South Africa conference as Van Niek-
erk and Von Solms (2006b). Based on the feedback received from both
reviewers and the audience at this conference the design was further
refined and submitted to the Journal of Computers & Security. This
version of the design went through four review and improvement cycles
before it was finalized and published as Van Niekerk and Von Solms
(2010).
• Guideline 7: Communication of Research. As mentioned above,
the design was published as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010). This
satisfies the criteria for communicating the research.
5.3 Corporate Culture Defined
Every organization has a particular culture, comprising an omnipresent set
of assumptions that is often difficult to fathom, and that directs the activities
within the organization (Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 382). Such a culture could
be defined as; the beliefs and values shared by people in an organization
(Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 382). Beliefs and values, however, are both concepts
that can be difficult to quantify. It is therefore often tempting to think of
culture as just ”the way we do things around here” (Schein, 1999a, p. 15),
or that ”something” that makes an organization more successful than others
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(Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). However, oversimplifying the concept of
culture is the biggest danger to understanding it (Schein, 1999a, p. 15).
Artifacts
Espoused values
Basic underlying
assumptions
Visible organizational structures
and processes
(hard to decipher)
Strategies, goals, philosophies
(espoused justifications)
Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs,
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings
(ultimate source of values and action)
Figure 5.1: Levels of Culture (adapted from Schein, 1999, p. 16)
A better way to think about culture is to examine the different ”levels”
at which culture exists (Schein, 1999a, p. 15). Figure 5.1 illustrates these
different levels. This way of thinking about corporate culture is already
widely accepted in information security (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In order
to clarify these levels of culture, each of the levels will now be briefly examined
in more depth.
Level One: Artifacts
Artifacts are what you can observe, see, hear, and feel, in an organization
(Schein, 1999a, p. 15). Artifacts would include visible organizational struc-
tures and processes. At the level of artifacts, culture is very clear and has
an immediate emotional impact, which could be positive or negative, on the
observer (Schein, 1999a, p. 16). Observing the artifacts alone, however, does
not explain why the members of the organization behave as they do (Schein,
1999a, p. 16). In order to understand the reasons for the behavior patterns
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of organization members it is necessary to examine ”deeper” levels of culture
(Schein, 1999a, p. 16), such as the organization’s espoused values.
Level Two: Espoused Values
An organization’s espoused values are the ”reasons” an organizational insider
would give for the observed artifacts (Schein, 1999a, p. 17), for example;
that the organization believes in team work, that everyone in the organiza-
tion’s view is important in the decision making process, etc. Espoused values
generally consist of the organization’s official viewpoints, such as mission-
or vision-statements, strategy documents, and any other documents that de-
scribe the organization’s values, principles, ethics, and visions (Schein, 1999a,
p. 17). However, it is possible for two organizations to have very different ob-
servable artifacts and yet share very similar espoused values (Schein, 1999a,
pp. 18-19). This is because there is an even deeper level of thought and
perception that drives the overt, or observable, behavior (Schein, 1999a, p.
19). The espoused values are values which the organization wants to live up
to. The interpretation, and application, of these espoused values in the day
to day running of the organization depend on the shared tacit assumptions
between the employees of that organization.
Level Three: Shared Tacit Assumptions (Basic Underlying As-
sumptions)
In any successful organization, shared tacit assumptions will eventually de-
velop. Often these assumptions are formed in the organization’s early years,
because certain strategies have proven to be successful (Schein, 1999a, p.
19). If strategies based on specific beliefs and values continue to be suc-
cessful, these beliefs and values gradually come to be shared and taken for
granted. The beliefs and values become tacit assumptions about the nature
of the world and how to succeed in it (Schein, 1999a, p. 19). These values,
beliefs, and assumptions that have become shared and taken for granted in
an organization, form the essence of that organization’s culture. Beliefs, in
this sense, refer to a group of people’s convictions about the world and how
it works, whilst values refer to a community’s basic assumptions about what
ideals are worth pursuing (Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). It is important to
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remember that the shared tacit assumptions resulted from a joint learning
process.
The corporate culture of any organization, is a result of all three the
above levels. At its most basic, and most difficult to quantify, level, the
members of the organization share certain beliefs and values. These shared
tacit assumptions act as a kind of ”filter”, which affects how individuals will
carry out their normal day-to-day activities. It also influences how these
individuals interpret the organization’s policies, and how they implement its
procedures. These policies and procedures form part of the organization’s es-
poused values. The espoused values can be seen as the ”visible” contribution
of the organization’s management towards the organization’s culture. To a
degree, espoused values provide cultural direction. The interpretation of this
”direction”, however, is extremely dependant on the underlying shared tacit
assumptions.
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Figure 5.2: The Effect of the Combination of Culture Levels
The combination of the espoused values, and the ”filtering effect” of the
shared tacit assumptions on these espoused values, results in the visible, and
measurable artifacts. This relationship is demonstrated in Figure 5.2. In
terms of Figure 5.2 a strong culture would be a culture where the under-
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lying beliefs and values of the employees are aligned with the policies and
other espoused values, as laid down by the organization’s management. In
such a culture, the measurable artifacts would have a strong correlation to
the espoused values and the underlying shared tacit assumptions. On the
other hand, in terms of the ”filtering effect” as illustrated by Figure 5.2, a
weak culture would be a culture where the shared tacit assumptions are not
aligned with the espoused values. Such a culture would result in a weaker cor-
relation between the espoused values and the measurable artifacts. In such a
culture the underlying beliefs and values are not in line with management’s
vision for the organization. This misalignment results in two opposing forces,
indicated by the vectors A and B in Figure 5.2, whose counter-acting effects
result in artifacts which are not in line with management’s vision. Vector
A indicates that the espoused values are more ”management orientated”, or
more authoritarian. Vector B indicates that the underlying beliefs and val-
ues of the employees are more ”employee orientated”, or less authoritarian.
As shown in Figure 5.2, the opposing forces in a weak culture could make it
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict the artifacts. However, if the
espoused values and the shared tacit assumptions are perfectly aligned, as
shown on the right-hand side of Figure 5.2, it should be possible to accurately
predict the resulting artifacts. The terms strong and weak, as used above,
do not refer to the actual stability of the culture, or to the magnitude of the
culture’s impact on the visible artifacts, instead it refers to the desirability
of the culture in terms of management’s vision for the organization. A strong
culture, in the context used above, is thus a culture where the measurable
results of the way things are done in the organization, are both predictable
and desirable. According to Schein (1999a, pp. 25-26) the magnitude of any
organizational culture should not be underestimated. Schein (1999a, pp. 25-
26) provides the following three basic facets of any organizational culture
that should always be kept in mind when working with culture:
1. Culture is deep: If culture is treated as superficial any results to change
it will always fail. Culture controls people more than people control
culture. This is because culture is based on tacit assumptions that
form part of the basic belief systems of people.
2. Culture is broad: All aspects of both internal and external relationships
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in an organization are affected by culture. Beliefs and values are formed
about every aspect of daily life. Deciphering culture can thus seem like
an endless task.
3. Culture is stable: Culture provides meaning to day-to-day activities
and makes life more predictable. Humans do not like chaotic or unpre-
dictable situations, and thus always try to ”normalize” such situations.
Attempts to change an existing culture is therefor always met with high
levels of anxiety and resistance to change. Culture is one of the most
stable facets in an organization.
For an organizational sub-culture of information security, an additional
dimension to the culture needs to be considered if the employees are ex-
pected to behave in the correct way. This additional dimension is the rele-
vant information security knowledge (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). An
information security culture’s definition would thus deviate slightly from the
standard definition for corporate culture (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010).
5.4 Information Security Culture
In ”normal” definitions of organizational culture, the relevant job-related
knowledge is generally ignored, because it can be assumed that the average
employee would have the requisite knowledge to do his/her job. In the case of
information security, the required knowledge is not necessarily needed to per-
form the employee’s normal job functions. Knowledge of information security
is generally only needed when it is necessary to perform the normal job func-
tions in a way that is consistent with good information security practices. It
cannot be assumed that the average employee has the necessary knowledge
to perform his/her job in a secure manner. If an organization is trying to
foster a sub-culture of information security, all activities would have to be
performed in a way that is consistent with good information security practice.
Having adequate knowledge regarding information security is a prerequisite
to performing any normal activity in a secure manner. Information security
knowledge, or a lack thereof, could therefor be seen as a fourth level to an
information security culture that will affect each of the other three layers.
For example:
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Artifacts: Artifacts are what actually happens in the organization. With-
out the necessary skills and proficiencies, it would be impossible to
perform information related tasks securely. Thus, for the day-to-day
task to happen in a secure way, the users would have to have sufficient
knowledge of how to perform their tasks securely.
Espoused Values: To create the policy document, the person, or team,
responsible for the drafting of the policy must know what to include in
such a policy in order to adequately address the organization’s security
needs.
Shared Tacit Assumptions: This layer consists of the beliefs and values
of employees. If such a belief should conflict with one of the espoused
values, knowing why a specific control is needed, might play a vital
role in ensuring compliance (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
Corporate
Culture
Information Security
Culture
Artifacts
Espoused
Values
Shared Tacit
Assumptions
Artifacts
Espoused
Values
Shared Tacit
Assumptions
Visible organizational structures and processes
(measurable, could be hard to decipher)
Strategies, goals, philosophies
(espoused justifications, official viewpoints)
Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs,
perceptions, thoughts, feelings
(ultimate source of values and action)
Necessary underlying Information Security
related Knowledge (What, How, and Why)
Knowledge
Figure 5.3: Levels of Culture (adapted from Schein, 1999, p. 16)
It should be clear that in an information security culture, knowledge un-
derpins and supports all three the ”normal” levels of corporate culture.
Without adequate knowledge, information security cannot be ensured. The
co-dependency between the three ”normal” levels of an organization’s infor-
mation security culture, and knowledge, the ”fourth level”, implies that each
of these four levels will have an impact on how ”secure”, or desirable, the over-
all information security culture will be. The first part of the model presented
in this chapter is thus an adaptation of Schein’s model. This adaptation
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incorporates the underlying need for information security related knowledge
into Schein’s model. Knowledge is added as a fourth level of culture that
is specific to an information security culture. This adaptation is necessary
because in an information security culture the requisite knowledge cannot
be assumed to be present. Figure 5.3, provides a graphical exposition
of this adaptation. In this presented conceptual model, knowledge is dealt
with as an additional level to culture, as opposed to viewing knowledge as
a sub-component of each of the original three levels. This is done solely be-
cause modeling knowledge as an additional level makes it easier to clearly
show the effect that knowledge, or a lack thereof, would have on the overall
information security culture.
In order to ensure an adequate level of information security knowledge,
international standards such as ISO/IEC 17799 (ISO/IEC 17799, 2000) rec-
ommend the creation of an organizational information security awareness
campaign. Awareness campaigns address the problems that a lack of knowl-
edge could lead to. These campaigns help to create a culture of information
security, by instilling the aspects of information security in every employee
as a natural way of performing his or her daily job (B. Von Solms, 2000).
Awareness campaigns are the key elements in ensuring that the knowledge
level of an information security culture is of adequate ”strength”.
Before the interactions between the above levels of an information security
culture can be examined in more depth, a final ”tool” is needed. The concep-
tual model presented later in this chapter also needs to borrow the concept
of elasticity from the economical sciences.
5.5 Elasticity in Information Security Culture
Elasticity is a general economic concept that measures the change in one
variable caused by changes in other, related variables (Acs & Gerlowski, 1996,
p. 49). In other words, elasticity measures how sensitive a variable is to
change in another variable. In the presented model, the concept of elasticity
will be borrowed, but instead of attempting to measure the change the
concept will simply be used to explain the fact that change will be inherent
in any such system and that the speed at which such change takes place
depends on the degree of elasticity in the system. In order to provide more
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clarity of exactly what is meant by elasticity, another basic idea will first
be borrowed from the economic sciences. Figure 5.4 shows a basic supply
and a basic demand curve. According to economic theory (Acs & Gerlowski,
1996, p. 45) the market will be in equilibrium if the quantity of goods or
services demanded in the market is matched perfectly by the quantity of
goods or services supplied in this market. In such a system, assuming all
other variables are fixed, the price that could be asked for the goods or
services would be perfectly static and predictable.
Su
pp
ly
D
em
and
Quantity
P
ri
c
e
Equilibrium
Shortage
Surplus
Figure 5.4: Market Equilibrium. Adapted from (Acs & Gerlowski, 1996, p.
47)
If, however, one of the variables in such a market was to change, for
example if an increase in the quantity of goods or services demanded was to
occur, the equilibrium would be disturbed. In such a case the other variable,
the quantity of goods or services supplied would have to increase to match
the increase in demand in order to bring the system back into equilibrium.
While this situation of disequilibrium exists, the price that could be asked
for the goods or services supplied, would be more dynamic and difficult to
predict. In Figure 5.5, the price could fall anywhere in the shaded area, due
to the increase in demand.
The term elasticity is used in economics to describe the relationship,
shown in the above system, whereby increased demand would cause an in-
crease in supply to eventually bring the system back into equilibrium. How-
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Figure 5.5: Change in Equilibrium caused by Increased Demand. Adapted
from (Acs & Gerlowski, 1996, p. 48)
ever, not all systems would have the same inherent degree of elasticity. Elas-
ticity could in fact range from systems that are infinitely elastic to systems
that are completely inelastic. In an infinitely elastic system, shown in Figure
5.6, an increase in supply would have no effect on either the demand or the
price people would be willing to pay. Figure 5.6 thus does not even show
the supply curve since its position in such a perfectly elastic system is irrel-
evant in determining the price. On the other hand, in a completely inelastic
system, shown in Figure 5.7, the variables would be ”locked together”. The
supply and demand would thus always stay in equilibrium (Acs & Gerlowski,
1996, p. 51). An example of such an inelastic system would be certain types
of life saving medicines. People who need such medicines would be willing
to pay any price for such medicines. For the purposes of this chapter it is
also important to note that in such an inelastic system consumers would be
willing to pay any price but can only do so if they have the necessary means.
Without the necessary means even consumers who are willing to pay any
price would still be unable to do so.
A very similar situation to the one demonstrated above also exists when
one looks at the human factors in an organization’s information security en-
vironment. As discussed earlier, two of the basic ”levels” of an information
security culture would be the company’s espoused values and the employees’
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Figure 5.7: Perfectly Inelastic Demand Curve. Adapted from (Acs & Ger-
lowski, 1996, p. 52)
shared tacit assumptions. To a certain extent, it can be argued that the
policies and procedures comprising the espoused values in an information
security culture are an indication of how much security management is ”de-
manding” from employees. Similarly, the shared tacit assumptions can be
seen as a reflection of how much ”compliance” employees are willing to ”sup-
ply”. If one were to model these two ”supply” and ”demand” curves, the
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intersection of these curves would be an indication of the actual amount
of effort employees are willing to give. In other words, the ”price” in this
case would be the measurable employee participation in the organization’s
security efforts. Similarly, having the requisite knowledge to be able to par-
ticipate in these security efforts is analogous to having the means to pay
the required price. Such a system is modeled in Figure 5.8. If the manage-
ment expectations are in perfect equilibrium with the employees’ shared tacit
assumptions, the resulting effort employees expended on behalf of the orga-
nization’s information security would be perfectly predictable (Figure 5.8).
Should management expect more than employees are willing to provide, it
would be less easy to predict the actual amount of effort employees would
expend towards the overall security goals (Figure 5.9). It should also be clear
that employees who are in fact willing to perform their security related roles
would only be able to do so if they have the requisite knowledge.
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Figure 5.8: Management Expectations in Equilibrium with Employees
Security Contribution. Adapted from (Acs & Gerlowski, 1996, p. 47)
In an information security culture there exists a causal relationship be-
tween the artifact level and the other three levels. In other words: the
visible artifacts or, ”how the employees actually behave towards information
security”, is caused by the combined effects of the espoused values, the shared
tacit assumptions and the underlying information security knowledge. In Fig-
ure 5.8 the artifact level is represented by the intersection of the lines. In
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Figure 5.9 the artifact level is represented by the shaded area between the
two possible intersection points. This reflects the fact that it would be dif-
ficult to predict how employees will actually behave (artifacts) in a scenario
where management demands (espoused values) and the effort employees are
willing (shared tacit assumptions), or able (knowledge), to supply are not in
equilibrium. In such a causal relationship elasticity plays an important role.
More ”demanding” espoused values will have an elastic effect on the artifacts,
and will require a matching increase in the shared tacit assumptions and/or
the knowledge level(s). Thus, if an organization’s management increases the
”strength” of the organization’s security related policies and procedures, the
”demand” (security needed) will increase in Figures 5.8 and 5.9. Such an
increase will in turn require an increase in how much ”security effort” em-
ployees are willing to give, or an increase in the security related knowledge
of employees, or an increase in both. Without such matching increases in
the other levels of the security culture, the culture will not be in equilibrium
and it would thus become more difficult to predict the resulting employee
behavior (artifacts).
In order to simplify the representation of the elasticity concept, it should
be noted that the dynamic system represented in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 currently
does not explicitly show the knowledge level. The knowledge level should,
however, be assumed present in all cases. As mentioned above, this level can
be seen as representing the ability to ”pay” the demanded ”price”, and as
such will have an equally important effect on the resulting employee behavior
(artifacts) as the other two levels. The conceptual framework presented in
the rest of this chapter will attempt to clarify this causal relationship between
the artifact level and the other three levels of an information security culture.
5.6 Information Security Culture: A Concep-
tual Model
The overall effect of an organization’s information security culture can be
seen as an accumulation of the effects of each of the culture’s underlying
levels. Each of these levels can either positively or negatively influence the
information security culture. In order to clearly demonstrate the interactions
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Figure 5.9: Increased Management Expectations require Increased Employee
Participation. Adapted from (Acs & Gerlowski, 1996, p. 48)
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Figure 5.10: Basic Elements of the Conceptual Framework.
between these four levels, and their effects on the overall security efforts, it
is necessary to first provide a basic reference framework.
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5.6.1 Basic Elements and Terminology of the Concep-
tual Model
The basic elements of this framework are depicted in Figure 5.10. The rep-
resentation in this and subsequent Figures was chosen over the basic curves
used in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, because it is easier to model all the interactions
in this way, rather than adding an additional dimension to the model used
to examine the concept of elasticity. The elements in Figure 5.10 can be
described as follows:
• BL: Minimum Acceptable Base Line - This line indicates what would
be an acceptable minimum security baseline; in other words, a culture
whose net effect would meet the minimum requirements for some in-
dustry standard.
• SL: Nett Security Level - This line indicates the actual nett effect of
the culture on the overall security effort. This line can be seen as the
cumulative effect of the four underlying levels of the culture. The nett
security level (SL) can either be more secure (to the right), less secure
(to the left), or just as secure (overlapping) as the minimum acceptable
baseline (BL).
• AF: Artifacts - This node represents the relative strength of the artifact
level (AF) of the culture. If this node is to the left of the minimum
acceptable baseline (BL), it indicates that the measurable artifacts are
not as secure as they should be. A node to the right of the baseline (BL)
would indicate artifacts that are even more secure than the acceptable
minimum. A node exactly on the baseline (BL) would indicate artifacts
that are just as secure as required by this baseline.
• EV: Espoused Values - This node represents the relative strength of
the organization’s espoused value level (EV). The various policies and
procedures comprising this level could be more, less, or just as compre-
hensive than those recommended as the minimum acceptable baseline.
• SA: Shared Tacit Assumptions - This node represents the relative strength
of the organization’s shared tacit assumption level (SA). The underly-
ing beliefs or values of the employees could be either more, less, or
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just as in favor of good secure practices as required by the minimum
acceptable baseline.
• KN: Knowledge - This node represents how much knowledge the orga-
nization’s employees have regarding information security. Employees
can be more knowledgeable than a certain minimum level needed to
perform their jobs securely, they could be less knowledgeable, or they
could have exactly the minimum requisite level of knowledge.
As mentioned above, the horizontal alignment of the nodes represent-
ing the various cultural levels, AF, EV, SA and KN, in comparison to the
minimum acceptable baseline, should be interpreted as an indication of the
relative strength of each level. In a similar fashion, the horizontal alignment
of the nodes in comparison to the same horizontal alignment of the other
levels should be interpreted as an indication of how stable, or predictable, the
culture is. The nett security level line (SL) is an indication of the average
strength of the culture, or the nett combined effect of all four the levels.
The culture depicted in Figure 5.10 should thus, firstly, be interpreted as
a strong, or secure culture. All four levels in Figure 5.10 have a strength
greater than the baseline, which also result in a nett security level that is
positive, or greater than the baseline. Secondly, all four levels are perfectly
aligned with each other. This results in a culture that should be completely
stable, or predictable. One could also say that this would be perfect cultural
equilibrium. The culture depicted in Figure 5.10 could thus be said to be
the ideal culture in terms of information security since it is both strong and
stable.
The terms strong, and stable, as used above, should not be confused as
being indicative of how pervasive or resistent to change the culture might be.
According to Schein (1999a, pp. 25-26), corporate culture is always strong
in the sense of affecting every single aspect of daily life in an organization at
a more than superficial level. Culture is also always stable, in the sense that
it resists attempts at changing it. In that sense, culture is one of the most
stable facets in an organization (Schein, 1999a, p. 26). When referring to
an information security culture, the term strong, as used in this chapter,
should be interpreted as a desirable culture that is conducive to information
security. The term stable, as used in the same context, should be interpreted
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as an indication of how predictable the resulting artifacts, or nett security
level of the culture would be for any specific scenario.
All of the factors mentioned above would contribute to the overall desir-
ability of an information security culture. How strong and stable an orga-
nization’s information security culture is, would depend on the interaction
between the various levels of culture.
5.6.2 Interpreting the Conceptual Model
Each of the underlying cultural levels will contribute towards the overall
strength and stability of such a culture. For example, if an organization has
espoused values that are in line with recommended best practices for security,
this would make the overall security better. Conversely, should the espoused
values fail to address all relevant security related issues, the overall security
would be weaker.
The combination of the espoused values, and the ”elasticity effect”, of the
shared tacit assumptions and the user knowledge on these espoused values,
results in the visible, and measurable artifacts. From a security viewpoint,
the artifact level is a very good indication of the overall security of the or-
ganization’s information, since this level reflects what actually happens in
the day to day operations. In cases where the various levels are not in equi-
librium this artifact level becomes more difficult to predict. In such cases
the degree of elasticity in the specific system would determine how long it
would take before the system ”settles” into equilibrium. In infinitely elastic
systems this equilibrium might never be attained, whilst completely inelastic
systems would always be in equilibrium. In terms of the degree of elasticity
in a security culture, the knowledge level also plays a very specific role in
that it can act as an ”inhibitor” of the elastic effect. A lack of knowledge can
prevent employees who want to act securely from doing so. For the specific
areas where the necessary security knowledge is lacking, this lack results in
an infinite degree of elasticity in the security culture. The visible behavior
(artifact level) cannot move towards equilibrium because the employees lack
the means to provide the desired behavior.
Figures 5.11 to 5.15 show a few possible effects interactions between the
various levels of culture could have on the overall state of the organization’s
information security.
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Figure 5.11: ”Neutral” and Stable Culture.
The examples in Figures 5.11 to 5.15 assume that the desirability of the
various levels can be quantified and normalized to the same scale. In other
words, it is assumed that, for example, the desirability of the relevant es-
poused values can be measured and expressed as a value that indicates the
contribution of this level towards the overall security. It is also assumed that
the other levels can be expressed in the same way, and that the scale of such
measurements can be normalized in such a way that these values will indicate
the relative desirability of that level when compared to the other levels. The
line marked SL(Security Level) represents the nett effect of the interactions
between various levels of the culture. The five examples can be interpreted
as follows:
Figure 5.11: ”Neutral” and Stable. The desirability of the various
levels of culture is ”neutral”, or average. In other words the strength of each
level neither exceeds, nor falls short, of the minimum acceptable baseline
standards. The Nett Security Level (SL) perfectly overlaps the Baseline (BL).
Since all the levels have the same level of desirability, the various levels will
neither negate nor reinforce the effects of other levels on the overall security.
The effects of such a culture would thus be predictable and stable.
Figure 5.12: Insecure and ”Mostly Stable”. Both the espoused val-
ues and the shared tacit assumptions in this culture are of sufficient strength
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Figure 5.12: Insecure and ”Mostly Stable” Culture.
to meet the minimum acceptable baseline standard. However, in this culture,
the employees do not have the requisite level of information security related
knowledge. It is thus possible for the measurable artifacts to fall short of the
minimum acceptable baseline. For example, either the policy dealing with a
specific control might be lacking because the person(s) responsible for cre-
ating the policy lacks the necessary knowledge, or the knowledge needed to
implement this control in day-to-day operations might be lacking amongst
the responsible employees. In both such cases, the resulting artifacts might
be weaker than expected. This misalignment between the various levels also
means that it would be difficult to predict the exact relative strength of the
overall security level. In this case one could probably assume that the culture
will be mostly predictable, hence stable, because the lack of knowledge would
probably not apply equally to all controls. This culture would also have an
almost infinite degree of elasticity and the artifacts would thus never per-
fectly align with the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions. This is
due to the lack of supporting information security knowledge. The lack of
knowledge acts as an ”anchor” and prevents the artifacts from aligning with
the other layers. By addressing the lack of knowledge the degree of elasticity
inherent in this culture could be reduced. This would increase the rate at
which a more desirable state is reached where the artifacts align with the
shared tacit assumptions and espoused values.
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Figure 5.13: Insecure and Unstable Culture.
Figure 5.13: Insecure and Unstable. The various levels contributing
to the culture are not aligned. This would mean that the nett effects of
the culture might be unpredictable, due to the opposing forces at play in
this culture. The espoused values are very desirable, but the users lack the
requisite knowledge and do not have the desired beliefs and values, resulting
in a measurable artifact level that is not secure. For any specific security
control, a user may, or may not, have the requisite knowledge to fulfill his/her
role in the implementation of that specific control. That same user could also
agree with the relevant espoused value, or could have beliefs that are contrary
to that espoused value. It would thus be very difficult to predict the nett
security level of this culture. Such a culture would not be a desirable culture.
In order to make this culture more desirable it would be necessary to address
both the lack of knowledge and the underlying shared tacit assumptions of
the employees. Once these aspects have been addressed the various levels of
the culture will re-align to become more ”stable”. The rate at which this
re-alignment will take place would be dependent on the degree of elasticity
present in the system.
Figure 5.14: Secure and Unstable. The various levels contributing
to the culture are not aligned. The espoused values are desirable, and the
users have adequate knowledge. The high level of user knowledge in this case
somewhat negates the fact that the users do not have the desired beliefs and
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Figure 5.14: Secure and Unstable Culture.
values, resulting in an overall culture that is more secure than the minimum
acceptable baseline. However, this culture should be considered not desirable,
because its effects cannot always be predicted. It might be possible for the
users to behave insecurely with regards to a specific security control because
the specific control conflicts with their beliefs (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
In this culture the knowledge level is already sufficient to enable employees
to behave securely. However, there is still a gap between the knowledge
level and the espoused values. This gap will have to be addressed before the
culture could possibly align with the espoused values. The degree of elasticity
in this culture could be reduced by addressing the shared tacit assumptions
of employees. If employees can be convinced of the importance of their
respective roles and responsibilities towards the organization’s information
security the culture should start to align itself.
Figure 5.15: Secure and Unstable. As in Figure 5.14 the various
levels contributing to the culture are not aligned. In this case the figure
models the scenario where the organization is small and all staff are skilled
IT professionals who have both the requisite knowledge levels and the per-
sonal belief systems that enable secure behavior. In such a case it is quite
likely to have a secure artifact level despite the fact that there is little or
no espoused values. This is still not a desirable culture. Without adequate
security policies (espoused values) in place, there can be no guarantees of
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Figure 5.15: Secure and Unstable Culture.
desirable behavior. The appointment of additional staff members who might
lack the underlying security knowledge can easily move the observable arti-
facts in this model back towards the less secure side. Unless the organization
actively addresses the lack of espoused values, this culture will have an in-
finite degree of elasticity. The espoused values will never align themselves
without active intervention.
The above examples only reflect a few possible scenarios. It should, how-
ever, be clear that the nett effect of any information security culture can be
influenced, either positively, or negatively, by how ”secure” the underlying
levels of such a culture is. In such a model it might also be possible to deduce
the relative state of one or more of the cultural levels. For example, if the
organization has good espoused values, but the measurable artifacts indicate
bad security, it might be inferred that the employees lack either the required
knowledge or the desired attitude. In the cultures represented by Figure 5.14
and Figure 5.15 the culture can probably be ”improved” by involving em-
ployees in the process of creating the espoused values. In both these cultures
involving the employees in a ”negotiation” process when creating espoused
values could reduce the ”gap” between the espoused values and shared tacit
assumption layers. In both cases this would make the culture more pre-
dictable, and thus more desirable. In all cases insight into the degree of
elasticity inherent in the culture can help guide decisions as to what course
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would be most appropriate to help manage the culture. If a system has in-
finite elasticity it will never align itself unless the underlying cause for this
infinite elasticity is addressed. If management wants to see faster changes
at the artifacts layer, i.e. how people behave on a day to day basis, steps
should be taken to decrease the degree of elasticity. From a management
perspective, the ”perfect security culture” would be one that is completely
inelastic. Such a culture will always instantly reflect changes in the espoused
values of the organization.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter suggested that, for an effective information security culture,
the requisite information security knowledge amongst an organization’s users
could be seen as a fourth layer to Schein’s (Schein, 1999a) model for corporate
culture. The various interactions between the layers of such an information
security culture were then presented conceptually.
The conceptual model presented showed that the nett overall effect that
an information security culture would have on the organization’s information
security efforts would depend on the relative desirability, or strength, of
each underlying level in such a culture. Furthermore, the alignment of the
strengths of the individual underlying culture levels relative to the other
levels, would to a large extent determine how predictable, hence stable, the
effects of such a culture would be. The ideal culture would thus be one where
all four underlying levels are stronger than the minimum acceptable baseline,
and are also perfectly aligned relative to each other. The example in Figure
5.10 would be such an ideal culture.
The model also attempted to show that management demands and em-
ployees’ participation are strongly interrelated. In an information security
culture the visible artifacts are thus dependent on both the supporting knowl-
edge as well as this relationship between espoused values (management de-
mands) and shared tacit assumptions (employees’ underlying beliefs and val-
ues). In any information security culture a certain degree of elasticity will
be present. This elasticity will determine whether or not the shared tacit
assumptions will over time align themselves to the espoused values of the
organization. It will also determine how fast changes will occur if the system
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is not infinitely elastic. The lower the degree of elasticity in the system, the
faster it would take for a possible re-alignment to happen. From a manage-
ment perspective it would thus be highly desirable to reduce the degree of
elasticity in such a culture as much as possible.
In its current form, the model’s primary contribution is at a conceptual
level where it aids in the understanding of information security culture. The
current model has limited ”hands-on” use. In a scenario where an organi-
zation’s measurable artifacts are undesirable, a manager who is sure that
the organization’s espoused values are of adequate strength and who is also
certain his/her staff members have adequate knowledge, might infer that the
employees’ beliefs and values are not in line with the espoused values. Based
on the presented model, such a manager will also be able to deduce that
he/she can make the artifacts easier to predict by addressing the shared tacit
assumptions, for example by trying to convince the employees to buy into
the espoused values. Through campaigns aimed at improving the employees’
attitude towards security, management can reduce the degree of elasticity
inherent in the culture and thus speed up the pace at which the measurable
artifacts become more in line with the espoused values. Alternatively the
espoused values could be ”relaxed” to be more in line with the shared tacit
assumptions, similar to the idea of adjusting the governing variables in a
double-loop learning system (Smith, 2001). This might result in a culture
that is slightly less secure but more predictable.
In either of the above mentioned approaches, use of the current model
would only provide very vague guidance to someone wanting to manage an
information security culture. In order for this model to become useful as a
”hands-on” cultural management tool additional research would be required.
If one could accurately quantify and normalize the various levels at play
in this conceptual model it should be possible to use the model to manage
specific aspects of an information security culture more precisely. The as-
sumption, made when presenting the example, namely that the desirability of
the various levels can in fact be quantified and normalized to the same scale,
should by no means be taken as an assertion made by this chapter. The aim
of the chapter was not to present such metrics and normalization processes
but rather to show, at a certain level of abstraction, how this conceptual
model could be used to reason about information security culture. It should,
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however, be possible to quantify and normalize the various factors for certain
subsets of controls. For example, it might be possible to turn the presented
conceptual model into a working model for a smaller sub-problem such as
mapping the relationships between the four levels for password usage. If
the required processes and metrics are developed, the conceptual framework
might also play a valuable role in the management of an information security
culture. For example; a metric that quantifies the actual degree of elasticity
in an information security culture would be a very useful tool to have. This
type of usage for the presented model could possibly be addressed by future
research efforts. For the present, the contention of this thesis is simply that
the conceptual model presented, could assist in improving the understanding
of an information security culture. The work in this chapter should thus be
seen as an attempt to lay a solid foundation on which future research could
be built.
Finally, this chapter highlighted the important role relevant information
security knowledge plays in an information security culture. From an infor-
mation security viewpoint, it is vital for organizations to ensure that or-
ganizational employees have the requisite information security knowledge to
perform their day-to-day activities in a secure manner. An appropriate infor-
mation security educational approach is thus a vital building block towards
the fostering of an information security culture. The next chapter will focus
on a pedagogically sound approach towards the design of such an information
security educational program.
Chapter 6
EDUCATIONAL DESIGN
This chapter focuses on the design of educational content for information
security educational programs. The chapter firstly provides a brief overview
of information security education in general. This is followed by an in-depth
discussion on formal pedagogics and how these could be used in information
security education. The chapter concludes by demonstrating how Bloom’s
taxonomy of the cognitive domain could be used as a theoretical basis for the
design of information security educational content.
6.1 Introduction
The need for information security education is well established. Education
is central to any attempt at addressing the human factor in information
security. Section 3.4 of this thesis has shown that the human factor in infor-
mation security consists of two inter-related, and co-dependant, dimensions,
namely knowledge and behavior.
In order for an organization to have an acceptable level of information
security, the users in that organization need to have both the requisite infor-
mation security related knowledge and the desired secure behavior. Most
current approaches to addressing this human factor agree that the fostering
of an organizational information security culture can help to address the be-
havioral aspects of the human factor in information security. The previous
chapter, chapter 5, focused on the concept of an organizational culture of
information security. Chapter 5 also argued that the generic organizational
culture model used by most current approaches to information security is
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not necessarily specific to the needs of information security practitioners.
An adaptation to Schein’s model for organizational culture was drafted and
presented as a conceptual model to enhance the understanding of an infor-
mation security culture. One of the primary adaptations made to Schein’s
model was the incorporation of knowledge as an additional level in such a
culture (section 5.4). This adaptation was necessary because in an infor-
mation security culture the requisite knowledge cannot be assumed to be
present. The previous chapter also demonstrated that a lack of knowledge
can effectively act as a kind of ”anchor” which could prevent users from
behaving in a secure manner even if every other level of the organization’s
information security culture is conducive to the desired secure behavior. The
concept of elasticity was ”borrowed” from the economic sciences to explain
this effect (section 5.5). Ensuring that organizational users have the requi-
site information security knowledge is vital to the overall security efforts of
an organization. According to Dhillon (2007, p. 7), increasing awareness
of security issues is the most cost-effective information security control an
organization can implement. Without adequate information security related
knowledge, users cannot behave securely.
In order to convey the necessary knowledge to an organization’s users, it
is necessary to educate the users. This chapter will address issues relating to
the selection/design of content for information security educational programs.
6.2 Research Paradigm and Rationale
The work in this chapter is based on qualitative, or phenomenological-, re-
search methods, as described in Creswell (1998). This chapter should thus be
seen as ”an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological
traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem” (Creswell, 1998,
p. 15). The research presented here does not attempt to define new knowl-
edge, but rather to provide a more formalized understanding of information
security awareness, training and education. As far as could be determined,
the application of Bloom’s Taxonomy, both the original and the revised ver-
sions, specifically to information security education has never been published
before. It is the author’s belief that the use of this taxonomy could improve
the understanding of the pedagogical issues that should be considered in
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any educational program, amongst information security specialists.
Since education, as a field of study, is normally seen as a ”human sci-
ence” it was deemed fitting to also ”borrow” the research paradigm used
in this chapter from the humanities. Most current work dealing with infor-
mation security education sees this education as a continuum consisting of
three main levels, namely; awareness, training and education (Schlienger &
Teufel, 2003),(Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004),(NIST 800-16, 1998, pp. 15-
17). This continuum is used by many information security specialists when
constructing information security educational campaigns. These specialists
may not necessarily be educationalists. In order to ensure a rigorous research
approach, this chapter will revisit all concepts it introduces, including those
with a seemingly ”obvious” meaning. The description and discussion of these
concepts are deemed necessary because there might exist differences between
the ontologies commonly adhered to by information security specialists and
researchers from the educational sciences. It can be argued that for most
security education programs more knowledge of the underlying theoretical
background can help both practitioners and scholars to understand why a
particular information security awareness approach is expected to have the
desired impact on users’ security behavior (Puhakainen, 2006, p. 139). It is
believed that adherence to sound pedagogical principles when constructing
information security educational campaigns, could improve the efficiency of
such campaigns.
In order to ensure research rigor, the work in this chapter has been verified
by means of peer-review and through publication at appropriate forums. An
initial version of the work was presented at the Information Security South
Africa conference as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2008). This conference
was chosen as an appropriate platform specifically because it is the foremost
information security specific conference in South Africa and has many inter-
national attendees. Based on feedback received at this conference a second
paper was prepared providing more insight into the use of Bloom’s taxon-
omy for information security education. This second paper was presented
at the World Information Security Education conference as Van Niekerk and
Von Solms (2009). This conference was chosen because, in the author’s opin-
ion, it is the foremost international publication forum specific to information
security education.
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By demonstrating how Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain can be
used to introduce pedagogical rigor into the design of information security
educational programs this chapter will answer the second research question
posed in section 1.6. This will also meet the second research objective of this
thesis as identified in section 1.7. Before demonstrating the use of Bloom’s
taxonomy for information security, the areas where current approaches are
lacking will first be examined.
6.3 Current Information Security Awareness,
Training and Education
The need for affordable and effective information security education has be-
come well established. According to Dhillon (1999) the widespread use of IT
by businesses today has given rise to ”security blindness” on the part of the
users. However, when addressing this lack of knowledge, the term ”users”
no longer means your traditional end-users, but includes staff at all levels
of responsibility inside the organization. Nosworthy (2000) states that each
person in the organization from the CEO to house keeping staff must be
aware of, and trained, to exercise their responsibilities towards information
security.
Taking into consideration the number of different information security
standards that are available today, as well as the complexity and comprehen-
siveness of these standards, the task of educating ”each person in the orga-
nization” with regards to their responsibilities towards information security
is enormous. Very few organizations would have the kind of economic re-
sources, or enough ”teachers” with the necessary knowledge, available that
such an educational program would require. It is therefor vital to ensure that
the educational methodology used for such an user education program match
the requirements for information security. The first step towards determining
such a match is to delimitate the boundaries of such programs clearly.
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6.3.1 The Scope of Information Security Education Pro-
grams
In order to determine the required scope of an information security educa-
tion program the following two fundamental questions need to be answered
regarding such user education, namely:
• Who (exactly) should be educated?
• What should be taught to the ”learners”?
The answers to these two questions are to a large degree interdependent and
will now be examined in more depth. The related question: ”How should
the users be taught?” will be explored in depth in the next chapter.
According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. 9, section 6.2.1), ”All employees
of the organization and, where relevant, third party users, should receive
appropriate training ... before access to information or services is granted”.
As mentioned earlier, ”all employees” include staff at all levels of responsibil-
ity inside the organization from the CEO to House Keeping staff (Nosworthy,
2000).
It would make sense for an organization’s information security education
program to cover all the controls specified by the specific information security
standard used by the organization. However, it is clearly an overkill to expect
each and every end-user to be educated about all the controls specified by a
standard such as ISO/IEC 27002 (2005). According to ISO/IEC TR 13335-1
(2004, p. 25), each employee should know his or her role and responsibility,
his or her contribution to ICT security, and should be entrusted to
achieving the organization’s ICT security goals. It is therefore necessary to
tailor the information security educational material used to the needs of the
individual user.
As mentioned in 3.4.1, the training needs of individuals are heavily depen-
dant on the actual role that individual plays inside the organization. Since
forms of role-based schemas are already widely used for the implementation
of access control, it would be logical to create a form of role-based information
security education. Such a system would solve the dilemma of creating a cus-
tomized educational program for every individual by reducing the number of
customizations to a manageable, and affordable, level.
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Section 3.4.1 also stated that information security roles can be broadly
categorized into three groups: End users, IT Personnel and Top Management,
and that a further distinction between different types of users can be made
based on their actual departmental role inside the organization. Thus, an
end-user in the finance department might have different information security
education needs to an end-user in a manufacturing department. This need
to distinguish between users based on their actual role in the organization
is also supported by the American information security training standard
NIST 800-16 (1998), which states that an individual’s need for security train-
ing will change as their organizational role changes (NIST 800-16, 1998, p.
43). This American standard NIST 800-16 (1998) is the only major infor-
mation security standard dealing specifically with role-based information
security education. NIST 800-16 (1998), together with NIST 800-50 (2003),
is also the only current international standard that specifically deals with
the creation/selection of content for information security educational pro-
grams. Section 4.4 provided a brief overview of this standard. However, due
to its specific relevance to the work in this chapter, the NIST model will be
examined in more depth in the next section.
6.3.2 NIST Special publication 800-16: Information
Technology Security Training Requirements: A
Role- and Performance-Based Model
The American National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pro-
vides an information security specific training model (NIST 800-16, 1998).
This model provides a framework that serves as the American standard for
information security training. The NIST model, entitled: ”Information Tech-
nology Security Training Requirements: A Role- and Performance-Based
Model”, together with the complementary document ”Building an Infor-
mation Technology Security Awareness and Training Program” (NIST 800-
50, 2003), is currently the only standard that focuses exclusively on the
learning needs related to information security.
The NIST model is based on the premise that learning is a continuum.
Specifically, learning in this context starts with awareness, builds to train-
ing, and evolves into education (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14). Furthermore
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the model is role-based, meaning that it defines the IT security learning
needed as a person assumes different roles within an organization and differ-
ent responsibilities in relation to IT systems (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 14).
The premise that information security learning is a continuum consist-
ing of awareness, training and education is fairly widely accepted (Horrocks,
2001)(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). The three levels of learning in this contin-
uum can be described as follows:
• Awareness: The purpose of awareness programs is simply to focus at-
tention on security issues. In awareness activities, the learner is simply
the recipient of information and does not actively participate (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 15). Awareness campaigns often make use of tools
such as posters, videos and promotional slogans.
• Training: The learner has to know how he/she can behave securely.
This level strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and
competency by practitioners of functional specialties other than IT
security (e.g., management, auditing). Training of special security tools
or features within applications must be offered (NIST 800-16, 1998, p.
16),(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
• Education: The ”Education” level integrates all of the security skills
and competencies of the various functional specialties into a common
body of knowledge. It also adds a multi-disciplinary study of concepts,
issues, and principles (technological and social). This level strives to
produce IT security specialists and professionals capable of vision and
pro-active response (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 16). An important charac-
teristic of education is that the employee must understand why infor-
mation security is important for the organization (Schlienger & Teufel,
2003).
The model in NIST special publication 800-16 deals primarily with the
training part of this learning continuum. The NIST document uses this con-
tinuum to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities an individual needs to
perform the IT security responsibilities specific to each of his or her roles in
the organization. According to this model all employees would need aware-
ness. Training would only be required by individuals whose roles in the
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company indicate a need for specific knowledge of security threats and risks,
as well as the safeguards against these threats and risks. Lastly, according to
this model, education would only be needed by information security special-
ists. Thus, the type of learning that individuals need, starts simplistically
and then becomes more comprehensive and detailed towards the top of the
continuum (NIST 800-16, 1998, pp. 13-14).
In addition to the three levels of the learning continuum, NIST 800-16
(1998) defines six generic categories into which most organizational roles can
be categorized, namely: Manage, Acquire, Design and Develop, Implement
and Operate, Review and Evaluate, and Use. The NIST model also has a
seventh category, Other, that acts as a place holder, to accommodate any
additional functional roles identified in the future (NIST 800-16, 1998, p.
43).
Once the specific information security related roles of an employee have
been determined, the NIST document can be used to identify the specific
learning requirements of that employee. These are sub-divided into a further
three levels, beginner, intermediate and advanced. Finally, the document
provides a framework for the planning of information security training cur-
ricula and the evaluation of training effectiveness. This framework consists
of a ”training matrix” that is used to determine the specific training needs of
individuals based on their organizational roles, the level of training they re-
quire (beginner, intermediate or advanced), and the applicable training areas,
which could vary depending on the organization’s information security policy
and supporting procedures. Table 6.1 illustrates such a training matrix.
Training A B C D E F G
Areas Manage Acquire Design Implement Review Use Other
and and and
Develop Operate Evaluate
1 Laws
and 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 1F n/a
Regulations
2 Security Program
2.1 Planning 2.1A 2.1B 2.1C 2.1D 2.1E 2.1F n/a
2.2 Management 2.2A 2.2B 2.2C 2.2D 2.2E 2.2F n/a
3 System Lifecycle Security
3.1 Initiation 3.1A 3.1B 3.1C 3.1D 3.1E n/a n/a
etc ...
Table 6.1: Training Matrix adapted from NIST 800-16, p. 14
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The entries in the first column of each row in Table 6.1 correspond to
specific training areas. The column headings specify the organizational roles
of the users. The entries in the actual cells specify the specific training pro-
grams applicable to the denoted training area, for a user fulfilling the
corresponding role. Each of these training programs would have beginner,
intermediate and advanced levels. As mentioned earlier, this model deals
specifically with security training needs, as opposed to awareness or educa-
tion needs. It would, however, be possible to devise a similar training matrix
to identify the specific information security education needs for individuals
within an organization. The following section will briefly demonstrate how
such an adaptation could be made.
6.3.3 An organizational information security education
matrix
For the purposes of this thesis the term education will be used in an encom-
passing sense. In other words, the term information security education will
be used in a sense that includes both training and awareness activities,
where these are required. Standards such as ISO/IEC TR 13335-1 (2004),
use the term awareness in a similar encompassing sense that includes all
three aspects of the learning continuum as outlined in NIST 800-16 (1998).
The term education is used in an encompassing sense in this thesis because
education is the highest level of the continuum. It could thus be argued that
education would include aspects of both awareness and training. The use of
the word awareness to also refer to programs and that includes both training
and educational components could be construed to indicate a lack of rigor
in the use of terminology. This will be discussed in more depth in the next
section.
In order to adapt the NIST training matrix to the educational needs of a
specific organization, the following tasks would have to be completed:
• The specific training/education areas applicable to the organization
would have to be determined. These will depend on several factors,
including the legal obligations of the organization regarding information
security, the organization’s information security policy and the specific
information security standard used by the organization.
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• The organizational roles applicable would have to be defined. These
roles could be ”borrowed” from a framework such as NIST 800-16
(1998), or it could be defined in a more customized manner, in order
to suit the specific organization’s needs better.
• Educational goals or outcomes for each cell would have to be defined.
These outcomes would essentially be a clear definition of exactly what
knowledge and/or skills a person should attain at the end of a specific
course. As in NIST 800-16 (1998), these could be subdivided into
several staged levels, i.e. beginner, intermediate and advanced levels.
Table 6.2 illustrates an example of how such an educational needs matrix
might look.
Training Top Management Finance IT
Areas Info
Manage Sec Manage Account- Audit Admin Manage Develop etc
Officer ing
1. Strategic Security Issues
1.1 Laws 1.1 A 1.1 A 1.1 A 1.1 A 1.1 A n/a 1.1 A n/a ...
1.2 IT 1.2 A 1.2 A&B n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.2A&B n/a ...
Governance
2. End User Security
2.1 Email &
Web 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 A 2.1 ...
Security A&B
2.2 Virus
Prevention 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 A 2.2 ...
A&C
Etc.. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 6.2: Information Security ”Educational Needs Matrix”
In Table 6.2, the rows correspond to the broad educational areas for the
organization. These areas should be defined to fit the specific needs of the or-
ganization. The columns in figure 6.2 represent the organizational structure
and the specific roles which individuals within that structure would fulfil.
The cells contain references to the specific educational outcomes that a per-
son in a specific role would have to attain for a defined educational area. As
an example: All managers, regardless of the department they head in the or-
ganization, might need familiarity with the legal and statutory obligations of
the organization towards information security. On the other hand, only the
top management, the information security officer, and the CIO might require
education regarding IT security governance issues. These needs would prob-
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ably vary from organization to organization, although similarities between
the needs of organizations within the same sector would exist.
From the example in Table 6.2 it should be clear that the model pre-
sented in NIST 800-16 (1998) could be used to identify the awareness, train-
ing and/or educational needs of an organization’s users to a certain extent.
Using this model an information security educationalist would, for example,
be able to identify the specific controls from a standard such as ISO/IEC
27002 (2005) for which various levels of organizational users would require
education. However, it is the contention of this thesis that using the NIST
model exclusively, without attention to additional pedagogical theory, would
not address all the needs of information security educational design. The
NIST model provides guidance on the applicability of education/training
for specific information security controls for specific user roles. However,
the NIST model does not address the exact extent towards which such ed-
ucation/training should be conducted. It only provides vague guidance in
terms of the education/training being at ”beginner, intermediate or advanced
level”.
The following sections will briefly look at the need for more pedagogical
theory in information security education and will then demonstrate how the
use of a learning taxonomy could alleviate the above mentioned shortcoming
of the NIST model.
6.4 The need for Pedagogics in Information
Security
According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
(2000) pedagogics can be defined as the art of teaching. A study of ped-
agogics is essentially a study of formal educational theory. Many current
information security educational programs are constructed by information
security specialists who do not necessarily have a strong educational back-
ground. Puhakainen (2006, pp. 33-56) reviews 59 current approaches to
security awareness, most of which are not based on pedagogical theo-
ries. The qualitative content analysis in chapter 4 showed that only 22.7% of
all approaches reviewed had any form of formal or pedagogical basis (section
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4.3). Puhakainen (2006, p. 56) also argues that there is a need for theory-
based information security education approaches. These approaches should
not be only theoretical, but should also be practically effective. The nature of
information security educational or awareness issues is often not understood,
which could lead to programs and guidelines that are ineffective in practice
(Siponen, 2000). A formally trained educationalist might, for example, raise
the question whether or not knowledge is in fact enough. In Bloom’s tax-
onomy, which is a well known and widely accepted pedagogical taxonomy,
knowledge only comprises the very first, and lowest, level of education (Sousa,
2006, pp. 248-255). One could argue that this level of comprehension is in
fact not adequate for most humans who play a role in the information security
process. It is probable that security practitioners refer to knowledge as an
all encompassing term which includes abilities at other levels of the cognitive
domain. However, from an educational perspective, it would make sense to
be precise in terms of exactly what level of cognition is required from users
in an information security context. Especially for the purposes of designing
educational content for information security campaigns. Similarly, the tradi-
tional approach of classifying the requisite information security educational
needs as a continuum consisting of either awareness, training or education,
might also be too simplistic.
In the current information society, educational or awareness issues affect
almost all organizations. Despite this fact the nature of these programs is still
not well understood and this often leads to ineffective security guidelines or
programs (Siponen, 2000). Many organizations have some form of awareness
program but often do not augment these with supporting training and/or
education programs. The terms awareness and education are also often used
interchangeably. It is not uncommon to hear security specialists talk about
”awareness campaigns”, when the campaigns actually focus on the training or
education levels of the continuum. As mentioned earlier, the term knowledge
only describes the lowest level of Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain.
From an educational viewpoint one could thus argue that the terminology
used lacks rigor. This lack of rigor could contribute to the fact that the
nature of awareness and educational issues is often misunderstood. One
model that could possibly provide such rigor is Bloom’s taxonomy.
Many formal learning theories that could contribute at various levels in
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the creation of information security educational programs exist. However,
”learning is such a complex matter that it might be impossible to conceive
of a single theory broad enough to encompass all important aspects of learn-
ing and yet specific enough to be useful for instruction” (Driscoll, 2000, p.
299). Each learning theory can usually provide only one part of the overall
perspective needed to ensure learning. Each of such part emphasizes specific
aspects of learning, but might lack in other areas (Driscoll, 2000, p. 299).
Attempting to address all the possible theories which could conceivably con-
tribute to improving the design of information security educational content
falls outside the scope of this thesis.
Instead this thesis will focus only on the use of a learning taxonomy to
provide a more pedagogically sound interpretation of the educational needs
of humans involved in information security processes. Bloom’s taxonomy is
arguably the most widely used, and best known, learning taxonomy. The rest
of this chapter will thus focus exclusively on demonstrating how Bloom’s re-
vised taxonomy, as discussed in Anderson et al. (2001), could be incorporated
into the design of information security educational material as a pedagogical
framework.
6.5 Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive do-
main
Bloom’s taxonomy is the best known and most widely used learning tax-
onomy amongst educators today (Materna, 2007, p. 138). Bloom’s model
was originally developed in the 1950’s and remained in use more or less un-
changed until fairly recently (Sousa, 2006, p. 249). A revised version of the
taxonomy was published in Anderson et al. (2001). This revised taxonomy
has become accepted as more appropriate in terms of current educational
thinking (Sousa, 2006, pp. 249-260). Both versions of Bloom’s taxonomy
consist of six levels which increases in complexity as the learner moves up
through these levels. Figure 6.1 shows both versions of this taxonomy.
There are two main differences between the original and the revised ver-
sions of the taxonomy. Firstly, the revised version uses descriptive verbs for
each level that more accurately describes the intended meaning of each level.
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Figure 6.1: Blooms Taxonomy, Original and Revised (Adapted from Sousa
(2006) pp. 249-250)
Secondly, the revised version has swapped the last two levels of the origi-
nal version around. This was done because recent studies have suggested
that generating, planning, and producing an original ”product” demands
more complex thinking than making judgements based on accepted criteria
(Sousa, 2006, p. 250). The hierarchy of complexity in the revised taxonomy
is also less rigid than in the original in that it recognizes that an individual
may move among the levels during extended cognitive processes. This pa-
per will focus on the revised version of the taxonomy. Wherever this paper
mentions Bloom’s taxonomy, it should be assumed that the revised version
is intended, unless otherwise stated. The following is a brief explanation of
each of the six levels of this revised taxonomy (Sousa, 2006, pp. 250-252):
• Remember: Remember refers to the rote recall and recognition of previ-
ously learned facts. This level represents the lowest level of learning in
the cognitive domain because there is no presumption that the learner
understands what is being recalled.
• Understand: This level describes the ability to ”make sense” of the
material. In this case the learning goes beyond rote recall. If a learner
understands material it becomes available to that learner for future use
in problem solving and decision making.
• Apply: The third level builds on the second one by adding the ability
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to use learned materials in new situations with a minimum of direction.
This include the application of rules, concepts, methods and theories
to solve problems within the given domain. This level combines the
activation of procedural memory and convergent thinking to correctly
select and apply knowledge to a completely new task. Practice is es-
sential in order to achieve this level of learning.
• Analyze: This is the ability to break up complex concepts into simpler
component parts in order to better understand its structure. Analysis
skills includes the ability to recognize underlying parts of a complex
system and examining the relationships between these parts and the
whole. This stage is considered more complex than the third because
the learner has to be aware of the thought process in use and must
understand both the content and the structure of material.
• Evaluate: Evaluation deals with the ability to judge the value of some-
thing based on specified criteria and standards. These criteria and/or
standards might be determined by the learner or might be given to the
learner. This is a high level of cognition because it requires elements
from several other levels to be used in conjunction with conscious judge-
ment based on definite criteria. To attain this level learners need to
consolidate their thinking and should also be more receptive to alter-
native points of view.
• Create: This is the highest level in the taxonomy and refers to the
ability to put various parts together in order to formulate an idea or
plan that is new to the learner. This level stresses creativity and the
ability to form new patterns or structures by using divergent thinking
processes.
In terms of recent studies on cognitive processing the lower three levels
(remember, understand, and apply) describe a convergent thinking process.
In such a process the learner will first recall information, then focus on what
is known and understood in order to apply the knowledge to solve a problem
(Sousa, 2006, p. 254). The upper three levels (analyze, evaluate, and create)
describe a divergent thinking process. In such a process the learner’s pro-
cessing of the knowledge will result in new insights, or previously unknown
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information (Sousa, 2006, p. 254). It is important to remember that the
levels of the taxonomy are fluid and overlapping (Sousa, 2006, p. 254).
In addition to these levels of the cognitive domain Anderson et al. (2001)
also place major emphasis on the use of the following categorization of the
knowledge dimension (Anderson et al., 2001, pp. 45-62):
• Factual Knowledge - The most basic elements the learner must know
in order to be familiar with a discipline. I.e. terminology or specific
details and elements.
• Conceptual Knowledge - The interrelationships among the basic ele-
ments of larger structures that enable these elements to function to-
gether. I.e. classification, categories, principles, theories, models, etc.
• Procedural Knowledge - How to do something, methods of inquiry, how
to use skills, apply algorithms, techniques and methods. I.e. subject
specific skills, algorithms, techniques, and methods as well as knowledge
of criteria for determining when to use appropriate procedures.
• Meta-Cognitive Knowledge - An awareness and knowledge of one’s own
cognition. I.e. strategic knowledge, self-knowledge, knowledge about
cognitive tasks, including contextual and conditional knowledge.
Activities at these six levels of the cognitive domain are usually combined
with the one or more of the four types of knowledge in a collection of state-
ments outlining the learning objectives of an educational program. Usually a
learning objective statement will be used to create a set of learning activities.
Learning activities are activities which help learners to attain the learning
objectives. A Learning activity consist of a verb that relates to an activity
at one of the levels of the cognitive domain, and a noun providing additional
insight into the relationship of the specific learning objective to a category of
knowledge (Anderson et al., 2001, pp. 93-109). The use of a taxonomy often
assist educators in gaining better understanding of learning objectives, and
activities. However, it is not always clear how this increased understanding
can help the educators. Anderson et al. (2001, pp. 6-10) identify the fol-
lowing four ”organizing questions” as the most important areas in which a
taxonomy like Bloom’s can assist educators:
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• The Learning Question: What is the most important for learners to
learn in the limited time available
• The Instruction Question: How does one plan and deliver instruction
that will result in high levels of learning for large numbers of learners
• The Assessment Question: How does one select or design assessment
instruments and procedures to provide accurate information about how
well students are learning
• The Alignment Question: How does one ensure that objectives, in-
struction, and assessment are consistent with each other.
In most cases, the correct usage of a taxonomy table which combines elements
from both the cognitive and knowledge dimensions, will allow educators to
answer these question to some extent. An example of such a taxonomy table
will be given later in this chapter in Table 6.5.
Educational taxonomies, such as Bloom’s taxonomy, are useful tools in
developing learning objectives and assessing learner attainment (Fuller et al.,
2007). All well known educational taxonomies are generic. These taxonomies
rely on the assumption that the hierarchy of learning outcomes applies to
all disciplines (Fuller et al., 2007). Bloom’s taxonomy would thus apply
equally to a more traditional ”subject”, such as zoology, as to organizational
information security education.
6.6 Bloom’s Taxonomy for Information Security
Education
Learning taxonomies assist the educationalist to describe and categorize the
stages in cognitive, affective and other dimensions, in which an individual
operates as part of the learning process. In simpler terms one could say that
learning taxonomies help us to ”understand about understanding” (Fuller et
al., 2007). It is this level of meta-cognition that is often missing in infor-
mation security education. According to Siponen (2000) awareness and ed-
ucational campaigns can be broadly described by two categories, namely
framework and content. The framework category contains issues that can be
approached in a structural and quantitative manner. These issues constitute
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the more explicit knowledge. The second category, however, includes more
tacit knowledge of an interdisciplinary nature. Shortcomings in this second
area usually invalidate awareness frameworks (Siponen, 2000). How to really
motivate users to adhere to security guidelines, for example, is an issue that
would form part of this content category.
It has been shown that even in cases where users have ”knowledge” of a
specific security policy, they might still willfully ignore this policy because
they do not understand why this policy is needed (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
Answering the question ”why” not only increase insight but also increases
motivation (Siponen, 2000). Simply informing employees that ”this is our
policy”, or ”you just have to do it”, which is often the traditional approach, is
not likely to increase motivation or attitudes (Siponen, 2000). Learning is a
willful, active, conscious, and constructive activity guided by intentions and
reflections (Garde et al., 2007). According to most constructivist learning
theories, learning should be learner-centered (Garde et al., 2007). In an
organizational information security educational campaign, the learnersmust
include each and every employee. It is also important to realize that the
campaign has to be successful for each and every learner (Van Niekerk
& Von Solms, 2004).
In order to ensure successful learning amongst all employees, it is ex-
tremely important to fully understand the educational needs of individual
employees. According to Roper et al. (2005, pp. 27-36) managers often
attempt to address the security education needs of employees without ade-
quately studying and understanding the underlying factors that contribute
to those needs. It has been argued before that educational material should
ideally be tailored to the learning needs and learning styles of individual
learners (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004)(NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 19). One
could also argue that awareness campaigns that have not been tailored to the
specific needs of an individual, or the needs of a specific target audience,
will be ineffective. It is in the understanding of these needs, that a learning
taxonomy can play an important enabling role.
Information security specialists should use a taxonomy, like Bloom’s tax-
onomy, before compiling the content category of the educational campaign.
The use of such a taxonomy could help to understand the learning needs
of the target audience better. It could also reduce the tendency to focus
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only on the framework category of these campaigns. For example, simply
teaching an individual what a password is, would lie on the remember, and
possibly understand level(s) of Bloom’s taxonomy. However, the necessary
information to understand why their own passwords are also important and
why they should also be properly constructed and guarded, might lie as high
as the evaluate level of the taxonomy. An information security specialist
might think that teaching the users what a password is, is enough, but re-
search has shown that understanding why is essential to obtaining buy-in
from employees. It is this level of understanding that acts as a motivating
factor and thus enables behavior change (Siponen, 2000)(Schlienger & Teufel,
2003)(Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004)(Roper et al., 2005, pp. 78-79).
The use of an educational taxonomy in the construction of information
security educational programs requires that both the content and the assess-
ment criteria for this program are evaluated against the taxonomy in order
to ensure that learning takes place at the correct level of the cognitive do-
main. The reference point for any educational program should be a set of
clearly articulated ”performance objectives” that have been developed based
on an assessment of the target audience’s needs and requirements (Roper et
al., 2005, p. 96). Correct usage of an educational taxonomy not only helps
to articulate such performance objectives but, more importantly, helps the
educator to correctly gauge the needs and requirements of the audience.
An example of how Bloom’s revised taxonomy could be used in an infor-
mation security context is supplied in Table 6.3. This example is not intended
to be a definitive work, but rather to serve as an example or starting point
for information security practitioners who want to use Bloom’s taxonomy
when constructing awareness and educational campaigns. It should however
be clear that this taxonomy could easily be used to categorize most, if not
all, information security educational needs effectively. Once categorized ac-
cording to a taxonomy like Bloom’s taxonomy, it should also be easier to find
related information regarding pedagogical methods suitable to assist learn-
ers in attaining the desired level of cognitive understanding. The example
in Table 6.3 demonstrates how the use of specific terms in the specification
of a learning activity can help to ensure that the learning activity is in fact
at the correct level of the cognitive domain. For example, if the activity
is based purely on the learner’s ability to recognize a specific threat, this
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Level Terms Sample Activities
Create imagine Pretend you are an information security officer for a large
firm. Write a report about a recent security incident.
compose Rewrite a given incident report as a news story.
design Write a new policy item to prevent users from putting
sensitive information on mobile devices.
infer Formulate a theory to explain why employees still write
down their passwords.
Evaluate appraise Which of the following policy items would be more
appropriate. Why?
assess Is it fair for a company to insist that employees never use
their work email for personal matters? Why or Why not?
judge Which of the security standards you have studied is more
appropriate for use in the South African context?
Defend your answer.
critique Criticize these two security products and explain why you
would recommend one over the other to a customer.
Analyze analyze Which of the following security incidents are more likely?
contrast Compare and contrast the security needs of banking
institutions to those of manufacturing concerns.
distinguish Sort these security controls according to the high level
policies that they address.
deduce Which of these procedures could derive from the given
policy.
Apply practice Use these mnemonic techniques to create and recall
a secure password.
calculate Calculate how secure the following password is.
apply Think of three things that could go wrong should your
password be compromised.
execute Use the given tool to encrypt the following message.
Understand summarize Summarize the given security policy in your own words
discuss Why should non alpha-numeric characters be used in a
password?
explain Explain how symmetric encryption works.
outline Outline your own responsibilities with regards to the
security of customer account information.
Remember define What is the definition of a security incident?
label Label each of the threats in the given picture.
recall What is social engineering?
recognize Which of the pictures shows someone ”shoulder surfing”?
Table 6.3: Bloom’s Taxonomy for Information Security adapted from Sousa
(2006, p. 251). (See also Anderson et al. (2001))
activity probably only involves cognitive skills at the remember level of the
taxonomy. The next sub-section will further clarify how Bloom’s taxonomy
can be used in the construction of information security programs.
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6.6.1 Using Bloom’s taxonomy
When using Bloom’s taxonomy to assist in the design of educational content,
a simple list of activities like the one presented in 6.3 is of limited use. Usually
such a list is used in combination with a taxonomy table. In order to clarify
the use of such a taxonomy table, an abbreviated and more focused example
of how the taxonomy could be used for a specific learning objective (LO1)
will be used. This learning objective can be briefly expressed as: ”Learners
should be able to understand, construct and use passwords in the correct
context”.
Level Verb Sample Activities
Create design Write a new policy item to govern the use of
passwords on company ABC’s Information Systems. (A6)
Evaluate critique Critique these two passwords and explain why you
would recommend one over the other in terms
of the security it provides.(A5)
Analyze analyze Which of the following security incidents involving
stolen passwords are more likely in our company?(A4)
Apply execute Use the appropriate application to change your password
for the financial sub-system. (A3)
Understand discuss Why should non alpha-numeric characters be used in a
password? (A2)
Remember define What is the definition of access control? (A1)
Table 6.4: Abbreviated and Focused Example of Password related Learning
Activities based on Bloom’s Taxonomy for Information Security, adapted
from Anderson et al., 2001
Table 6.4 lists an abbreviated example of learning activities (A1 to A6),
based on this learning objective (LO1). This abbreviated example, together
with a taxonomy table, shown in Table 6.5, will be used to clarify the use of
Bloom’s taxonomy in an information security context. The use of a taxonomy
table is central to the effective use of Bloom’s taxonomy for the design of any
educational material (Anderson et al., 2001, pp. 27-37). In order to fill such
a taxonomy table the educator starts by examining each learning activity.
The noun portion of the learning activity is used to determine which of
the categories of the knowledge dimension would be the best match for the
particular learning activity. A single learning activity could be classified
into more than just one of the dimensions if necessary. The verb portion
of the learning activity is used to determine at which level of the cognitive
domain the activity would lie. Based on this, the particular learning activity
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is then mapped to the appropriate cell of the taxonomy table. An illustrated
example of this process is provided in Figure 6.2.
The
Knowledge
Dimension
Factual
Conceptual
Procedural
Meta-
cognitive
Remember Understand Apply
X
Analyze Evaluate Create
The Cognitive Process Dimension
Educational Objective
The user will learn how to use built-in password protection/encryption features to protect Microsoft Office 
documents
Noun
built-in password protection/
encryption features
Verb
Use (apply)
Knowledge Dimension
Factual knowledge
Conceptual knowledge
Procedural knowledge
built-in password protection/
encryption features
Meta-cognitive knowledge
Cognitive Process 
Dimension
Remember
Understand
Apply (Use)
Analyze
Evaluate
Create The user will learn how to 
use built-in password 
protection/encryption 
features to protect Microsoft 
Office documents
Figure 6.2: How to fill the taxonomy table. Adapted from Anderson et al.
(2001, p. 32)
A similar process to the one used to place learning activities into the
taxonomy table is also used for the main learning objective of a learning
program, and for the various assessments associated with these learning ac-
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tivities/learning objectives. Table 6.5 represents a completed taxonomy table
for the learning objective (LO1) mentioned earlier, which is associated to the
learning activities in Table 6.4.
The The Cognitive Process Dimension
Knowledge
Dimension Remember Understand Apply Analyze Evaluate Create
Factual
Knowledge A1 A6
Conceptual Test1A Test1B
Knowledge A2 A4 A6
Procedural LO1
Knowledge A3 A6
Meta-
Cognitive
Knowledge A5
Table 6.5: Example Taxonomy Table adapted from Anderson et al., 2001
Once such a taxonomy table has been completed, the educator can use it
to identify any possible ”gaps” in the intended learning program. This can
be done by examining the four ”organizing questions” as discussed in section
6.5. Answering the four ”organizing questions” is one of the most difficult
things for creators of educational matter to do. The following sub-section
will briefly explain how the taxonomy table, Table 6.5, could be used to assist
in answering these question for the learning activities, as shown in Table 6.3.
6.6.2 Answering the four ”Organizing Questions”
Each learning activity in Table 6.3 consists of a verb that relates to one of
the cognitive domain levels in Bloom’s Taxonomy (Anderson et al., 2001,
pp 67-68). Each activity also has a noun relating to knowledge that could
be categorized as one of the four categories of knowledge. By marking the
appropriate spaces in the taxonomy table for each activity, the educator
can derive a lot of useful information about the ”coverage” provided by the
activities. As an example, the activity marked A1 lies at the remember level
of the cognitive domain and since it deals with basic subject terminology
it deals with the ”factual” category of knowledge. This is reflected by its
positioning in Table 6.5. Each of the other activities, A2 to A6, as shown
in Table 6.3 has also been appropriately placed in Table 6.5. A complete
information security educational program will obviously include many more
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activities, which would result in many more entries in the taxonomy table.
Such a table does not always have to deal with an entire program, but could,
like the given example, focus on a single learning objective, or even on a few
related objectives.
By examining the taxonomy table the educator can easily identify areas
of knowledge, or levels of the cognitive domain, that have not been covered
by the learning activities. Similarly, areas where multiple activities covers
the same levels of cognition and categories of knowledge can be identified.
This can assist in answering the so-called ”learning question”, i.e. ”are most
important activities receiving the larger share of the available resources?”. In
order to design activities that will result in maximum learning, thus answer-
ing the ”learning question”, one can look for activities that involves more
than just one type of knowledge. For example, in order to create a new
policy item (Activity A6), the learner will need to know; basic terminology
(factual knowledge), how items relate to each other (conceptual knowledge),
and which steps to follow to create a policy (procedural knowledge). To an-
swer the ”assessment question” the educator could choose to focus on the
learning objective itself, and thus, in the example given, only use assessment
methods that require the learner to apply procedural knowledge. Or the
assessor might decide to focus on one or more learning activities and thus
have a wider range of assessment coverage. By noting assessment activities
on the same taxonomy table, the educator can ensure that the chosen assess-
ments correspond directly to what he/she intends to assess. For example,
that learners must understand the concept of a password (Test1A) and must
be able to analyze the relative strength of a given password ( Test1B). The
table will also, at a glance, show which areas are not being assessed. Finally,
given a complete taxonomy table, the ”alignment question” should be rela-
tively easy to answer. In the given example, a clear ”disconnect” between
the assessment and the learning objective itself exists. Instead of focusing on
the application, or use, of passwords the assessments focus on the concept
of what a password is, and how to determine its relative strength. Similarly,
other ”miss-alignments” can be identified with the help of this taxonomy
table.
As mentioned earlier, this example is not intended to be a definitive work,
but rather to serve as an example or starting point for information security
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practitioners who want to use Bloom’s taxonomy when constructing aware-
ness and educational campaigns. It should however be clear that this taxon-
omy could easily be used to categorize most, if not all, information security
educational needs effectively. Once categorized according to a taxonomy like
Bloom’s taxonomy, it should also be easier to find related information regard-
ing pedagogical methods suitable to assist learners in attaining the desired
level of cognitive understanding.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined the widely used information security awareness, train-
ing and education continuum as defined in NIST 800-16 (1998). It was argued
that this continuum, though useful, is not precise enough to meet all the re-
quirements for the design of information security educational programs. Most
information security professionals do not necessarily have a background in
educational theory and thus require more precise guidance in the design of
educational programs. This chapter suggested that information security ed-
ucational programs would be more effective if they adhered more strictly to
pedagogical principles. It was specifically suggested that the common catego-
rization of security educational needs into the broad categories of awareness,
training, and education, is not ideal. Instead an educational taxonomy, like
Bloom’s taxonomy, should be used to accurately define the security education
needs of organizational users. Through the use of such a taxonomy certain
common weaknesses in current security awareness and educational programs
might be addressed.
An example of how Bloom’s taxonomy might be applied to information
security concepts was provided. This example was based on an information
security specific learning objective. Specific examples of learning activities
relating to this learning objective were given for each level of Bloom’s tax-
onomy of the cognitive domain. The chapter used this brief example, to
show how a taxonomy table based on this example, could assist educators in
addressing the four ”organizing questions” faced by educators. The use of
a learning taxonomy, as discussed in this chapter, could be of assistance to
information security practitioners who want to determine what to include in
an information security related educational campaign. The related question:
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”How should the users be taught?” will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 7
EDUCATIONAL DELIVERY
This chapter discusses issues that should be considered in choosing a deliv-
ery medium for organizational information security education. The chap-
ter firstly discusses the requirements of organizational information security
educational programs. The chapter then discusses what e-learning is and
examines the components of e-learning systems. Next the benefits offered
by e-learning to various stakeholders in organizational information security
educational programs are discussed. The chapter also briefly examines the
benefits of e-learning from a strictly pedagogical viewpoint. Finally an argu-
ment is presented to show that e-learning is an ideal medium for the delivery
of organizational information security education.
7.1 Introduction
Information security educational material must be designed according to the
specific learning needs of the intended target audience (NIST 800-16, 1998,
p. 19). The learning approach most effective for a particular individual
will depend on several factors. These could include his/her preferred learn-
ing style, current level of education, and/or prior experience relating to the
subject matter (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 19). The designers of information
security educational content thus need to focus on more questions than just
”what information security related knowledge is required?” and ”by whom
is this knowledge required?”. It is also very important to address the ques-
tion; ”how should the knowledge be communicated to the intended target
audience?”.
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Every individual can learn in one or more different ways, but usually
has a preferred or primary learning style. Some students might learn bet-
ter through self-paced reading, others through watching instructional videos.
How well the given instruction matches an individual’s learning style prefer-
ences can affect the learner’s performance in either a positive or a negative
way (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 19). If an information security education cam-
paign is to be successful, it is vital to try to accommodate as many of the
learning preferences of the intended target audience as possible.
The previous chapter discussed the use of the learning matrix from NIST
800-16 (1998) to identify what should be taught to whom. It also discussed
the use of a learning taxonomy to correctly determine the scope and/or depth
of learning needed in each of the identified topics. The previous chapter
thus addressed the second objective of this thesis, namely; to demonstrate
how the use of a learning taxonomy can be used to add pedagogical rigor to
information security educational programs. This chapter will address how
information security educational material should be delivered in an organi-
zational context. The aim of this chapter is to address the third objective of
this thesis as defined in section 1.7. Namely, to demonstrate the suitability
of e-learning as a delivery medium for organizational information security
educational programs.
7.2 Research Methodology and Process
This chapter argues in favor of e-learning as the ideal delivery medium for
organizational information security educational content. The work in this
chapter is primarily based on a qualitative content analysis of literature, as
described by (Krippendorff, 2004, pp 87-88) and argumentative techniques,
as described by (Mason, 1996, pp. 171-204). Arguments are primarily pre-
sented evidentially (by showing relevant evidence gathered from literature)
and narratively (by showing the validity of interpretation through a mean-
ingful/reasonable narrative) (Mason, 1996, p. 176). Through qualitative
content analysis techniques, the presented arguments are interwoven with
quotes from analyzed texts and literature to support the arguments and/or
conclusions (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 87-88). The presented requirements for
organization information security education were initially verified through
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publication as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004) as part of the author’s
work prior to this thesis. An initial argument in favor of using e-learning,
and specifically adaptive e-learning for information security education was
presented as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2006a). A related paper, which
evaluates the appropriateness of using the Cisco networking academy’s learn-
ing model as an e-learning framework for information security educational
content planned according to Bloom’s taxonomy, has been accepted for pub-
lication as (Van Niekerk & Thomson, 2010).
7.3 Requirements for Organizational
Information Security Education
The user education programs needed for information security purposes differ
from traditional educational programs. Unlike traditional educational pro-
grams, organizational information security education programs will primarily
be aimed at teaching adults. Adults have well established, not formative, val-
ues, beliefs, and opinions (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 20). Adults also have well
established learning preferences. The educational approach used should thus
be suitable for adult education. Furthermore, there are several other re-
quirements specific to the role that such a program will play in the overall
organization’s information security efforts. Information security education
is not just about the transfer of knowledge to learners. The aim of orga-
nizational information security education should be to foster a culture of
information security within the organization (B. Von Solms, 2000). Atten-
tion to behavioral theories is thus vital in the construction of organizational
information security educational programs. In the rest of this section, this
thesis will suggest and motivate some of the criteria that should typically
be considered when selecting a medium for the delivery and creation of an
information security education program. Most of the listed criteria have been
previously published by the author in Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004).
The discussion below reiterates the arguments presented in Van Niekerk and
Von Solms (2004) and also presents some additional arguments based on re-
search subsequent to the original publication. The requirements below should
be considered when choosing an educational approach for an organizational
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information security educational program.
7.3.1 Everyone should be able to ”pass” the course
In an organizational information security program, it is essential that each
and every ”learner” successfully completes the course. Nosworthy (2000)
states that each person in the organization from the CEO to house keeping
staff must be aware of, and trained to exercise their responsibilities towards
information security. However, in traditional educational models there are
usually a percentage of the learners who do not pass the course, or in other
words, do not successfully meet the assessment criteria. In order for an orga-
nization’s information resources to be secure, everyone needs to not only be
trained, but to ”pass” the training. Unlike traditional education, failing an
information security educational program cannot be accepted. Workers at
every level, even those who do not use a computer, are liable to be targeted
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 39). This means that having even a single person
who does not know his/her information security responsibilities should be un-
acceptable. The delivery mechanism chosen for such a program should thus
provide learners with multiple opportunities to acquire the requisite knowl-
edge. Allowing learners multiple opportunities to learn is also vital from a
purely educational viewpoint. Learning requires sufficient opportunities for
practice (Smilkstein, 2003, p. 128). How much practice and/or repetition is
needed before someone learns a specific concept will vary from one individual
to another based on various factors (Smilkstein, 2003, p. 128).
7.3.2 Current values, beliefs, and opinions must be ad-
dressed
In Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004) this requirement was previously ex-
pressed as ”employees must know why” information security is important
and why a specific policy or control is in place. Studies have suggested that
current information security awareness programs are failing (Siponen, 2001).
This failure is due to many reasons. Schlienger and Teufel (2003) have shown
that even employees who know their responsibilities with regards to infor-
mation security will still disobey security policy if they disagree with the
policy. They suggest that the mere awareness of the policies and procedures
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is in fact not sufficient, the users also need to know why a specific policy or
control is in place (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In information security, being
taught why a specific policy or control is in place, is generally considered to
be a feature of education, and not of awareness (NIST 800-16, 1998, pp. 16-
17)(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). A feature of the educational level is that the
user must understand why information security is important (NIST 800-16,
1998, pp. 16-17)(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). However, as shown in chap-
ter 4, this clear distinction between awareness, training and education is not
universal amongst current approaches. In terms of the NIST learning contin-
uum, understanding why a specific control is needed refers to education as
opposed to awareness. NIST 800-16 (1998) reserves this level of education for
the information security specialist. It is not the contention of this thesis that
all users should receive the same level of education as information security
professionals. It should be obvious that end-users do not require the same
level of understanding as information security professionals (NIST 800-16,
1998, p. 14). One does not need to understand why procedures are in place
or how the technologies work to use them effectively (Tripathi, 2000), (NIST
800-16, 1998, p. 14). However, due to the need to sometimes ”convince” users
about the relevance of a specific control, in information security, if a user asks
why, it should always be explained (Tripathi, 2000). To a large extent, the
need to explain to users why a specific control is needed, is based on the
fact that the learners are adults and could thus already have values, beliefs,
and/or opinions that are contrary to the taught material. Education aimed
at younger learners is normally formative in nature. Because these younger
learners do not yet have well established values, beliefs, and opinions, it is
easier to convince them to conform to certain desired norms and/or behavior
patterns. Adult learners, on the other hand, already have well established
values, beliefs, and opinions. These values, beliefs, and opinions might clash
with the desired values, beliefs, and opinions the organization would like to
foster. In some cases explaining why a specific control is needed would be
sufficient to address the differences between a user’s current values, beliefs,
and opinions, and the desired values, beliefs, and opinions. In other cases
it might be necessary to address these existing values, beliefs, and opinions
more comprehensively. In information security education rationality may not
necessarily be enough to convince an employee to behave in a desired fashion
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(Kabay, 2002, p. 35.2). ”People can get very angry about what they perceive
as interference with their way of getting the work done” (Kabay, 2002, p.
35.2). The delivery medium chosen for an information security educational
program should thus be capable of facilitating approaches that could be used
to address these current values, beliefs, and opinions.
7.3.3 Learning materials should be customized
Learning materials should be customized to the needs of individual learn-
ers. In an organizational context, users of information exist at several levels.
There are essentially three categories of users that need to be educated in
information security awareness namely: the end-user, IT personnel and top
management (M. Thomson, 1998). The National Institute for Science and
Technology (NIST) expands on this classification by stating that training and
education are to be provided selectively, based on individual responsibilities
and needs. Specifically, training is to be provided to individuals based on
their particular job functions (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 43). ISO/IEC 27002
(2005) states that the information security policy should be communicated
throughout the organization to users in a form that is relevant, accessible and
understandable to the intended reader (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005, p. 3, section
3.1.1). According to NIST, individuals learn in several ways, but each per-
son, as part of his/her personality, has a preferred or primary learning style.
Instruction can positively, or negatively, affect a student’s performance, de-
pending on whether it is matched, or mismatched, with a student’s preferred
learning style (NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 19). Thus, what should be taught to
a specific individual user (content) and how it should be taught (delivery),
will depend on both the user’s preferred learning style, and the specific role
which that user plays within the organization. The educational approach
used should thus, as far as possible, allow for the customization of both the
program content and the specific delivery methods.
7.3.4 Users should be responsible for their own learn-
ing
In today’s organizations it is crucial to maximize return on investment.
Through its very nature classroom training requires the availability of highly
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trained specialists to present the courses, as well as the availability of training
facilities. It also requires that the learners take time off from their regular du-
ties to attend classes. These factors make classroom training very expensive.
One of the most cost-effective substitutes for traditional classroom training
is to provide employees with intranet-based instruction (O’Brien, 1999, p.
361). Such web-based instructional programs require individual learners to
be responsible for their own acquisition of knowledge instead of being passive
receptors in the process (ITiCSE, 1997). Self-driven learning also enables or-
ganizations to make learning material available in a variety of formats. This
in turn means users will have a choice of how they are taught, which has
already been shown to be a necessary feature of information security educa-
tion. Adults learners will ”explore a variety of learning modalities” if they
are empowered to use their own learning strengths (Materna, 2007, p. xii).
Users should be provided with learning via a delivery mechanism that allows
them to explore the learning in their own way. It is however, important
to note that this does not mean learners should simply be provided with
material and then ignored. Motivational factors, brain compatible learning
strategies, current education levels, past experience, and other possible fac-
tors which could influence learning should still be addressed. ”How a person
feels about a learning situation determines the amount of attention devoted
to it” (Sousa, 2006, p. 44). Allowing adult learners to gain more under-
standing of, and autonomy over, their own learning, leads to the learners
becoming ”more invested in their learning, rising to the challenge with new
energy, enthusiasm, and commitment (Materna, 2007, p. xii).
7.3.5 Users should be held accountable for their stud-
ies
Most information security standards make it clear that users should be held
accountable for their information security responsibilities (ISO/IEC 27002,
2005, pp. 8-10, section 6). These responsibilities are normally spelt out in
the organization’s information security policies and procedures. In an orga-
nization, policies function in a similar fashion to laws. For laws, ignorance
is not a valid defense. However ignorance of policy is an acceptable defense
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009, pp. 89-90). Thus, to be able to hold employees
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accountable for their actions, the organization should have proof, normally in
the form of a signed form, that the employees have been educated regarding
their responsibilities and that they understand and accept these responsibili-
ties as laid out in the policies (Whitman & Mattord, 2009, pp. 89-90). Wood
(1997) suggests that all employees should be required, on an annual basis, to
sign a statement saying that they have read and understood the information
security policy manual. It should thus be clear that self-driven learning for
information security purposes, as discussed previously, could only be used if
the employees are also held accountable for their learning. Otherwise the or-
ganization could not legally hold the employees accountable for their actions.
This requirement also leads logically from the combination of the requirement
that everyone must ”pass” the course, and that users should be responsible
for their own learning. If the organization allows users to have the respon-
sibility over their own learning, but still requires everyone to successfully
complete the learning, it would have to hold users accountable for their own
learning to ensure that the users are trying to acquire the necessary knowl-
edge. Research has shown that learners who are held accountable for the
learning will spend more time attempting to process the same information
(Sousa, 2006, p. 66).
7.3.6 Learners must receive feedback
According to NIST 800-16 (1998), evaluation of training is vital, and should
be an integral component of any training programme (NIST 800-16, 1998,
p. 157). This holds true for any form of education. Being able to as-
sess progress and provide feedback to the learner is a prerequisite for any
educational program to be successful. Fingar (1996) states that feedback,
specifically in the form of knowledge regarding the outcomes of the learn-
ers’ actions, is required for learning to take place. This feedback should be
continuous and constructive (DOE, 2001). Prompt, specific, and corrective
feedback increases the likelihood of a learner continuing the learning process
until successful completion (Sousa, 2006, p. 66). In a traditional class-
room situation educators are responsible for helping the learners achieve the
instructional objectives designated for their classes. These instructional ob-
jectives are that each learner should attain the learning outcomes by being
able to demonstrate their mastery of the assessment standards. The pur-
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pose of assessment is to determine whether the learners have achieved these
objectives (Cunningham, 1998). Assessment, in this case, should not be con-
fused with evaluation. According to Siebo¨rger (1998) assessment is similar
to evaluation, but assessment is the measurement of the extent of learning in
individuals, whereas evaluation is a process by which the effects and effec-
tiveness of teaching are determined. Both assessment and evaluation should
form part of any information security program. The learners should thus
receive feedback in two forms. First they should be assessed, which will tell
them how well they as individuals have mastered the knowledge from a spe-
cific program. Secondly, they should be evaluated. Evaluation could serve
as a metric towards measuring the overall success of the information security
education program. Such a metric could also be used as a key performance
indicator to assist in holding users accountable for their studies.
It is not the contention of this thesis that the above requirements consti-
tute a definitive list of all requirements that should be met by an educational
approach to organizational information security education. They do however
represent factors that in the author’s opinion should specifically be considered
when choosing a medium for the creation and delivery of educational mate-
rial for information security programs. Other psychological factors, such as
aspects relating to motivating employees to both learn the required security
knowledge and skills, and then apply this knowledge and skills when and
where necessary, would still need to be addressed. These motivational aspects
do not necessarily directly impact the choice of educational delivery approach
and will thus be dealt with in the next chapter when the integration of the
various contributions made by this thesis is discussed. As mentioned above,
web-based-, or e-learning can be one of the most cost-effective approaches
to the education of organizational users. However, such approaches do not
necessarily have to completely exclude other forms of education. Classroom
education, instructional videos, printed media, etc could still play a signif-
icant role in organizational information security education. Many recent
studies have started to use the term blended learning to refer to an approach
that mixes technological and other forms of education into a more holistic
approach. The following sections will firstly clarify exactly what blended-
and/or e-learning is. The benefits that such technology-integrated/blended
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approaches could offer will be examined, and finally a critical comparison
of such approaches against the above identified criteria for organizational
information security education will be performed.
7.4 What is Blended and/or E-learning?
Many different terms are commonly used to refer to educational approaches
that utilize computer based technology in the delivery of learning material.
It is important to understand the differences between the most commonly
used terminology. Commonly used terminology includes e-learning, blended
learning, online learning, web-based learning, and computer aided instruc-
tion. For the purposes of this thesis the term e-learning will be used to refer
to any instructional approaches that include computer based delivery mech-
anisms. Online-, and web-based, learning will be used to refer to e-learning
that specifically make use of web-based technologies to deliver instruction.
Finally the term blended learning (sometimes called ”hybrid” learning) refers
to learning/teaching approaches where online and/or e-learning components
are combined with more traditional approaches, such as face-to-face instruc-
tion, to provide an enhanced learning experience (DOE, 2009, p. 9).
Despite the fairly ”broad” nature of the above definitions, it would be
a mistake to simply view any learning content in an electronic form as e-
learning. It is also important to not simply devolve the development of an
e-learning system into a purely technical exercise (Ismail, 2002). This might
result in an expensive software implementation that does not deliver much
learning value. Instead, designers of e-learning programs should focus on un-
derstanding the basic components that constitute an e-learning environment
(Ismail, 2002). Such environments could, for example, be based on a frame-
work like the widely accepted Learning Technologies Systems Architecture
(LTSA) as presented in the international standard IEEE 1484.1 (2003). A
simplified overview of components common to such e-learning environments
is provided by Ismail (2002). This simplified overview is graphically depicted
in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: E-learning Application Environment. Adapted from (Ismail,
2002)
7.4.1 Components of an E-learning Environment
The first component of the e-learning environment shown in Figure 7.1 is a
Learning Design System (LDS). A learning design system allows the design
and analysis of instructionally sound learning programs (Ismail, 2002). A
learning design system also provides the capability to manage the overall in-
structional design project. In a ”good” learning design system this would
allow the incorporation of an instructional design methodology of choice
(Ismail, 2002). Being able to incorporate an instructional design method-
ology of choice into the overall management of a learning program project
allows the use of content developers who are not trained in instructional
design principles to still develop content which adheres to such principles
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(Ismail, 2002). In an e-learning environment, the learning design system is
used to manage the creation of learning projects based on learning needs
identified in the human resource management system of the organization (or
possibly some other sub-system used to identify the educational needs for
specific target employee groups).
The learning design system manages the overall creation of content in
the Learning Content Management System (LCMS). The learning content
management system provides a collaborative environment for the creation,
and maintenance, of learning content. This system is usually supported
by various forms of content creation tools and is used by subject matter
experts, media-, and content developers (Ismail, 2002). The learning content
management system also allows the storage of instructional content, and the
delivery of this content to the learning support system.
A learning support system is an environment, often web-based, for the
support of actual teaching and learning activities (Ismail, 2002). For an in-
structor, this component enables him/her to select various learning objects
from the learning content management system and incorporate them into a
blended learning approach. The instructor could plan the delivery of spe-
cific parts of a syllabus using this learning support system. For learners,
this is their main point of entry into the available e-learning material. In
a non-blended approach the learning support system could also be used di-
rectly by learners to plan and conduct their own learning activities. Such a
learning support system commonly also contains entry points into automated
assessment and feedback modules. Some modern systems would also support
adaptive technologies (see discussion below). Ensuring that employees do in
fact participate in the learning activities is achieved via the use of a learning
management system.
Many early e-learning ”solutions” consisted of only a Learning Manage-
ment System (LMS) (Ismail, 2002). Some current approaches still use the
term learning management system to refer to an entire e-learning environ-
ment, and not only to the specific sub-component (Lonn & Teasley, 2009).
The term learning management system, as used in this thesis, refers to the
component of an e-learning environment that allows for the administration,
documentation, tracking and reporting of learning activities. With the help
of a learning management system, an organization’s human resource depart-
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ment can keep track of employees’ learning. The learning management system
can report on who learned, what content/subject matter was studied, when
it took place, and even how much time was spent on learning. As depicted in
Figure 7.1, the learning management system is usually connected to both the
organization’s human resource database, and to a Learning Support System
(LSS).
The above components (sometimes described using different names and/or
terminology) form part of the most common e-learning environments. Popu-
lar open-/community source e-learning platforms, such as Moodle (http://moodle.org)
and Sakai (http://sakaiproject.org), are also based, at a conceptual level, on
the component framework as described above. Some e-learning systems also
have more advanced components. Of particular importance, for the purposes
of this thesis, are the so-called adaptive e-learning systems which personalize
the learner’s access to educational material.
7.4.2 Adaptive E-learning
The need for personalized access to information has become a well established
feature of many application areas in ICT (Brusilovsky & Henze, 2007). Areas
such as e-commerce, news access, and many others already successfully make
use of a variety of adaptive features. However, despite the fact that educa-
tion, as a field, has one of the biggest needs for personalized access, adaptive
technologies have not yet become widely used in education (Brusilovsky &
Henze, 2007). This is primarily due to the fact that most of the ”adapta-
tion techniques that focus on user interests and work successfully in other
fields have a limited applicability in the educational context” (Brusilovsky
& Henze, 2007). In education users do not only differ in terms of interests,
but also requires adaptation based on current knowledge levels, goals, skills,
and personal learning styles (Brusilovsky & Henze, 2007). These adaptations
form the basis of adaptive e-learning technologies.
Adaptive e-learning systems, as well as intelligent tutoring systems, are
categories of e-learning solutions that make use of advances from the field of
artificial intelligence (AI) to better support learning. The primary purpose
of adaptive e-learning systems is to automatically adapt presented learning
content to the learner. Artificial intelligence can be seen as the key to this
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automation of e-learning (Hentea, Shea, & Pennington, 2003). However, for
the purposes of this thesis, the exact ”form(s)” of artificial intelligence used
need not be examined. Instead, the underlying architectural structure that
enables the adaptation of content in current adaptive systems will be briefly
examined.
Current adaptive e-learning systems make use of a user model and a do-
main model to provide adaptive features. ”The user model is a representation
of information about an individual user that is essential for an adaptive sys-
tem to provide the adaptation effect, i.e., to behave differently for different
users” (Brusilovsky & Milla´n, 2007). The adaptive system collects knowl-
edge about the user from various sources. These sources could include both
implicit observation of the user’s behavior and/or explicitly asking the user
for inputs (Brusilovsky & Milla´n, 2007). The type of information represented
in a system’s user model, as well as how much information is stored, will de-
pend on the specific kind of adaptation effect that the system has to deliver
(Brusilovsky & Milla´n, 2007). Adaptation of educational resources is done
in order to increase the usefulness of the educational resource to the learner.
How useful a specific resource is to a learner depends on many factors.
For example, ”some resources may require additional knowledge that the
learner does not yet have (in accordance to his/her user model), while others
may teach the subject without sufficient in-depth information and are thus
too easy for this learner” (Brusilovsky & Henze, 2007). The learner’s current
progress, personal learning style preferences, learning goals, and many other
factors could thus all form part of the user model in a specific adaptive e-
learning system. It should be clear that the user model will be continuously
updated and adapted as the learner progresses through an e-learning course.
The user model is used in combination with an expert-, or domain model.
The domain model is also sometimes referred to as the ”ideal student model”
(Brusilovsky & Milla´n, 2007). This domain model is constructed by subject
experts and reflects the knowledge an ”ideal” learner should have after suc-
cessfully completing the desired educational module. The domain model will
also contain a large amount of meta-knowledge regarding the pre-requisite
knowledge that a learner would need before being able to attempt a spe-
cific learning task, and other relationships between various units of knowl-
edge. Before choosing specific content to present to a learner, an adaptive
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system performs a comparison, with the help of artificial intelligence based
techniques, between the user model and the domain model. Some systems
perform this comparison with the assistance of an overlay model. An overlay
model represents an individual user’s knowledge as a subset of the domain
model. ”For each fragment of domain knowledge, an overlay model stores
some estimation of the users knowledge level of this fragment” (Brusilovsky
& Milla´n, 2007). Through the use of these user-, domain, and sometimes
overlay-, models, an adaptive system can determine how to adapt the actual
content of a learning module to be more applicable for a specific learner.
However, the use of these models is not restricted to only the adaptation
based on current knowledge.
User models can also be used to contain information specifically focused
on user interest. In many current adaptive systems modeling user interest is
seen as more important than modeling user knowledge (Brusilovsky & Milla´n,
2007). In an information security context, this might not necessarily be the
case. Even if a user is not really interested in learning about information
security it would still be necessary for the organization to ensure the user
is educated. However, the same techniques that are used to model interest
could probably be applied to model the applicability of specific knowledge
based on a user’s security roles and responsibilities. Brusilovsky and Milla´n
(2007) also discusses the use of user models to model goals and tasks. This
form of adaptation depends on the current context within which the user
operates and would be used to present information that could fill the users
immediate information needs. As an example, due to such a contextual adap-
tation, a user actively engaged in a task where encryption techniques could
be of importance, might be presented with knowledge specifically relating
to the use of encryption techniques. Additionally, user models can be used
to model user background (previous experience outside the core knowledge
domain), individual traits (including cognitive styles and learning styles),
and work context (location, systems/platform(s) used, etc) (Brusilovsky &
Milla´n, 2007). Adaptation of e-learning materials based on such extended
user models would obviously require corresponding changes in the supporting
domain models. As a field of study, adaptive e-learning is constantly evolving
and improving.
According to Brusilovsky and Henze (2007) current adaptive techniques
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can already be used
• ”to support the learner in finding the most appropriate learning re-
source;
• for providing awareness about the learning process (e.g., by pointing
out necessary pre-knowledge that this learner might otherwise miss);
• for providing guidance (e.g., by providing an individually tailored se-
quence of learning resources which teach the topics s/he is interested
in while incorporating all required prerequisite knowledge);
• for providing orientation (e.g., by pointing out the next learning steps
to take, or the existence of different schools-of-thought);
• for considering individual learning styles” (Brusilovsky & Henze, 2007)
Adaptive technologies already play an important role in e-learning and
will probably start to play a progressively more important role in future e-
learning solutions. It is the opinion of the author of this thesis that these
technologies can play an especially important role in the use of e-learning
for organizational information security education. This possible use will be
discussed later in this chapter.
This section established what e-learning and blended learning are. It
also explored the components that commonly form part of such systems,
and the role(s) these components play in such a system. Finally the field of
adaptive e-learning was briefly introduced and discussed. The next section
will specifically focus on the benefits e-learning, and/or blended learning can
offer to organizations.
7.5 Benefits of Blended and/or E-learning
Providing learning to organizational employees in an e-learning, or blended
learning, format holds many advantages for all the stakeholders involved
in these learning programs. These advantages can be loosely categorized
according to the specific stakeholders who benefit as follows:
Firstly, e-learning approaches hold advantages for the learners themselves.
These include:
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• material can be used as self-study, with or without tutor support, or in
blended environment (Nisar, 2002)
• learning material often has a hyper-linked nature which allows learners
to explore related topics of interest
• learning can be enhanced and be more flexible (for example through
adaptive features) (Nisar, 2002)
• time spent on training is significantly reduced (Nisar, 2002)
• travel away from home is not required (Nisar, 2002)
• training material is of a consistent quality (Nisar, 2002)
• individuals can work at their own pace (Nisar, 2002)
• student support systems are better (Nisar, 2002)
• learning environment is anonymous and there is less pressure to perform
well in front of peers (Bell, 2007)
• anonymous learning environments also allow the exploration of more
personal issues (Bell, 2007)
• adaptive features support preferred learning styles, allow for learners
past experience, individual traits, specific learning needs, etc (Brusilovsky
& Milla´n, 2007)
• training is available when and where required at a time and place con-
venient to both learner and employer (Bell, 2007)
The second major stakeholder in organizational information security ed-
ucation would be the organization itself. From the organization’s viewpoint,
e-learning also offers many advantages:
• huge cost savings including less time away from job, cheap premises,
no travel and subsistence costs, and little or no course fees (Nisar,
2002)(Unneberg, 2007)
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• E-learning based training solutions are inexpensive to distribute orga-
nization wide and can easily be administrated from a centralized point.
This also means that it would be very easy to maintain, manage and
update training materials.
• employees spend less time away from work
• participation in learning programs can easily be checked and monitored
(Nisar, 2002). This is especially important from a legislatory compli-
ance point of view (Bell, 2007). This includes detailed reports on when
and where training took place, how much time was spent, how the
employee performed in the assessments, etc
• learning management systems can also be used to audit which em-
ployees must go on additional or refresher training. This can help
organizations to meet legal requirements (Bell, 2007)
• e-learning improves employees’ abilities to interpret information, make
decisions, and solve problems which in turn enable greater exploration
of new technologies
• training can be ”targeted” to enhance the ability to interpret infor-
mation relating to a specific task
• training can be delivered just in time. A learning management sys-
tem could even be used to support customer relationship management
through streamlining certain tasks (Deeny, 2003)
• course materials can be constantly updated which can ensure that
the course is current, relevant and in line with new legislation (Bell,
2007)(Young, 2002)
• training can complement existing knowledge management processes
(Young, 2002)
• e-learning can lead to a reduction in staff turnover (Deeny, 2003)
• material can be globalized, i.e. translated into many languages. This
allows the reuse of existing material and once again leads to cost savings
(Pollitt, 2008)(Bell, 2007)
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• anonymous training environments can allow the exploration of issues
relating to ethics, or other sensitive/personal matters. This could be
of use in fostering a specific organizational culture
• e-learning activities often have a positive impact, in terms of both cost
and efficiency, on critical business processes (Young, 2002)
Thirdly, the design and implementation of any instructional program re-
quires a significant investment in time from course and/or content creators.
E-learning also offers many benefits to the course/content creators involved
in such a program:
• Electronic and/or web-based media are very rich. This means that
educational material developed in these types of media is not restricted
to simple text and static graphics, but can consist of a mixture of text,
graphics, animations and even sound or video clips.
• E-learning training materials can include programmatic components,
which could allow virtually limitless customization.
• wikis, blogs, podcast, e-portfolios, etc allow instructors a variety of
tools. Furthermore, new technologies are constantly emerging. This
gives course designers a lot of creative freedom (Clark, 2007)
• learning design systems allow the use of content creators who are not
familiar with a specific pedagogical approach (Ismail, 2002)
• existing material can be re-used or even re-purposed to meet new train-
ing needs.
• the ability to rapidly distribute new material also allows more time
spent on the actual creation of content, and less on administrative
tasks
It can be argued that many, if not most, of the above mentioned benefits
are logical and ”expected”. However, blended and e-learning also has some
less obvious benefits. These relate specifically to improvements in learning
from a strictly pedagogical point of view. From a purely educational point
of view, it is these pedagogical benefits that should carry the most weight in
a decision to make use of blended and/or e-learning.
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7.5.1 Pedagogical benefits of Blended and/or E-learning
Since the first computer aided instruction systems appeared, many researchers
have conducted studies to compare the effectiveness of these ”new” ap-
proaches to more traditional classroom based instruction approaches. Such
research papers would thus be the most appropriate sources to evaluate in
order to determine whether or not blended and/or e-learning approaches of-
fer a pedagogical advantage over traditional instruction approaches. The
United States Department of Education recently published a report based
on a meta-analysis of the results of more than 1000 such empirical studies
that were published from 1996 through July 2008 (DOE, 2009). The re-
port focuses predominantly on publications after 2004 which compares the
effectiveness of various forms of e-learning and blended learning to face-to-
face education (DOE, 2009, p. xiii). This report would thus be an ideal
source to provide insight into the effectiveness of blended and/or e-learning
approaches. However, one might argue that many of these studies might not
be applicable to information security education which focuses predominantly
on adult education.
The report examined 51 identified study effects, of which 44 were drawn
from research focusing on older (adult) learners. This focus on older learn-
ers is thus of particular importance to educators, focusing on organizational
information security end-user education, who work exclusively with adult
learners. Adults already have well-established values, beliefs, and opinions.
Adults relate new information and knowledge to previously learned infor-
mation, experiences, and values which might result in misunderstanding
(NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 20). It is therefore vital to ensure that learning
approaches followed are suitable for adult learners. The fact that 44 of the
51 study effects analyzed in the meta-analysis focus on adult learners makes
the results of this analysis very relevant for the purposes of this thesis.
The following key-findings are of specific importance for the purposes of
this thesis (DOE, 2009, p. xiv-xvi):
• ”Students who took all or part of their class online performed better,
on average, than those taking the same course through traditional face-
to-face instruction”
• ”Instruction combining online and face-to-face elements had a larger
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advantage relative to purely face-to-face instruction than did purely
online instruction”
• ”The effectiveness of online learning approaches appears quite broad
across different content and learner types.”
• ”Most of the variations in the way in which different studies imple-
mented online learning did not affect student learning outcomes signif-
icantly.”
• ”Effect sizes were larger for studies in which the online and face-to-
face conditions varied in terms of curriculum materials and aspects of
instructional approach in addition to the medium of instruction.”
• ”Online learning can be enhanced by giving learners control of their
interactions with media and prompting learner reflection.”
• ”Providing guidance for learning for groups of students appears less
successful than does using such mechanisms with individual learners.”
From a purely pedagogical viewpoint the findings in DOE (2009) are very
important. Firstly, the findings show that a blended approach, where
e-learning and face-to-face instruction are combined, is the most effective
educational approach. However, if such a blended approach is not possible,
a purely e-learning based approach would in fact be better than classroom
instruction. Secondly, the findings show that approaches incorporating e-
learning are effective irrespective of the specific e-learning approach taken,
the learner type, or the specific field of study. Finally, the findings showed
that learners in e-learning based programs should be given control of their
own learning, and should, if possible, be given individualized guidance.
The benefits discussed above should make it clear that an e-learning based
approach would definitely be the best pedagogical approach towards educa-
tional delivery for organizational information security education if it also
matches the general requirements for information security education identi-
fied in section 7.3. The next section will compare the features of an e-learning
to the identified requirements for information security education.
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7.6 E-learning for Information Security Edu-
cation
Section 7.3 identified certain requirements that should be met by educational
approaches used for information security education. These requirements have
also been published before as part of Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004). This
section will compare these requirements against the features of e-learning ap-
proaches to determine how well e-learning as an educational delivery channel
matches the needs of organizational information security education.
• The first identified requirement is the need for all employees to (even-
tually) ”pass” the course. Information security depends on each and
every person involved in the security process to have the necessary
security related knowledge and/or skills to perform his/her job in a
secure manner. It is thus necessary to ensure that the educational
approach taken allows users who ”fail” the assessments relating to a
specific knowledge element, and/or skill that is needed, the opportunity
for additional learning and, afterwards, to be re-assessed. E-learning
approaches are arguably better suited to address this need than any
other possible approach. Because e-learning can be done at a time and
place that suits both the employee and the organization, there are lit-
tle or no additional impact on a learner’s normal job functions should
he/she need to repeat on of the learning modules. There is also no
additional cost involved in having an employee who repeats a specific
learning module. The facilities provided by a learning management sys-
tem will also enable the organization to keep track of each and every
individual employee’s learning/progress.
• The second identified requirement is the need to address current val-
ues, beliefs, and opinions of employees. This is especially important if
the overall goal of the program is to foster an organizational culture
of information security. However, employees can come from many dif-
ferent educational and/or cultural backgrounds. These different back-
grounds, and many other factors could influence the current values,
beliefs, and/or attitudes of employees towards information security.
These values, beliefs, and attitudes can thus vary significantly amongst
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an organization’s employees. In some cases, individuals might even
consider their own values, beliefs, and attitudes to be personal/private
and would thus not like to openly discuss/share these. E-learning sys-
tems provide an excellent medium to assist in the addressing of current
employees’ values, beliefs, and attitudes. Firstly, the user models / do-
main models in current adaptive e-learning systems can already accom-
modate the modeling of various user backgrounds and other individual
traits. These and similar features could, to a certain extent, also be
used to determine a difference between the desired values, beliefs, and
attitudes (as modeled in the domain model) and the specific user’s (as
modeled in the user model). The content can then be adapted to the
specific user’s needs in order to allow the user to explore (if preferable,
anonymously) the reasons/reasoning for the inclusion of specific infor-
mation security controls. In addition to this, e-learning solutions offer
the ability to use a multitude of approaches. Course designers could
thus address specific ”contentious” issues in wiki’s, blogs, videos, or
even via interactive discussion forums. According to Kabay (2002, p.
35.9) the use of simulations, videos, and role-laying exercises could as-
sist in changing user beliefs/attitudes during a culture change program
by helping users bridge the gap between intellect and emotion (what
they are taught is logical, but it conflicts with how they feel about the
topic). The use of interactive discussion forums could allow users to
not only explore the reasons/reasoning for a specific control, but to also
provide their own opinions on specific issues.
• Thirdly, information security education requires that learning materi-
als are customized to the needs of specific target users and/or groups.
Such customization is one of the central features of e-learning. The
entire field of adaptive e-learning systems specifically aims at the im-
plementation and improvement of such learner specific customization.
As discussed earlier, these systems can customize content based on the
individual user’s learning preferences, learning needs, current activi-
ties (work context), background, location, systems and/or platforms
used, individual traits, cognitive styles, goals and tasks. E-learning
approaches are arguably more accommodating of such customization
needs than any other educational delivery medium.
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• The fourth requirement for information security education that was
identified is that users should be responsible for their own learning.
This requirement was motivated in Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004)
specifically based on the cost implications of education in terms of both
time and financial resources. It is also important in terms of the first
requirement identified, namely that everyone should ”pass” the course.
From a time and cost perspective, users could only be allowed multiple
opportunities to learn, if such additional opportunities do not require
them to spend additional time away from their job responsibilities. E-
learning systems allow users to learn when and where they choose to.
It also allows users to learn at their own pace, according to their own
learning needs, and to explore topics according to their own interests.
E-learning enables users to participate in group discussions, or not to,
should they so choose. With the help of the learning support systems
in modern e-learning solutions, learners are empowered to take control
of their own learning. E-learning systems thus allow organizations to
pass the responsibility for their learning to the users themselves. How-
ever, in order to ensure that the user takes this responsibility seriously,
organizations need to hold the users accountable for their learning.
• Holding users accountable for their own learning was the fifth require-
ment identified for information security educational approaches. This
requirement goes hand-in-hand with making users responsible for their
own learning. Through the use of learning management systems orga-
nizations can not only hold users accountable for their own learning,
but can also keep extensive records of learning. E-learning systems al-
low organizations to monitor user learning progress, in terms of training
completed, time spent on specific modules, performance in assessments,
etc. With the extensive learner monitoring and tracking capabilities of
current e-learning solutions organizations can also identify learners who
need remedial or additional training in order to remain compliant with
legislatury changes.
• The final identified requirement for information security education is
the need to provide learners with feedback. Feedback is a central fea-
ture of any successful educational approach. Providing learners with
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prompt, specific, and corrective feedback increases the likelihood that
the learners will persist in their learning activities until they are suc-
cessful (Sousa, 2006, p. 66). The ability of computers (e-learning) to
provide immediate and objective feedback is considered to be a moti-
vating factor towards continued learning because learners can under-
stand their own level of competence and can evaluate their own progress
(Sousa, 2006, p. 66). E-learning systems can be used to provide contin-
uous formative assessments and feedback to enhance the learners own
learning process, or to administer summative assessments for use by the
organization in order to determine whether or not a specific learning
module has been completed successfully.
E-learning systems thus meet all the identified requirements for infor-
mation security education. It can be argued that e-learning is in fact the
most appropriate delivery channel for information security education avail-
able to modern organizations. Additionally, e-learning components can also
be included in more traditional educational approaches to form a blended
learning environment. Research discussed earlier in this chapter has shown
that such blended approaches are highly effective from a pedagogical point
of view.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter examined the requirements of organizational information security
education. It was argued that information security is dependant on each and
every human involved in the security process. Organizations thus cannot
afford to have any of the users in an information security educational pro-
gram fail the course. It was also argued that the existing values, beliefs,
and attitudes of users must be addressed by these educational programs.
This is especially important if the organization wishes to foster a culture
of information security. Thirdly, the learners in organizational information
security educational programs are adults, who have well established learning
preferences, educational backgrounds, and levels of technological competency.
These adult learners also have very specific, and varied, roles and responsibil-
ities towards information security. There is thus a need to customize learning
material in organizational information security educational programs in or-
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der to accommodate the variety of needs and background amongst the target
learners. The fourth, fifth, and sixth identified requirements were all based
on the fact that few organizations can afford to send all their staff for ex-
tensive classroom training. Organizations should thus be able to make the
users responsible for their own learning. However, if users are responsible
for their own learning, organizations would have to hold them accountable
for this learning in order to ensure compliance with possible legislatory re-
quirements, and in order to ensure that organizational information resources
are in fact secure. Finally, learning requires feedback. If users are to be
responsible for their own learning, the educational approach would have to
accommodate this need for feedback. Based on the identified requirements,
e-learning was suggested as the preferred educational delivery medium for
organizational information security education. The chapter examined the
components of such e-learning systems, as well as the role(s) each of these
components play(s) in an e-learning environment. In addition to the ”nor-
mal” components, the features of adaptive e-learning systems were briefly
examined. The chapter examined the benefits that e-learning, and blended
learning approaches that incorporate e-learning components, can offer to var-
ious organizational stakeholders. The specific benefits offered by these ap-
proaches from a purely pedagogical viewpoint were also discussed. Finally
the chapter compared the requirements of organizational information security
education to the features provided by e-learning systems. It is the conclusion
of this chapter that e-learning would be a medium that is ideally suited for
the delivery of organizational information security education. Furthermore,
the possibilities provided by adaptive e-learning technologies can potentially
add a lot of value to information security educational programs. Through
the use of e-learning environments, organizations can not only create ap-
propriate information security educational material, but can also effectively
administer and manage such programs. This chapter has thus addressed the
third research objective of this thesis, namely to ”demonstrate the suitability
of e-learning as a delivery medium for organizational information security
educational programs”. The next chapter will show how e-learning can be
used as part of a pedagogically sound process in order to address the final
research objective identified in section 1.7, namely to demonstrate ”how the
various elements contributed by this thesis integrate into existing transfor-
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mative change management processes for the fostering of an organizational
information security culture”.
Chapter 8
INTEGRATING THEORY
AND TECHNOLOGY
This chapter integrates the theoretical and technological concepts discussed
in the previous three chapters. The chapter discusses the typical design of
an e-learning based information security educational program, using Bloom’s
taxonomy to plan the educational activities, in order to address specific needs
relevant to the fostering of an organizational information security culture.
8.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters each discussed a specific element with regards
to dealing with the human factor in information security, but did not clearly
describe or demonstrate the integration between these elements. Chapter
5 discussed the concept of an information security culture and proposed a
conceptual model to aid in understanding the interaction(s) between the var-
ious dimensions of such a culture. The fostering of an information security
culture is seen as fundamental to effectively addressing the human factors in
information security. Through the establishment of an organizational infor-
mation security culture, secure behavior can be made a ”normal” part of the
organization’s employees’ day-to-day behavior.
Chapter 5 also identified the vital role played by knowledge in the fos-
tering of such an organizational culture of information security. The role of
knowledge was argued to be critically important in an information security
culture. For this reason it warranted the extension of the classical model used
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to define a ”normal” organizational culture, as presented by Schein (1999a),
to include knowledge as an additional dimension in the model used to define
an information security culture. Knowledge is also one of the dimensions of
the human factor in information security.
The human factor in information security consists of two closely interre-
lated dimensions, namely knowledge and behavior. These two dimensions are
mutually dependant. Without adequate information security related knowl-
edge it is not possible for organizational end-users to behave correctly. This
would be true even if a user has the desired attitude towards his/her infor-
mation security role(s) and responsibilities, and is properly motivated to ad-
here to the information security related policies and procedures relevant to
his/her daily tasks. A lack of the requisite knowledge could potentially pre-
vent users from behaving securely. Similarly, having the requisite information
security related knowledge still does not guarantee the desired behavior. A
user who has the requisite knowledge but who views security as a hindrance
to performing his/her job, or as not being very important, might still be-
have in an insecure manner. Any attempt to address the human factors
in information security should thus address both these dimensions holisti-
cally. Both of these dimensions form part of an organizational information
security culture, as discussed in chapter 5, and to a large extent both of these
dimensions to the human factor can be addressed via information security
educational programs.
Due to the important role information security educational programs play
in the establishment of an organizational information security culture, it is
vital that these educational programs are pedagogically sound. Chapter 6
examined the design of educational content for information security educa-
tional programs from a pedagogical point of view. Chapter 6 also suggested
the use of Bloom’s taxonomy, a major learning taxonomy, to accurately de-
fine the security education needs of organizational users. Once the specific
information security related educational requirements of a target user/user
group have been identified, the appropriate educational content needs to be
developed and delivered.
Chapter 7 identified e-learning as an ideal medium for the development
and delivery of organizational information security educational programs.
This chapter will discuss the integration of the work done in the previous
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three chapters. The aim of this chapter is to integrate the concepts discussed
in the previous three chapters in order to address the fourth research objective
of this thesis listed in section 1.7, namely to provide a detailed overview of how
educational content should be delivered in a corporate information security
educational program, with specific emphasis on the role(s) technology can
play as a media channel. In order to address this objective, it is important to
remember that the overall aim of addressing the human factors in information
security is to foster an organizational information security culture. This
should be accomplished through a culture change process. The following
section will firstly provide a brief overview of a ”generic” culture change
process. This overview will then be followed by an adapted culture change
process which incorporates the work done in this thesis in order to make it
specific to changing an information security culture.
8.2 Organizational Culture Change Process
In order to change organizational culture, it is necessary to follow a struc-
tured change management process (Schein, 1999a, p. 132). Without such a
structured process it will be difficult, if not impossible, to change the under-
lying beliefs, values and principles of employees, to a ”level” that matches
the organization’s espoused values.The management, and/or change of, or-
ganizational culture is a problem that has been extensively studied in the
management sciences. The process presented in this section has been ”bor-
rowed” from the management sciences. An adapted version of this process,
which incorporates the contributions made by this thesis, will be presented
in the next section. This process is depicted in Figure 8.1.
8.2.1 Top Management Commitment
Any culture change process has to start with top management commitment
to the process. This is done, firstly, by developing visionary statements
and/or slogans (Sadri & Lees, 2001). This could be part of the corporate
vision statement or an awareness campaign, for example; putting up, and
endorsing, posters stating that the organization is committed to improving
information security. For example, a poster, signed by the CEO, could be
posted throughout the organization stating: ”At ABC we are committed to
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Top Management Commitment
(Information Security Vision)
Assess Current State
Define Ideal Future 
State
(Espouse Values)
Analyze Gap
(Determine Steps from 
Current to Ideal State)
Define Specific Business Problem
(Repeat for each business problem)
Define Culture Change Metrics
(Performance Assessment Standards)
Feedback, Rewards and 
Punishments 
(Middle Management)
Review and Refine
Educate Employees
Figure 8.1: Organizational Culture Change Process
exceptional customer service” (or any other value the organization wishes to
espouse). Top management also has to visibly support the desired culture
through its own behavior (Wallace, Hunt, & Richards, 1999). Once man-
agement has committed to the new culture, the vision for this information
security culture has to be followed up by a corporate information security
policy. This policy will form part of the organization’s espoused values. The
policy, in turn, is followed up by various levels of sub-policies and/or opera-
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tional procedures, each dealing with specific aspects of the desired culture.
8.2.2 Define Change Needed in Business Context
According to Schein (1999a, pp. 86-87), culture change should always be
done in a specific business context. Culture itself is too vast to accurately
assess. The impact of culture on a specific goal can, however, be assessed
meaningfully. Organizational culture affects all aspects of the day-to-day
business of an organization. Changing such a culture could thus have a far
reaching impact. As such, it is very important to understand the current
culture in an organization, before trying to change it. This phase of a culture
change process should answer the question: ”If you are to solve the business
problem or achieve the ideals that are not being met, what are the new
ways of thinking and working that will get you there?” (Schein, 1999a, p.
133). Without a clear definition of the behavioral changes that are ultimately
needed, it is not possible to test the relevance of culture to the change process
(Schein, 1999a, p. 134). In other words, the organization needs to know,
in cultural terms, what should change, otherwise they will not be able to
measure the behavioral change. Before it is possible to decide what should
change, one first needs to know what the current state of the culture is, in
terms of the specific business context being examined.
Assess Current State
In order to determine the desired future state of an organizational culture for
a specific business context, each of the underlying dimensions of the culture
needs to be examined, in terms of the specific business context. Firstly the
current espoused values, or policy items and related business procedures,
should be assessed. Secondly the current artifacts need to be assessed. In
other words, measurements should be gathered to determine how well the
current espoused values are implemented. Thirdly, the underlying shared
tacit assumptions need to be assessed. This layer of underlying beliefs and
values will generally be the most difficult to quantify. Several techniques,
such as interviews and surveys, might contribute towards such an assess-
ment (Martins & Eloff, 2002; Schein, 1999a, pp. 59-87). For an information
security culture, whether or not the employees currently have the under-
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lying knowledge required to act securely in the specific business context,
would also need to be assessed. Assessing the current state of an information
security culture will be dealt with in more depth in the next section. Once
the current state of the culture has been determined, the desired future state
(the ideal culture) needs to be defined.
Define Ideal Future State
The ideal future state for the specific business process should also be defined
in terms of all three layers of the corporate culture (as well as the required
employee knowledge in the case of information security). The first step in
this definition is to create ”new” espoused values. Existing policies, sub-
policies, and operational procedures need to be updated in order to reflect
the new desired culture. The actual desired way in which employees should
behave (artifacts) must also be clearly defined. Such a definition should
be specific and in terms of measurable outcomes. Finally the organization
needs to define the desired beliefs, attitudes, and values employees should
have in order to support this new culture (as well as the requisite knowledge
they would need in the case of an information security culture). Once the
ideal future state has been defined, the ”gap” between the current state and
the desired ideal state needs to be analyzed for the specific business problem
being addressed.
Analyze Gap
The extent of the ”gap” between the current state of the culture and the
desired ideal state will determine the amount of work needed to attain the
new culture. The present should be assessed in terms of the future in order
to quantify the amount of work needed to get from the present state to the
future state (Schein, 1999a, p. 133). According to Schein (1999a, p. 136),
identification of the gaps that need to be bridged should make the areas
where cultural assumptions aid, or hinder, the change agenda more appar-
ent. Once the gaps have been identified, processes to bridge these gaps, can
be introduced.
Determining exactly how much work needs to be done in order to affect
change for a specific business context can be seen as the high level planning
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phase of a culture change process. During this phase the primary aim should
be to clearly define the steps needed to get from the current state to the
desired future state. In some cases it might be necessary to go through
several intermediate ”states” to eventually attain the desired ideal state.
Once this high level planning is complete, the actual change is affected via a
transformative change management process (Schein, 1999a, pp. 116-139).
8.2.3 Transformative Change Management
Culture is extremely stable and any attempt to change it will thus have to
start with a disconfirmation process. Employees will have to realize that
the current way of doing things is no longer good enough. Without such
an unfreezing of current values, employees will resist the change. Human
systems tend toward trying to maintain a stable equilibrium. If change is to
occur, this equilibrium must be upset by some new force. The recognition
and management of these ”change forces” creates the motivation for humans
to change (Schein, 1999a, p. 117). The steps needed to get from the current
state to the future state should thus cover all the psychodynamic steps of
such a transformative change process (Woodall, 1996; Schein, 1999b, 1999a,
pp. 116-139). To large extent this process is realized by means of awareness
and education activities. In an information security context it would be
essential to include formal, pedagogically sound, educational programs to
impart the needed information security knowledge to employees. The process
in a transformative change program thus consists of three basic steps (Schein,
1999a, pp. 116-126):
1. Unfreezing: creating the motivation to change. This step is a
process of disconfirmation, which should make employees realize that
the current way they are doing things is no longer working. During this
step a certain level of survival anxiety will be instilled when employees
recognize the need to change. This survival anxiety will generally be
replaced by learning anxiety, once employees accept the need to change.
It is very important to create psychological safety in order to overcome
this learning anxiety.
2. Learning new concepts. This stage is where new ways of doing
things are learned. Generally employees will identify and imitate role-
CHAPTER 8. INTEGRATING THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 193
models, and/or attempt to adjust to new requirements through trial-
and-error learning. Effective employee education programs can play a
major role during this phase of the change process.
3. Internalizing new concepts and meanings. During this phase new
behavior becomes part of the employee’s self-concept and identity. The
new way of doing things is incorporated into ongoing relationships.
The above steps form the basis of a learning cycle in a culture change pro-
cess. These three steps should however be supported by an underlying, for-
mal, educational program, as well as a continuous motivational process to
encourage employees to change. Despite the fact that these educational and
motivational programs will be discussed separately below, these programs
are usually part of the above learning cycle and cannot, at implementation
level, be dealt with in isolation.
Educate Employees
The change manager must think carefully about which outcomes he/she
wants (Schein, 1999a). Decisions should be taken about whether entire
groups, or units, should adopt the new way. In most culture change pro-
grams it will be necessary to get entire groups to adopt new ways of thinking
and behaving. Therefor initial training activities should be aimed at groups,
not individuals (Schein, 1999a, p. 129). It is important to remember that the
shared tacit assumptions result from joint learning processes (Schein, 1999a,
p. 19). If only key individuals adopt the changes, they will, over time, re-
vert back to the norms of the group (Schein, 1999a, p. 129). The change
manager also needs to decide whether or not the new way of thinking and
behaving can be standardized. In other words, consensus should be reached
on the new way of behaving. If role models, and examples of correct be-
havior, can be provided it will speed up the learning process (Schein, 1999a,
p. 129). The danger of standardizing, and thus prescribing, the behavior
is that some learners might fail to internalize the new ways (Schein, 1999a,
p. 130). Such learners will eventually revert to the old way, unless their
behavior is continuously ”policed”. The alternative to standardizing the new
ways of thinking, and behavior patterns, is to provide clear goals to learners,
and to allow them to develop their own behavior patterns. This process is
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slower, but guarantees internalization of concepts learned (Schein, 1999a, p.
130). In this instance role models, and clear examples, should be withheld.
Evolutionary learning and change go on all the time (Schein, 1999a, p. 130).
Organizations are dynamic systems that interact with perpetually changing
environments. If some part of the organization can learn an alternative way
of thinking, and if the alternative can be shown to be successful, there will
be less anxiety in introducing this alternative way to the rest of the organi-
zation (Schein, 1999a, p. 130). It can therefor be beneficial to introduce the
educational, and culture change, program in a single department first. In
terms of the processes outlined in the previous subsection, it should be clear
that the education cycle in a culture change process is much more than
just a formal ”classroom” type of learning. It also includes learning that
takes place in the employee’s day to day activities. Shared tacit assumptions
are formed as part of a joint learning process based on successful behavior.
During a culture change, employees have to unlearn behavior patterns that
used to be successful. These old behavior patterns then need to be replaced
with new way of behaving. Most of the real learning will take place in the
actual workplace where role-models can play a vital role. For example, in an
information security context, the employee might try to imitate the behavior
of someone he/she perceives to be more ”security literate”. However, if new
tacit assumptions are to be formed based on these learning experiences, it
is vital for employees to perceive the desired way of behaving as being suc-
cessful. In order to show that this alternative way of operating is successful,
some way of measuring the benefits would be needed.
Motivate Employees
Employee motivation plays a vital role in culture change management. With-
out proper motivation, employees will only comply with behavioral guidelines
that are in line with their own tacit assumptions. Employees could be coerced
into behaving in a specific way, but such a behavior change will be superficial
and unstable (Schein, 1999a, p. 115). It is thus essential to provide incen-
tives for employees to want to behave in the desired way. One of the most
widely accepted theories to explain motivation is Vroom’s expectancy theory
(Robbins, Odendaal, & Roodt, 2003, pp. 140-141)(Huczynski & Buchanan,
2007, pp. 251-254). ”Expectancy theory argues that the strength of a tendency
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to act in a certain way depends on the strength of the expectation that the act
will be followed by a given outcome and on the attractiveness of that outcome
to the individual” (Robbins et al., 2003, p. 140). Essentially this means that
an employee will be motivated to behave in a certain way if he/she believes
this will lead to some positive outcome like a financial reward, good perfor-
mance appraisal, peer recognition, promotion, etc. It is also important to
note that the expected positive outcome must be in line with the employee’s
personal goals (Robbins et al., 2003, pp. 140-141). Robbins et al. (2003,
pp. 140-141) provide the following three ”questions” that need to be an-
swered affirmatively from the employee’s point of view if the employee is to
be motivated:
• ”First, if I give maximum effort, will it be recognized in my performance
appraisal?”
• ”Second, if I get a good performance appraisal, will it lead to organi-
zational rewards?”
• ”Finally, if I’m rewarded, are the rewards ones that I find personally
attractive?” (Robbins et al., 2003, pp. 140-141)
These three questions help to clarify the underlying processes that should
be in place in order to effectively motivate employees to adhere to the desired
behavior patterns. Firstly, it is necessary to measure employee adherence to
desired behavior in an impartial way. Secondly, it is necessary to provide feed-
back to employees regarding the appropriateness of their behavior. Finally,
desirable behavior should be positively reinforced by being rewarded, con-
versely undesirable behavior should be discouraged/punished. A feedback
and/or reward system plays a very important role in such a motivational
process. Management buy-in is essential for such a system to work. Orga-
nizational culture should start with proper visionary statements and should
thereafter be positively reinforced through management behavior i.e. re-
warding employees’ successes and distributing newsletters and videos that
reinforce the culture. Leadership from the very top of an organization is es-
sential for major cultural change. However, even though middle managers do
not initialize the cultural change, ultimately it is their actions that produce
the changes (Brubakk & Wilkinson, 1996). Thus the culture change process
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has to be supported by a sound user education program and reinforced via
continuous feedback. This feedback will come from the organization’s mid-
dle management (Brubakk & Wilkinson, 1996). It is vital to remember that
shared tacit assumptions are formed as the result of continuously successful
past behavior (Schein, 1999a, p. 19). In the case of information security, it
will be very difficult for employees to know that their new behavior patterns
are successful, because successful information security is mostly tacit, and
difficult to quantify. It is therefor vital to implement security metrics and to
use these metrics to continuously provide feedback to employees. Employees
must realize that their behavior is successful, or that the old way of doing
things is not successful. Such metrics should thus, ideally, become part of
the key performance indicators for employees. In order to have the desired
motivational effect, the link between performance and rewards must be clear
and visible (Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007, p. 254). Management must show
their commitment to cultural change through rewarding employees who be-
have correctly (Brubakk & Wilkinson, 1996)(Huczynski & Buchanan, 2007,
pp. 253-254). Organizations should be careful to not only ”punish” those
who break the rules. Most studies on behavioral change have shown that
reward works better than punishment to modify behavior (Kabay, 2002, p.
35.10). A reward system based on ”impartial” metrics, in combination with
a degree of coercion is likely to be more successful. However, without ”im-
partial” metrics, a reward system could be viewed as biased or unfair and
might result in employee dissatisfaction.
This transformative change management process forms part of a repetitive
change management cycle. True culture change is a lengthy process. During
the entire change process, the change team, and its leaders, must own the
change process and must be held accountable for it (Schein, 1999a, p. 137).
8.2.4 Review and Refine Culture
It is also necessary to review and refine the entire culture management process
periodically. The modern business environment is a dynamic environment
with constantly changing needs. In addition to this, new employees could
join the organization and/or existing employees could leave/move. Various
aspects of the culture might be affected by these changes. It is therefor es-
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sential to continuously manage the organization’s culture to ensure that it
continues to meet the organization’s needs.
As mentioned earlier, the culture change process outlined in this section
is not specific to information security. The next section will incorporate the
contributions made by this thesis into the generic culture change process in
order to demonstrate how an information security culture change process
could work.
8.3 Information Security Culture Change
This section will integrate the use of the conceptual model for information
security culture (introduced in chapter 5), the use of Bloom’s taxonomy (as
discussed in chapter 6), and the use of e-learning as an educational design and
delivery medium (as discussed in chapter 7), into the organizational culture
change process that was discussed in the previous section. The aim of this
section is not to provide a definitive information security culture change pro-
cess, but rather to demonstrate how the various contributions made in this
thesis could be used to assist in addressing the human factor in information
security. In order to aid understanding, the process will be discussed within
the specific context of user authentication. Specifically the need for secure
password usage and the fostering of a supporting secure password culture will
be used as a continuous example throughout the remainder of this chapter.
This example will be presented within the same culture change process out-
lined in the previous section. In terms of this process, the first step towards
the changing/fostering of an information security culture would thus be to
get top management to commit to the culture change process.
8.3.1 Top Management Commitment
In the case of information security top management would have to visibly
support an information security culture. In this case an awareness campaign
might, for example, use a poster, signed by the CEO, that is posted through-
out the organization stating: ”At ABC we are committed to the integrity,
availability and confidentiality of all our information”. Top management also
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needs to commit to the information security culture by setting an example
through their own behavior, and through a commitment in terms of rewards
for desirable behavior and punishment for undesirable behavior (Alpander
& Lee, 1995). Rewarding desirable behavior and punishing undesirable be-
havior are both vital factors in shaping employee compliance in information
security (Gonzalez & Sawicka, 2002). The information security vision state-
ments should be followed by an organizational information security policy,
which in turn would have to be supported by various levels of sub-policies
and/or operational procedures. These policies and/or procedures will form
the espoused values dimension of the information security culture and will
thus be examined in more depth in the next subsection.
8.3.2 Define Change Needed in Business Context
As mentioned earlier, culture change is only meaningful if applied in a specific
business context. It would thus be necessary to identify each area of infor-
mation security for which the information security culture would have to be
managed individually. The information security specific business context of
the current example is the need for user authentication or the fostering of a
secure password culture. Any of the various operational controls specified by
the organization’s information security policy/sub-policies could be viewed
as a specific business context for the purposes of managing the organization’s
information security culture. Once a specific information security area has
been identified, the current state of the underlying culture must be assessed.
Assess Current State
In order to assess the current state of an organizational information security
culture in the context of a specific information security control/area of con-
cern, one has to examine the underlying dimensions of the culture. For an
information security culture it would thus be necessary to asses each of the
four dimensions of such a culture. For the given secure password usage ex-
ample, such an assessment could include:
• Espoused values: Are the espoused values supportive of the desired
secure password culture? Does the information security policy state
that users must be authenticated appropriately? Are there adequate
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procedural guidelines to prescribe the structure/minimum length of
secure passwords?
• Artifacts: Are the visible artifacts desirable? Do employees change
their passwords on a regular basis? Do employees keep their pass-
words a ”secret”? Are the passwords that are used ”strong”? Are
there any violations of current policies/procedures governing the use of
passwords?
• Shared Tacit Assumptions: Do the employees have the desired be-
liefs, values, and/or attitudes (shared tacit assumptions) regarding the
usage of passwords? Does every employee believe his/her own password
is also important? Would employees ”share” their passwords with their
colleagues?
• Knowledge: Do all employees have adequate knowledge to enable
them to use passwords correctly? Does every employee know how
to construct a ”strong” password. Do employees know how to use
mnemonic techniques to remember their passwords? Do employees
know how to change their own passwords on the organization’s infor-
mation systems?
The above example is by no means complete, however, it should serve to
demonstrate the kinds of questions that should be asked/answered during
an assessment of the current information security culture. It is important to
realize that not all aspects of the current culture will necessarily be easy, or
even possible, to directly measure. According to Schein (1999a, pp. 24-25)
it is impossible to infer the shared tacit assumptions just from observing the
behavior, or artifacts. However, if the shared tacit assumptions are under-
stood, it is easy to predict the artifacts. One of the keys to understanding an
organization’s culture is thus to gain understanding regarding the underlying
shared tacit assumptions. According to Schein (1999a, pp. 86-87), culture
should be assessed by means of individual and group interviews. Schein
(1999a, p. 86) also warns that surveys or questionnaires should not be used
to assess culture. Survey responses can be viewed as artifacts, but do not say
anything about the deeper values or assumptions (Schein, 1999a).
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Define Ideal Future State
Once the current state of the information security culture has been assessed
for the specific business context, the ideal/desired future state of the culture,
in terms of the specific business context, must be determined. For an infor-
mation security culture this ideal state could also be expressed in terms of
the various dimensions of such a culture. For the given secure password usage
example, describing the ideal future state could include:
• Espoused values: The espoused values should directly support the
desired secure password culture. At a policy level the need for user
authentication must be stated. At a sub-policy and/or procedural level
specific guidance should be given, for example, for password usage these
procedures could include:
– All users must use passwords that are at least eight characters
long and include at least two non-alphabetic characters
– All users must change their passwords at least once every two
weeks
– Users may not write down their password or share their password
with any other user
• Artifacts: The description of the ideal state should also include the
desired artifacts in terms of measurable ”goals”. For the password
example, these could include:
– All passwords should withstand a standard brute force attack per-
formed with tool x.
– Administrative log-files should show that all passwords are changed
at least once every two weeks.
– Each and every user should have their own individual, not shared,
user account.
• Shared Tacit Assumptions: Defining the desired underlying beliefs
and values for an ideal future state will require a lot of insight into
exactly what beliefs are needed. Basically this phase of a culture change
process should answer the question: ”If you are to solve the business
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problem or achieve the ideals that are not being met, what are the
new ways of thinking and working that will get you there?” (Schein,
1999a, p. 133). For the password example these could include:
– Every user must place as much value on the confidentiality of
his/her user account’s password, as he/she places on his/her per-
sonal bank account’s pin-number. A user should never be willing
to disclose his/her password, not even to the system administra-
tor.
– Every user should believe that the entire organization’s wellbeing
could depend on his/her password being secure.
– Every user must accept personal responsibility for his/her pass-
word, and should not believe that security is the IT Department’s
responsibility.
• Knowledge: The knowledge that would be required by individual em-
ployees in order to behave in the desired ideal way should be clearly
defined. This should ideally be done in terms of the specific assess-
ment outcomes for the related employee educational program. For the
password example these specific assessment outcomes could include:
– The learner should be able to demonstrate that he/she is able to
successfully change his/her own password
– The learner should be able to successfully construct a secure pass-
word
– The learner should be able to use mnemonic techniques to mem-
orize and recall secure passwords
Once the ideal future state has been defined in terms of the organizational
information security culture the gap between the current state and the desired
state must be analyzed for the specific business problem being addressed.
Analyze Gap
The gap between the current and the desired future state, will determine the
amount of work that needs to be done to attain the future state. During this
phase the steps needed to get from the current state to the desired future state
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need to be clearly defined. In some cases it might be necessary to go through
several intermediate ”states” to eventually attain the desired ideal state. The
gap should also be analyzed in terms of each of the underlying dimensions
of the information security culture. The difficulty/complexity of analyzing
the gap, and determining the steps needed to get from the current culture
to the desired culture, will not be equal across all of the various underlying
dimensions of the information security culture. For example, determining,
and addressing, the gap between the current and desired future espoused
values should be straightforward. However, determining the gap between
the current and desired future shared tacit assumptions will be much more
difficult, and in some cases might even be impossible to accurately measure.
This is one area where the conceptual model presented in section 5.6 of this
thesis could be of assistance. The possible role(s) this model could play in
the entire process from analyzing the current culture, to assessing the gap
between the current and desired culture will be discussed in the next sub-
section.
The Role of the Conceptual Model
When analyzing the organization’s current information security culture, and
the gap between this culture and the desired future culture, one should be
careful not to underestimate the complexity of such a culture. It could be
tempting to assume that examining each of the underlying dimensions of the
current information security culture in isolation, would be sufficient. How-
ever, according to Schein (1999a, p. 25) the biggest risk when working with
culture is to oversimplify it. ”Culture is a complex concept that must be
analyzed at every level before it can be understood” (Schein, 1999a, p. 25).
In an information security culture, the behavior of employees (artifacts) oc-
cur as a result of interactions between the other dimensions of the culture.
In order to determine the steps needed to change current behavior patterns
(artifacts) into the desired ideal behavior, the interactions between the var-
ious underlying dimensions of the culture should also be viewed holistically.
The conceptual model of information security culture presented in chapter 5
can to a certain extent assist in such a holistic understanding of the infor-
mation security culture. Firstly, an ideal information security culture would
be one where all the underlying dimensions of the culture are aligned and
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are at least equal to, or more secure, than the acceptable minimum baseline
level of security. Figure 8.2 represents such an ideal culture in terms of the
conceptual model presented in chapter 5.
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Figure 8.2: Ideal future culture
Assuming that the organization’s goal is to attain such an ideal for the
specific information security area being analyzed, the following scenarios will
outline various areas where the conceptual model could contribute towards
better understanding of the culture as a whole.
• When analyzing the current information security culture in order to
determine the work that needs to be done to attain the ideal culture
the relative ”strength” of the underlying espoused values should not
be analyzed in isolation. In an information security culture the mini-
mum acceptable baseline serves as a useful guide to the determination
of the relative ”strength” of the espoused values. In comparison with
the baseline, the espoused values could either be less secure than the
baseline, equal to the baseline, or more secure than the baseline. This
is represented in Figure 8.3. Should either the current, or the future
espoused values be less secure than a minimum acceptable baseline, it
would be necessary to adjust these values. However, if the espoused
values are equal to, or slightly more secure, than the minimum accept-
able baseline, these values would not need to be adjusted further. It
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is also possible that the espoused values are significantly more secure
than a minimum acceptable baseline. In such a case it might be nec-
essary to ascertain whether or not such ”strong” espoused values are
really required. If espoused values are too strong, it might also have
undesirable effects. For example, should the policy governing the usage
of passwords require the use of passwords that are extremely complex
and long, and this requirement is furthermore enforced at a technical
and/or procedural level, it might result in more employees writing their
password down due to the increased difficulty of remembering such a
password. It would thus be more sensible to have a requirement that
is less ”severe” but still equal to or stronger than a certain minimum
baseline.
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B. Current desired behavior (espoused values) is less secure
than minimum required behavior (baseline)
A. Current desired behavior (espoused values) is matches
minimum required behavior (baseline)
Figure 8.3: Assessing the Gap: Espoused Values vs. Baseline
• Secondly, for each specific information security context, the observable
behavior (artifacts) should be compared to the stipulated policy items
(espoused values). For example, the regularity with which employees
currently change their passwords should be compared to the operational
guidelines that prescribe how often such passwords should be changed.
It is possible for the observable artifacts to be more secure than the
espoused values, less secure than the espoused values, or in line with the
requirements stipulated in the espoused values. Figure 8.4 illustrates
these possibilities (assuming the espoused values are at the ideal level).
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B. Current measurable behavior (artifacts) is more secure than
desired behavior (espoused values)
C. Current measurable behavior (artifacts) matches
desired behavior (espoused values)
Figure 8.4: Assessing the Gap: Espoused Values vs. Artifacts
If the current artifacts are in line with the desirable espoused values,
there is a chance that the underlying shared tacit assumptions and/or
knowledge dimensions of the culture are also already in line with the
espoused values. In such a case the culture would already be ideal for
the specific information security context being examined. However, if
the current artifacts are either more secure, or less secure, than the
espoused values, it is an indication that either the underlying shared
tacit assumptions dimension, and/or the knowledge dimension, are not
aligned with the espoused values. In the case where the current arti-
facts are more secure than the espoused values, the misalignment of
the underlying cultural dimensions would cause the culture to be less
predictable. However, the overall culture could probably still be consid-
ered secure. Conversely, in the case where the artifacts are less secure
than the desired espoused values, the underlying knowledge and/or
shared tacit assumptions dimension would need to be improved in or-
der to ensure secure behavior. The next scenario listed will explore
this situation in more depth.
• If the current behavior of employees (artifacts) is less secure than the
desired level of behavior (espoused values), one would have to determine
the cause of this misalignment in order to address the misalignment.
If one assumes the espoused values are both adequate and reasonable,
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the only remaining cause for such a misalignment would be that either
the shared tacit assumptions, and/or the knowledge are not at the
requisite level of security. The shared tacit assumptions of employees
should ideally be assessed by means of individual and group interviews
Schein (1999a, p. 86). Such a process could be difficult, expensive,
and time-consuming. However, assessing whether or not the employees
have the requisite knowledge should be easier. Such an assessment
could, for example, be done by means of automated assessment modules
in an e-learning environment. If the employees are found to have an
adequate level of knowledge to enable them to behave according to the
requirements as stated in the espoused values, one could assume that
the underlying shared tacit assumptions of the employees must be the
cause for the undesirable behavior. This would not provide any insight
into the exact nature of the underlying beliefs, values, and/or attitudes
that are negatively affecting the culture, but it would indicate that such
undesirable shared tacit assumptions exist and need to be addressed.
Figure 8.5 illustrates such a scenario.
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Figure 8.5: Assessing the Gap: Adequate Knowledge vs. Shared Tacit As-
sumptions
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Alternatively, should the employees be found to have inadequate knowl-
edge, this lack of knowledge will act as an ”anchor” and will cause
an infinite degree of elasticity between the various dimensions of the
culture. Such a scenario is illustrated in Figure 8.6. The employees
will never be able to act in the desired way because they do not have
the necessary knowledge and/or skills to enable them to act securely.
In such a case one cannot infer anything about the shared tacit as-
sumptions. It would thus make sense to first address the known lack
of knowledge before re-assessing the underlying culture.
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Figure 8.6: Assessing the Gap: Inadequate Knowledge vs. Shared Tacit
Assumptions
The purpose of the various scenarios discussed in this subsection was
not to provide complete coverage of all possible combinations of the vari-
ous cultural dimensions. Instead, the scenarios serve to illustrate that an
understanding of the interaction between the underlying dimensions of an
information security culture could enable the person(s) responsible for man-
aging the fostering of an information security culture to better understand
the underlying cause(s) of undesirable employee behavior (artifacts). Such
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an improved understanding could lead to a more optimal allocation of avail-
able resources during the culture change process. The conceptual model
presented in section 5.6 of this thesis could aid in gaining such an improved
understanding of the interaction between the underlying levels of an infor-
mation security culture. In cases where a lack of more concrete information
exists, the conceptual model could also in some cases aid in predicting the
areas that need to be addressed. However, if the available resources allow it,
it would be better to measure the actual underlying shared tacit assumptions
and/or knowledge levels of employees in order to determine the gap.
Once the gap between the current and the desired future information security
culture has been determined, the actual culture change should be initiated
through a transformative change management process.
8.3.3 Transformative Change Management
Culture is extremely stable and, as discussed in section 8.2.3, any attempt to
change it will thus have to start with a disconfirmation process. Employees
will have to realize that the current way of doing things is no longer good
enough. Without such an unfreezing of current values, employees will re-
sist the change. Human systems tend toward trying to maintain a stable
equilibrium. If change is to occur, this equilibrium must be upset by some
new force. The recognition and management of these ”change forces” create
the motivation for humans to change (Schein, 1999a, p. 117). The steps
needed to get from the current state to the future state should thus cover all
the psychodynamic steps of such a transformative change process (Woodall,
1996; Schein, 1999b, 1999a, pp. 116-139), as well as the required, formal,
educational and/or motivational programs to impart the needed information
security knowledge to employees. For the password example used in this
chapter these steps could include:
• Unfreezing/Disconfirmation: Many employees currently believe that
truly secure passwords are not necessary for them personally. This be-
lief should be disconfirmed. Regular password audits should be run and
disciplinary steps should be taken against employees whose passwords
do not conform to the company policies. Regular internal propaganda
programs should be used to emphasize that each and every password
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must be secure.
• Learning: Employees should be taught what would constitute a se-
cure password. Employees should be taught techniques for constructing
and memorizing such passwords, in other words, how to manage pass-
words. Employees should also be taught why it is necessary for each
and every password to be secure.
• Internalizing/Refreezing: The average strength of each department’s
employees’ passwords should be included as a key performance indica-
tor for that department’s manager. Individual employees should receive
continual feedback regarding their own password’s strength. Employees
should be rewarded for compliance, or disciplined for non-compliance.
To a certain extent, a culture change process will always be coercive (Woodall,
1996; Schein, 1999b). Schein (1999b) compares the processes needed for an
enforced culture change to ”brainwashing” techniques used in prisoner of war
camps. Woodall (1996) argues that such a culture change process can only be
considered ethical if there is an equitable balance between the degree of coer-
cion used, and the rewards, and other positive spin-offs, for employees. It is
also advisable to create communication conditions where employees have an
equal say in the new cultural direction (Woodall, 1996). Involving employees
at this planning stage should help to reduce resistance to change.
It is important to realize that, firstly, the above process of disconfirmation,
learning, and internalization, is, to a large degree, dependent on the authority
given to the person, or team, responsible for the culture change process, by
top management. Without complete top management buy-in it would be
difficult, or impossible, to apply the necessary degree of coercion and/or,
give the needed rewards, to employees. It is thus advisable for the person,
or team, responsible for the management of the culture change, to ensure
that the steps outlined during this phase of the culture change process are
possible, given the level of top management buy-in.
Secondly, the above steps of the transformative change management pro-
cess would not be implemented as discrete processes. To a large extent, the
three steps will be dealt with as part of an internal information security
awareness, training, and education program. This program will consist of
both educational and motivational elements in order to address both the
CHAPTER 8. INTEGRATING THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 210
underlying need for information security knowledge, as well as the need to
encourage new employee behavior through changing existing beliefs, values,
and attitudes (shared tacit assumptions).
Thirdly, it should be noted that the aim of the educational programs is not
exclusively to address the need for underlying information security knowledge.
Education can to a large extent also address the underlying shared tacit as-
sumption dimension of the organization’s information security culture. Both
beliefs and attitudes can be influenced by education. In psychological terms,
beliefs are not the same as attitudes (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10). A belief is
cognitive information that does not necessarily have an emotional compo-
nent, whilst an attitude is primarily an emotional response (Kabay, 2002,
p. 35.10). Beliefs can change when contradictory information is presented.
However this change might take time and requires the opportunity to reflect
on current beliefs before change can take place (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10).
An attitude on the other hand is a ”learned evaluative response, directed
as specific objects, which is relatively enduring and influences behavior in
a generally motivating way” (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10). Attitudes can, to a
certain extent, be addressed by motivational programs. However, ”studies of
how attitudes are learned consistently show that rewards and punishments
are important motivators of behavior” (Kabay, 2002, p. 35.10). Ensuring
employees have the desired attitudes will thus require more than just educa-
tion.
Finally, all of the discussed elements, including the educational and mo-
tivational components, the punishment and rewards system, as well as top
management commitment and support, form part of the overall transfor-
mative change management learning cycle discussed above. These processes
should form an integrated ”whole”. The remainder of this section will discuss
the ”steps” that would form part of the design and delivery of specifically
the underlying educational and motivational programs. It is important to
note that, as discussed in section 1.5, the in-depth examination of the mo-
tivational components for this process falls outside the scope of the current
thesis. Such motivational aspects will thus only be dealt with in sufficient
depth to demonstrate the integrated nature of the educational and motiva-
tional campaigns.
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Step 1: Define Learning Objectives
The formal educational components of the transformative change manage-
ment process will consist of both an instructional design phase and an ongoing
instructional delivery phase. During the instructional design phase, the use
of Bloom’s taxonomy, as discussed in chapter 6, can assist in determining
exactly what, should be taught to whom. As discussed in chapter 6, the
creation of a relevant taxonomy table would start with the expression of one
or more learning objectives. The following examples might be applicable
to the given password example:
• Learning Objective 1 (LO1): ”Learners should be able to understand,
construct and use passwords in the correct context”
• Learning Objective 2 (LO2): ”Learners should be able to change their
own passwords on the organization’s financial information system”
• Learning Objective 3 (LO3): ”Learners should be able to memorize
and recall passwords of appropriate strength with the help of mnemonic
techniques”
These learning objectives can be ”general” in nature, like LO1 listed above,
or could be more specific, like LO2. The degree of specificity of learning
objectives will to a large extent depend on the difficulty of the underlying
subject matter and/or the specific intended target audience.
Step 2: Determine Target Audience
In order to plan learning activities that are suitable for the intended tar-
get audience, everyone who needs to be educated has to be identified. As
discussed in section 7.3.3, learning activities and/or material should be cus-
tomized according to the both current technical capabilities of the intended
target audience, the type of user (end-user, IT, etc), and/or individual learn-
ing preferences. The need for specific information security related education
should also be recorded in the human resources system. The human resources
system can then, in conjunction with a learning management system, be used
to ensure that each and every employee attains the requisite level of infor-
mation security knowledge. For the password example it would be sensible
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to provide educational material suitable for the average organizational end-
user. All users of information systems in the organization should complete
this educational program.
Step 3: Plan Learning Activities
Once the relevant target audience for a specific learning objective has been
established, various learning activities can be defined to address the learning
objective. Examples of such learning activities were demonstrated in Table
6.4 of chapter 6. The activities listed in Table 6.4 of chapter 6 included
learning at all of the six levels of the cognitive domain identified by Bloom’s
taxonomy. However, for an information security educational campaign fo-
cussing on culture change amongst organizational end-users, activities at the
higher levels of the cognitive domain would not always be relevant. Specif-
ically, for the secure password culture example, it would make more sense
to have additional learning activities at the apply level of the cognitive do-
main, rather than having activities at the create level. Table 8.1 contains
example learning activities for learning objective 1 (LO1) for an intended
target audience of organizational end-users.
Level Verb Sample Activities
Evaluate critique Critique these two passwords and explain why you
would recommend one over the other in terms
of the security it provides.(LA5)
Analyze analyze Which of the following security incidents involving
stolen passwords are more likely in our company?(LA4)
Apply execute Use the appropriate application to change your password
for the financial sub-system. (LA3-2)
practice Practice using these mnemonic techniques to create and recall
a secure password (LA3-1)
Understand discuss Why non alpha-numeric characters should be used in a
password? (LA2-3)
explain Explain why your password should not be shared with
anyone, not even your direct superior (LA2-2)
outline Outline responses you could use should someone from IT
ask you to disclose your password over the phone (LA2-1)
Remember define What is the definition of access control? (LA1)
Table 8.1: Learning Activities relating to Learning Objective 1 (LO1),
adapted from Anderson et al., 2001
Usually learning activities are not pre-categorized according to the levels
of the Bloom’s taxonomy directly. Instead, learning activities are planned ac-
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cording to the instructional designers perception of what would be needed to
attain the learning objective. Once the preliminary set of learning activities
has been planned, each of these learning activities is categorized appropri-
ately according to both the categories of the knowledge dimension, and the
levels of the cognitive domain, and then placed in a taxonomy table. As
discussed in section 6.6.1, this taxonomy table can then be used to identify
possible gaps in the curriculum. Identified gaps can be addressed by the ad-
dition of extra learning activities to the curriculum. The learning activities
are placed in the appropriate cell of the taxonomy table by firstly examining
the noun portion of the learning activity. This is used to determine which of
the categories of the knowledge dimension would be the best match for the
particular learning activity. For the learning activity LA3-1 in Table 8.1, the
noun portion would be the concept of mnemonic techniques, which can be
classified as a form of procedural knowledge. A single learning activity could
be classified into more than just one of the dimensions if necessary. The verb
portion of the learning activity is used to determine at which level of the
cognitive domain the activity would lie. For the learning activity LA3-1 in
Table 8.1, the verb is practice, which belongs at the apply level of the cogni-
tive domain. Based on this, the particular learning activity is then mapped
to the appropriate cell of the taxonomy table. This process will be repeated
for all learning activities linked to the learning objective.
Step 4: Plan Assessments
Once the learning activities relating to the specific learning objective have
been created, assessments for the various learning activities have to be de-
signed. The reference point for any educational program should be a set of
clearly articulated ”performance objectives” that have been developed based
on an assessment of the target audience’s needs and requirements (Roper
et al., 2005, p. 96). The role of assessments in an educational program is
to ensure that these ”performance objectives” can be met by the successful
learner. Assessments can be either formative or summative. Formative as-
sessment provides feedback on learning progress to the learner him/her self.
Summative assessments evaluate the overall success of the learner and in or-
der to determine whether or not the learner has successfully completed the
”course”.
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For LO1 in the example listed above, the following summative assessment
might be appropriate for some of the listed learning activities:
• Assessment 1 (AS-1): The learner must be able to create a strong pass-
word and change his/her own password on the organization’s network
to this new strong password without assistance.
The above assessment (AS-1) serves only as an example. A complete
curriculum would normally include a wide range of assessments. A simi-
lar process to the one used to place learning activities into the taxonomy
table is also used for the main learning objective itself, and for the vari-
ous assessments associated with these learning activities/learning objectives.
Table 8.2 represents a completed taxonomy table for the learning objective
(LO1) mentioned earlier, which is associated to the learning activities in
Table 8.1 and the above assessment. It is important to note that a single
activity, assessment or learning objective can be placed in more than one cell
in the taxonomy table. In Table 8.2 the assessment AS-1 has been placed
in multiple cells since it tests both conceptual and procedural knowledge.
The The Cognitive Process Dimension
Knowledge
Dimension Remember Understand Apply Analyze Evaluate Create
Factual
Knowledge LA1 LA2-1 A6
LA2-3
Conceptual AS-1
Knowledge LA2-2 LA4 A6
Procedural LO1
Knowledge LA3-1 A6
LA3-2
AS-1
Meta-
Cognitive
Knowledge LA5
Table 8.2: Example Taxonomy Table adapted from Anderson et al., 2001
Step 5: Review and Revise Topic Coverage
As discussed in section 6.5, the curriculum designer can use a taxonomy table,
like Table 8.2, to answer the four ”organizing questions”. By examining the
taxonomy table the educator can easily identify areas of knowledge, or levels
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of the cognitive domain, that have not been covered by the learning activities.
Similarly, areas where multiple activities cover the same levels of cognition
and categories of knowledge can be identified.
In the example given in Table 8.2, the assessment and the primary learn-
ing objective clearly overlap. This means that the assessment is at the correct
dimension of the cognitive domain and that it also tests the right kind of
knowledge in order to properly evaluate the learner’s mastery of the stated
learning objective, thus answering the ”assessment question”. Should
it be necessary, due to lack of resources, to choose specific learning activ-
ities to prioritize, the taxonomy table can help to answer the ”learning
question” by determining which of the learning activities provide the best
”coverage”. One activity could, for example, ”cover” more than just one
type of knowledge. This also helps to answer the ”instruction question”
by helping educators plan learning activities in such a way that all neces-
sary types of knowledge and levels of the cognitive domain are addressed for
the specific target audience’s needs. Finally, the ”alignment question”
can be addressed by ensuring that there exists no miss-alignments between
learning objectives, learning activities, and assessments. If the learning ac-
tivities LA3-1 and LA3-2 were omitted from the given example in Table
8.2, there would have been such a disconnect because the learning object
and assessment both require the ability to apply knowledge, but none of the
other learning activities would have addressed this need. Through the use of
Bloom’s taxonomy, information security educational program designers can
ensure the pedagogical soundness of the planned curriculum. It would also be
sensible at this stage to ensure that motivational aspects will be adequately
addressed.
If an appropriate e-learning platform was chosen as delivery channel for
the informational security educational and motivational programs, steps 1
to 5 listed above could have been performed with the assistance of the plat-
form’s learning design system (LDS). As discussed in section 7.4.1, a ”good”
learning design system allows the incorporation of an instructional design
methodology of choice (Ismail, 2002). Once the appropriate content for a
specific target user group has been determined, the next step would be to
develop the instructional material.
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Step 6: Develop Learning Content
Learning content for each of the learning activities identified has to be devel-
oped using the tools provided by the e-learning platform’s learning content
management system (LCMS). Various learning objects will be created by a
combination of content developers, subject matter experts, and media devel-
opers. These learning objects are added to the learning object catalog and
are linked to specific learning activities and automated assessments. Learn-
ing objects are also indexed according to meta-data tags. This allows the
easy re-use and/or re-purposing of these learning objects in future learning
programs. In the case of adaptive e-learning systems an explicit model of
the knowledge domain to be taught also has to be created. This model then
has to be linked to the specific elements in the adaptive educational mate-
rial in order to let the adaptive system ”know” what the specific page, or
page fragment, presents. Knowledge behind pages is ”the secret of adaptivity
in all adaptive hypermedia systems” (Brusilovsky, 2003). Learning objects
can thus include all forms of media and/or adative/programmatic content.
These objects can thus cover the full range of awareness, training, and/or ed-
ucation requirements of the information security educational program. For
the password example used in this section, learning objects related to some
of the learning activities listed in Table 8.1 could, for example, include the
following:
• A web page discussing the concept of access control and providing a
formal definition (addresses learning activity LA1)
• An interactive ”role playing game” where learners get to choose the
appropriate responses from lists of possible answers in response to social
engineering attempts (addresses learning activity LA2-1)
• A company wide competitive ”memory game” where participants have
limited time to memorize and recall various ”passwords”. The game is
supported by web-pages explaining mnemonic techniques. Rewards are
given for the best overall score, and for the ”mnemonic rhymes” voted
most entertaining by other staff members (addresses learning activity
LA3-1)
• An awareness video listing various employee roles in the company and
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explaining how each of these could lead to specific vulnerabilities should
a person in such a role allows his/her password to be compromised
(addresses learning activity LA4)
The above descriptions of learning objects serve only as example. It should
however be clear that the scope of what such learning objects could comprise
of is limited only by the availability of resources. Learning objects could
be combined to create more complex learning objects. Once created, these
learning objects must be deployed.
Step 7: Link to Learning Management System and Learning Sup-
port System
The completed learning objects are deployed to the learning support sys-
tem (LSS) and simultaneously linked to the specific learning activities in the
learning management system (LMS). The learning management system al-
lows for the administration, documentation, tracking and reporting of learn-
ing activities, whilst the learning support system acts as a portal that pro-
vides learning access to the learners. The learning management system can
be linked to the human resource system in order to ensure that each and
every employee receive the requisite level of information security education.
Data regarding assessments completed, etc, could in turn feed back into the
human resource system if it is to serve as a job related performance indi-
cator. The learning support system could also be used to encourage collab-
orative learning, and the discussion of contentious topics via forums. Such
discussion could aid in fostering the eventual change of beliefs since it would
allow employees to articulate and evaluate their own beliefs (Kabay, 2002,
p. 35.10). Allowing interaction and collaboration is a very important feature
of the learning support system. Student dissatisfaction rises dramatically
when the social aspects of the classroom are missing (Ismail, 2002). Col-
laborative/interactive features in the learning support system can thus also
increase the motivation to learn.
The above steps outline the overall transformative change management
process and the roles that the use of Bloom’s taxonomy and an e-learning
platform could play in such a process. It is however vital to remember that
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both the disconfirmation and the internalization stages of such a process re-
quire top-management support. Top management must commit in terms of
resources to enable rewards for desirable behavior, and in terms of authority
to allow the punishment of undesirable behavior (Alpander & Lee, 1995). Re-
warding desirable behavior and punishing undesirable behavior are both vital
factors in shaping employee compliance in information security (Gonzalez &
Sawicka, 2002). Education can help to change behavior, but must also be
supported through the proper positive and/or negative incentives, as well as
strong leadership.
8.3.4 Review and Refine Culture
The above ”steps” will form part of a continuous cycle which will be exe-
cuted for each underlying information security ”business context” for which
the culture needs to be fostered/changed. Due to the dynamic nature of
both modern business and the field of information technology, it would also
be sensible to review the ”strength” of the culture needed. For example, if
technological advances were to make all forms of memorized passwords ob-
solete, the need for a ”secure password culture” would also become obsolete.
It is therefor necessary to continuously review and refine the ideal state for
each ”business context” of the organization’s information security culture.
If necessary, the culture would need to be adjusted through the re-iteration
of the above steps. The review process should also examine all underlying
elements, such as the effectiveness of the educational programs, the need for
additional motivation, etc, to ensure that the culture change process has the
desired effect.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown how the various elements towards dealing with the
human factor in information security, as discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7,
integrate with, and relate to, each other. In order to comprehensively ad-
dress the human factor in information security, organizations must ensure
that their employees have both the requisite knowledge, which enables them
to perform the day-to-day function in a secure manner, as well as the desired
attitude, which ensures that they want to behave securely. It has become
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widely accepted amongst the information security research fraternity that the
ideal way to address both the dimension of the human factor in information
security would be to foster an information security culture within the
organization. Chapter 5 has discussed the concept of such a culture and has
adapted the ”generic” model used to define an organizational culture, to a
specific model which can be used to define an information security culture.
This chapter has demonstrated how this model can be used to enhance the
understanding of the work needed to be done during a formal process to foster
an information security culture within an organization. Part of such a formal
transformative change management process to foster an information security
culture, is a formal information security educational program. Chapter
6 has discussed the use of Bloom’s taxonomy as a pedagogically sound way
to determine the information security educational needs of employees. This
chapter has shown, by means of example, how the use of Bloom’s taxonomy
can be integrated into the transformative change management process during
the fostering of an information security culture. Once the educational needs
of employees has been determined, the actual learning program(s) needs to
be developed and ”delivered”. Chapter 7 has shown that e-learning envi-
ronments would be very well suited to the needs of information security
educational programs. As a final element, this chapter also showed how the
use of such an e-learning platform could be incorporated into the overall
process of fostering an information security culture. The process outlined in
this chapter has thus demonstrated how the various theoretical and techno-
logical elements from this thesis form part of an integrated, holistic, process
towards dealing with the human factors in information security. The next
chapter will conclude this thesis.
Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
This chapter concludes this dissertation
9.1 Introduction
Organizational information security depends on the behavior of humans
involved in the processes that secure organizational information resources.
Humans are the weakest link in information security. In today’s information
society is is thus vital for organizations to ensure that the humans involved
in their information security processes are a security asset and not a liabil-
ity. This human factor in information security consists of two dimensions,
namely knowledge, and behavior. These two dimensions are closely inter-
related. Firstly, all humans involved in information security processes need
to know what their security role(s) and responsibilities are, and also how
these role(s) and responsibilities should be executed. However, even if or-
ganizational users do have the requisite knowledge, they might still choose
not to behave in the desirable, secure manner. It is therefor also necessary
to ensure the users behave in the correct way by instilling the underlying
beliefs, values, and attitudes which would lead to such desirable behavior.
Conversely, should a user want to behave in the desirable way, but lacks
the requisite knowledge, such a user would still be unable to perform his/her
security role(s) and responsibilities. It is thus necessary to address both these
dimensions of the human factor in information security holistically. One way
of addressing this human factor is through the fostering of an organizational
information security culture. This thesis showed that, to a certain extent, ex-
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isting research focussing on the establishment of such an information security
culture, and/or on the underlying information security educational programs
that support the fostering of such a culture, lacks a theoretical basis. The
aim of this thesis was to address this lack by demonstrating how existing
theory from the managerial- and the educational sciences could be adapted
and/or used in order to improve the processes addressing the human factor
in information security.
9.2 Summary of Results
The primary objective of the thesis, as presented in section 1.7, was to demon-
strate how existing theory can be modified and/or used when addressing the
human factor in information security. In order to achieve this objective,
several sub-objectives had to be achieved.
The first sub-objective was to adapt the generic model which defines or-
ganizational culture, as presented by Schein (1999a, pp. 15-16) to be specific
to the needs of information security. Chapter 5 modified Schein’s model of
organizational culture to be specific to the needs on information security.
Chapter 5 also ”borrowed” the concept of elasticity from the economical sci-
ences in order to assist in understanding the interaction of the underlying
dimensions of such an information security culture. This adapted model to
define information security culture was extensively peer-reviewed and finally
published as Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2010). This achieved the first
sub-objective and thus answered the first research question from section 1.6,
namely ”how can the generic definition of organizational culture be adapted
to be specific to the needs of information security?”.
The second sub-objective was to ”demonstrate how the use of a learning
taxonomy can be used to add pedagogical rigor to information security edu-
cational programs”. This objective was addressed in chapter 6. Chapter 6
introduced Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain, the most widely used
learning taxonomy in education, as a possible tool to ensure that the content
of information security educational programs is at the correct level required
for the information security related learning needs of the intended target
audience. The chapter also demonstrated how Bloom’s taxonomy could be
used in order to design learning objectives, learning activities, and assess-
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ments for information security educational programs. Through the use of
this taxonomy, chapter 6 showed how information security practitioners can
ensure the pedagogical integrity of information security learning programs.
This answered the second research question of this thesis, namely ”how can
a learning taxonomy be used to plan the contents of an information security
educational program?”.
The third sub-objective was to ”demonstrate the suitability of e-learning
as a delivery medium for organizational information security educational pro-
grams.” This sub-objective was met in chapter 7. Chapter 7 outlined the
requirements that should be met by any educational approach in order for it
to meet the needs of organizational information security education. These re-
quirements were previously published in Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2004).
The features offered by e-learning were then matched to the listed require-
ments. E-learning was shown to not only meet the listed requirements of
information security education, but to also be pedagogically more suitable
than other approaches. This answered the third research question of this
thesis, namely ”how should information security educational activities be de-
livered to organizational learners?”.
The final sub-objective of this thesis was to ”provide a detailed overview
demonstrating how the various elements contributed by this thesis integrates
into existing transformative change management processes for the fostering
of an organizational information security culture”. This objective was met
in chapter 8. Chapter 8 firstly integrated the use of the conceptual model
presented in chapter 5 into an existing transformative change management
for the fostering of an organizational information security culture. The thesis
demonstrated how the conceptual model can assist during the analysis of the
work that should be done in order to move from the current state of the orga-
nizational culture, to the desired future state. Secondly, the use of Bloom’s
taxonomy was integrated into the underlying educational processes which
support the transformative change management process. The thesis demon-
strated, by means of example, how this taxonomy could be used during the
fostering of an information security culture. Finally, the thesis showed, by
means of the same example, how the use of an e-learning environment could
be integrated as a development and delivery platform for educational material
during the overall transformative change management process. Collectively,
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this addressed the fourth sub-objective of the thesis and thus answered the
fourth research question, namely, ”how can the various theoretical and techni-
cal elements be integrated into transformative change management processes
in order to foster an organizational information security culture?”.
Through meeting the four sub-objectives of the thesis, the primary objec-
tive, to demonstrate how existing theory can be modified and/or used when
addressing the human factor in information security, was achieved. This an-
swered the primary research question of this thesis, namely, ”how can existing
theory be adapted and/or used to address the human factors in information
security?”.
9.3 Summary of Contributions
The work in this thesis led to two primary contributions towards the body
of knowledge in the field of information security. The following is a brief
summary of these contributions:
• The first research contribution of this thesis was the adaptation of
Schein’s model of organizational culture to the specific needs of infor-
mation security. Most current approaches to the human factor in infor-
mation security recognize the need for the fostering of an organizational
culture of information security. However, only a very small percentage
of these approaches adapts the generic definition(s) for such a culture
which has been ”borrowed” from the management sciences to the spe-
cific needs of information security. None of the approaches that do
adapt the generic model(s) to be more specific to the needs of infor-
mation security focused specifically on the underlying need to infor-
mation security related knowledge in an information security culture,
or on the interaction between the various underlying dimensions of
such a culture and the elastic effects of these underlying dimensions on
the resulting employee behavior (artifacts). This thesis thus made a
unique contribution which could improve the understanding of infor-
mation security culture amongst information security practitioners.
• The second contribution was to show how the use of Bloom’s taxon-
omy of the cognitive domain could be used to improve the pedagogical
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rigor of information security educational program design. Less than a
quarter of current approaches towards dealing with the human factor in
information security uses and/or proposes the use of a formal pedagog-
ically sound approach towards information security education. None
of these approaches that do propose the use of a formal approach to-
wards information security education uses a learning taxonomy. The
use of learning taxonomies is very widespread in education. The use of
such taxonomies during the design of educational programs improves
the overall pedagogical rigor of such programs. Bloom’s taxonomy is
the best known, and most widely used, of such learning taxonomies.
By demonstrating how the use of Bloom’s taxonomy could increase the
pedagogical rigor of information security educational programs, this
thesis has thus made an important contribution. The use of Bloom’s
taxonomy per se is not unique, however, the use of this taxonomy for
the purposes of improving information security education has, as far as
could be determined, never been proposed before.
9.4 Publications Stemming from this Research
The following publications stemmed directly from the work in this thesis:
• Van Niekerk, J., & Von Solms, R. (2006). The roles of e-learning
in corporate information security. E-Learn, Waikiki Beach, Honolulu,
Hawaii, Oct. 13-17, 2006 .
• Van Niekerk, J., & Von Solms, R. (2006b). Understanding information
security culture: A conceptual framework. Information Security South
Africa (ISSA), Johannesburg, South Africa, 5-7 July 2006.
• Van Niekerk, J., & Von Solms, R. (2008). Bloom’s taxonomy for infor-
mation security education. Information Security South Africa (ISSA),
Johannesburg, South Africa, 7-9 July 2008.
• Van Niekerk, J., & Von Solms, R. (2009b). Using bloom’s taxonomy for
information security education. Education and Technology for a Better
World. 9th IFIP TC 3 World Conference on Computers in Education,
WCCE 2009, Bento Goncalves, Brazil, July 2009.
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• Van Niekerk, J., & Von Solms, R. (2010). Information security culture:
A management perspective. Computers & Security, 29 (4), 476 - 486.
The following publications stemmed from work closely related to the work
in this thesis:
• Van Niekerk and Van Greunen (2006): Van Niekerk, J., & Van Gre-
unen, D. (2006). Is user education the answer to online security prob-
lems? Proceedings of the Conference on Information Technology in
Tertiary Education, Pretoria, South Africa, 18 -20 September 2006.
• Monk, Van Niekerk, and Von Solms (2010): Monk, T., Van Niekerk,
J., & Von Solms, R. (2010). Sweetening the medicine: Educating users
about Information Security by means of game play. South African Insti-
tute for Computer Scientists and Information Technologists (SAICSIT)
2010, October 11-13, 2010, Bela Bela, South Africa.
• Van Niekerk and Thomson (2010): Van Niekerk, J., & Thomson, K.
(2010). Evaluating the Cisco Networking Academy Program’s Instruc-
tional Model against Bloom’s Taxonomy for the purpose of Information
Security Education for Organizational End-users. Key Competencies
in the Knowledge Society (KCKS 2010), World Computer Congress
(WCC) 2010, Brisbane, Australia, 20-23 September 2010 .
9.5 Suggestions for Further Research
It is important to realize that the establishment of an organizational culture
of information security is a long-term process. This process needs to be ongo-
ing, and due to the fast evolving nature of information technology itself, such
a process would need continuous revision. The conceptual model proposed
by this thesis can aid in the understanding of such a culture and could help
the person(s) responsible for the fostering of such an information security
culture within an organization to understand ”where” additional change is
required in order to foster the culture. However, as it currently stands, the
utility of this conceptual model is limited to improving conceptual under-
standing, and is not directly usable. Should methods become available to
directly measure and normalize the strength(s) of the underlying dimensions
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represented by this model, the impact of the model would become much
higher. Such metrics would enable organizations to directly manage specific
aspects of an information security culture. Future research should focus on
the development of such metrics.
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a b s t r a c t
Information technology has become an integral part of modern life. Today, the use of
information permeates every aspect of both business and private lives. Most organizations
need information systems to survive and prosper and thus need to be serious about
protecting their information assets. Many of the processes needed to protect these infor-
mation assets are, to a large extent, dependent on human cooperated behavior. Employees,
whether intentionally or through negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, are the
greatest threat to information security. It has become widely accepted that the establish-
ment of an organizational sub-culture of information security is key to managing the
human factors involved in information security. This paper briefly examines the generic
concept of corporate culture and then borrows from the management and economical
sciences to present a conceptual model of information security culture. The presented
model incorporates the concept of elasticity from the economical sciences in order to show
how various variables in an information security culture influence each other. The purpose
of the presented model is to facilitate conceptual thinking and argumentation about
information security culture.
ª 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Today information can be seen as a basic commodity, similar
to electricity, without which many businesses simply cannot
operate (Carr, 2003). Unfortunately, in the interconnected
world we live in, information is a lot more vulnerable than
other basic commodities. It is highly unlikely that the actions
of a discontent teenager on another continent can affect
a company’s electricity supply. The same cannot necessarily
be said about the availability of information resources. It is
thus vital for organizations to ensure their continued access to
this commodity by protecting their information assets.
Many organizations will be unable to do business without
access to their information resources. However, protecting
these information resources often has no direct return on
investment. Securing information resources does not as
a rule generate income for an organization. Business people
are therefore rarely interested in how their information
resources are protected. From a business perspective, any
solution would be adequate as long as it is cost-effective and
takes into account issues such as productivity and ease of use
(Wylder, 2004, p. 6). It can thus be argued that the goal of
securing information is, to a certain extent, in conflict with
the normal business goals of maximizing productivity and
minimizing cost. Security is often seen as detrimental to
business goals because it makes systems less usable.
According to Wood (2005, p. 224) the only absolutely secure
system is an unusable one.
This conflict between business and security objectives has
become so well recognized, that the ability to resolve such
conflicts should be seen as a key performance indicator for
information security officers (Wood, 2005, p. 224). It can also
be argued that the problem of managing information security,
to a certain extent, is nothing more than the management of
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many similar conflicts. These ‘‘conflicts of interests’’ are of
special importance once one starts dealing with the role(s)
humans play in the information security process. Information
security consists of many processes. Some of these processes
are, to a large extent, dependent on human cooperated
behavior. Employees, whether intentionally or through
negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, are the greatest
threat to information security (Mitnick and Simon, 2002, p. 3).
Without an adequate level of user cooperation and knowl-
edge, many security techniques are liable to be misused or
misinterpreted by users. This may result in even an adequate
security measure becoming inadequate (Siponen, 2001). An
organization’s information security strategy should thus
comprehensively address this ‘‘human factor’’.
Many recent studies have shown that the establishment of
an information security culture in the organization is neces-
sary for effective information security (Eloff and Von Solms,
2000; Von Solms, 2000). Through the establishment of such
a culture, the employees can become a security asset, instead
of being a risk (Von Solms, 2000). However, even with such
a culture in place there still exist certain ‘‘trade offs’’ and
‘‘conflicts of interests’’ that should be managed. This paper
aims to provide a conceptual framework to assist readers in
understanding the interactions at various levels of such an
information security culture. It is hoped that this framework,
which incorporates elements of both managerial and
economical science, will promote better understanding of
information security culture amongst readers from a mana-
gerial background.
2. Research paradigm and rationale
The work in this paper is based on qualitative, or phenome-
nological-, research methods, as described in Creswell (1998).
This paper should thus be seen as ‘‘an inquiry process of
understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of
inquiry that explore a social or human problem’’ (Creswell,
1998, p. 15). The research presented here does not attempt to
define new knowledge, but rather to provide a more in-depth
understanding of the phenomenon described as ‘‘information
security culture’’. The work presented in this paper is
a continuation, an expansion, of work previously published by
the authors (Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2006). As far as could
be determined, the specific conceptual model, as well as the
underlying interactions between the various levels of infor-
mation security culture, as presented in this paper, has never
been published before. It is the authors’ belief that the use of
this conceptual model could improve the understanding of
the concept of information security culture. Since the concept
of organizational culture has been largely ‘‘borrowed’’ by
information security researchers from the humanities, it was
deemed fitting to also ‘‘borrow’’ the research paradigm, used
in this paper from the humanities.
The model for corporate culture as presented in Schein
(1999) has become widely accepted amongst information
security researchers (Schlienger and Teufel, 2003). However,
this model describes corporate culture in general, and not
information security culture specifically. In order to ensure
a rigorous research approach, even concepts with a seemingly
obvious meaning will be revisited in this paper. The descrip-
tion of these concepts in the presented information security
framework is deemed necessary because there might exist
differences between the ontologies commonly adhered to by
information security specialists and researchers from the
management sciences.
The aim of this paper is thus to present a holistic,
conceptual model of information security culture, for infor-
mation security practitioners and students. This model aims
to clarify, at a conceptual level, the interactions between
various elements comprising such an information security
culture. The model also attempts to clearly define, in an
information security context, concepts such as the strength
and the stability (or predictability) of an information security
culture. The model presented in this paper is intended to
clarify, and improve, the understanding of existing concepts.
It is hoped that this model will be of use to other information
security researchers when examining the human factors in
information security. Before the specific concept of an infor-
mation security culture is examined, this paper will first
explore the existing definition of corporate culture.
3. Corporate culture
Every organization has a particular culture, comprising an
omnipresent set of assumptions that is often difficult to
fathom, and that directs the activities within the organization
(Smit and Cronje´, 1992, p. 382). Such a culture could be defined
as; the beliefs and values shared by people in an organization
(Smit and Cronje´, 1992, p. 382). Beliefs and values, however,
are both concepts that can be difficult to quantify. It is
therefore often tempting to think of culture as just ‘‘the way
we do things around here’’ (Schein, 1999, p. 15), or that
‘‘something’’ that makes an organization more successful
than others (Smit and Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). However, over-
simplifying the concept of culture is the biggest danger to
understanding it (Schein, 1999, p. 15).
A better way to think about culture is to examine the
different ‘‘levels’’ at which culture exists (Schein, 1999, p. 15).
This way of thinking about corporate culture is already widely
accepted in information security (Schlienger and Teufel, 2003).
In order to clarify these levels of culture, each of the levels will
be briefly examined:
 Level One: Artifacts. Artifacts are what can be observed,
seen, heard, and felt, in an organization (Schein, 1999, p. 15).
Artifacts would include visible organizational structures
and processes. At the level of artifacts, culture is very clear
and has an immediate emotional impact, which could be
positive or negative, on the observer (Schein, 1999, p. 16).
Observing the artifacts alone, however, does not explain
why the members of the organization behave as they do
(Schein, 1999, p. 16). In order to understand the reasons for
the behavior patterns of organization members it is neces-
sary to examine ‘‘deeper’’ levels of culture (Schein, 1999,
p. 16), such as the organization’s espoused values.
 Level Two: Espoused Values. An organization’s espoused
values are the ‘‘reasons’’ an organizational insider would
give for the observed artifacts (Schein, 1999, p. 17), for
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example; that the organization believes in team work, that
everyone in the organization’s view is important in the
decision making process, etc. Espoused values generally
consists of the organization’s official viewpoints, such as
mission- or vision-statements, strategy documents, and any
other documents that describe the organization’s values,
principles, ethics, and visions (Schein, 1999, p. 17). However,
it is possible for two organizations to have very different
observable artifacts and yet share very similar espoused
values (Schein, 1999, pp. 18–19). This is because there is an
even deeper level of thought and perception that drives the
overt, or observable, behavior (Schein, 1999, p. 19). The
espoused values are values which the organization wants to
live up to. The interpretation, and application, of these
espoused values in the day-to-day running of the organi-
zation depend on the shared tacit assumptions between the
employees of that organization.
 Level Three: Shared Tacit Assumptions. The shared tacit
assumptions in an organization develop in any successful
organization. Often these assumptions are formed in the
organization’s early years, because certain strategies have
proven to be successful (Schein, 1999, p. 19). If strategies
based on specific beliefs and values continue to be
successful, these beliefs and values gradually come to be
shared and taken for granted. The beliefs and values
become tacit assumptions about the nature of the world and
how to succeed in it (Schein, 1999, p. 19). These values,
beliefs, and assumptions that have become shared and
taken for granted in an organization, form the essence of
that organization’s culture. Beliefs, in this sense, refer to
a group of people’s convictions about the world and how it
works, whilst values refer to a community’s basi-
c assumptions about what ideals are worth pursuing (Smit
and Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). It is important to remember
that the shared tacit assumptions resulted from a joint
learning process.
The corporate culture of any organization, is a result of all
three the above levels. At its most basic, and most difficult to
quantify, level, the members of the organization share certain
beliefs and values. These shared tacit assumptions act as a kind
of ‘‘filter’’, which affects how individuals will carry out their
normal day-to-day activities. It also influences how these
individuals interpret the organization’s policies, and how they
implement its procedures. These policies and procedures
form part of the organization’s espoused values. The espoused
values can be seen as the ‘‘visible’’ contribution of the
organization’s management towards the organization’s
culture. To a degree, espoused values provide cultural direc-
tion. The interpretation of this ‘‘direction’’, however, is
extremely dependant on the underlying shared tacit
assumptions. These three levels of corporate culture could be
seen to correspond closely to the behavioral aspects of the
‘‘human factor’’ in information security. As mentioned earlier,
this ‘‘human factor’’ in information security consists of two
dimensions, namely knowledge and behavior, which are very
inter-related. Due to the co-dependency between these two
dimensions it is not possible to ignore the impact a lack of
information security related knowledge would have on an
organizational sub-culture of information security.
4. Information security culture
In ‘‘normal’’ definitions of organizational culture, the relevant
job-related knowledge is generally ignored, because it can be
assumed that the average employee would have the required
knowledge to do his/her job. In the case of information secu-
rity, the required knowledge is not necessarily needed to
perform the employee’s normal job functions. Knowledge of
information security is generally only needed when it is
necessary to perform the normal job functions in a way that is
consistent with good information security practices. It cannot
be assumed that the average employee has the necessary
knowledge to perform his/her job in a secure manner. If an
organization is trying to foster a sub-culture of information
security, all activities would have to be performed in a way
that is consistent with good information security practice.
Having adequate knowledge regarding information security is
a prerequisite to performing any normal activity in a secure
manner. Information security knowledge, or a lack thereof,
could therefore be seen s a fourth level to an information
security culture that will affect each of the other three layers.
For example:
4.1. Artifacts
Artifacts are what actually happens in the organization.
Without the necessary skills and proficiencies, it would be
impossible to perform information related tasks securely.
Thus, for the day-to-day task to happen in a secure way, the
users would have to have sufficient knowledge of how to
perform their tasks securely.
4.2. Espoused values
To create the policy document, the person, or team, respon-
sible for the drafting of the policy must know what to include
in such a policy in order to adequately address the organ-
ization’s security needs.
4.3. Shared tacit assumptions
This layer consists of the beliefs and values of employees. If
such a belief should conflict with one of the espoused values,
knowing why a specific control is needed, might play a vital
role in ensuring compliance (Schlienger and Teufel, 2003).
It should be clear that in an information security culture,
knowledge underpins and supports all three the ‘‘normal’’
levels of corporate culture. Without adequate knowledge,
information security cannot be ensured. The co-dependency
between the three ‘‘normal’’ levels of an organization’s
information security culture, and knowledge, the ‘‘fourth
level’’, implies that each of these four levels will have an
impact on how ‘‘secure’’, or desirable, the overall information
security culture will be. The first part of the model presented
in this paper is thus an adaptation of Schein’s model. This
adaptation incorporates the underlying need for information
security related knowledge into Schein’s model. Knowledge is
added as a fourth level of culture that is specific to an infor-
mation security culture. This adaptation is necessary because
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in an information security culture the requisite knowledge
cannot be assumed to be present. Fig. 1, provides a graphical
exposition of this adaptation. In this presented conceptual
model, knowledge is dealt with as an additional level to
culture, as opposed to viewing knowledge as a sub-compo-
nent of each of the original three levels. This is done solely
because modeling knowledge as an additional level makes it
easier to clearly show the effect that knowledge, or a lack
thereof, would have on the overall information security
culture.
In order to ensure an adequate level of information secu-
rity knowledge, international standards such as ISO/IEC 27002
(International Standards Organization, 2005) recommends the
use of an organizational information security awareness
campaign. Awareness campaigns address the problems that
a lack of knowledge could lead to. These campaigns help to
create a culture of information security, by instilling the
aspects of information security in every employee as a natural
way of performing his or her daily job (Von Solms, 2000).
Awareness campaign is the key element in ensuring that the
knowledge level of an information security culture is of
adequate ‘‘strength’’.
Before the interactions between the above levels of an
information security culture can be examined in more depth,
a final ‘‘tool’’ is needed. The model presented later in this
paper also needs to borrow the concept of elasticity from the
economical sciences.
5. Elasticity in information security culture
Elasticity is a general economic concept that measures the
change in one variable caused by changes in other, related variables
(Acs and Gerlowski, 1996, p. 49). In other words, elasticity
measures how sensitive a variable is to change in another
variable. In the presented model, the concept of elasticity will
be borrowed, but instead of attempting tomeasure the change
the concept will simply be used to explain the fact that change
will be inherent in any such system and that the speed at
which such change takes place depends on the degree of elas-
ticity in the system. In order to provide more clarity of exactly
what is meant by elasticity, another basic idea will first be
borrowed from the economical sciences. Fig. 2 shows a basic
supply and a basic demand curve. According to economic
theory (Acs and Gerlowski, 1996, p. 45) the market will be in
equilibrium if the quantity of goods or services demanded in
the market is matched perfectly by the quantity of goods or
services supplied in this market. In such a system, assuming
all other variables are fixed, the price that could be asked for
the goods or services would be perfectly static and
predictable.
If, however, one of the variables in such a market were to
change, for example if an increase in the quantity of goods or
services demanded was to occur, the equilibrium would be
disturbed. In such a case the other variable, the quantity of
goods or services supplied would have to increase to match
the increase in demand in order to bring the system back into
equilibrium. While this situation of disequilibrium, exists, the
price that could be asked for the goods or services supplied,
would be more dynamic and difficult to predict. In Fig. 3, the
price could fall anywhere in the shaded area, due to the
increase in demand.
The term elasticity is used in economics to describe the
relationship, shown in the above system, whereby increased
demand would cause an increase in supply to eventually bring
the system back into equilibrium. However, not all systems
would have the same inherent degree of elasticity. Elasticity
could in fact range from systems that are infinitely elastic to
systems that are completely inelastic. In an infinitely elastic
system, shown in Fig. 4, an increase in supply would have no
effect on either the demand or the price people would be
willing to pay. Fig. 4 thus does not even show the supply curve
since its position in such a perfectly elastic system is irrele-
vant in determining the price. On the other hand, in
a completely inelastic system, shown in Fig. 5, the variables
would be ‘‘locked together’’. The supply and demand would
thus always stay in equilibrium (Acs and Gerlowski, 1996, p. x).
An example of such an inelastic system would be certain types
of life saving medicines. People who need such medicines
would be willing to pay any price for such medicines. For the
purposes of this paper it is also important to note that in such
an inelastic system consumers would be willing to pay any
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(espoused justifications, official viewpoints)
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Necessary underlying Information Security
related Knowledge (What, How, and Why) Knowledge
Fig. 1 – Levels of culture. Adapted from Schein (1999, p. 16).
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price but can only do so if they have the necessary means.
Without the necessary means even consumers who are
willing to pay any price would still be unable to do so.
A very similar situation to the one demonstrated above
also exists when one looks at the human factors in an
organization’s information security environment. As
discussed earlier, two of the basic ‘‘levels’’ of an information
security culture would be the company’s espoused values and
the employees’ shared tacit assumptions. To a certain extent,
it can be argued that the policies and procedures comprising
the espoused values in an information security culture are an
indication of how much security management is
‘‘demanding’’ from employees. Similarly, the shared tacit
assumptions can be seen as a reflection of how much
‘‘compliance’’ employees are willing to ‘‘supply’’. If one were
to model these two ‘‘supply’’ and ‘‘demand’’ curves, the
intersection of these curves would be an indication of the
actual amount of effort employees are willing to give. In other
words, the ‘‘price’’ in this case would be the measurable
S
D1
Quantity
ecirP Equilibrium 1
D2
Equilibrium 2
Fig. 3 – Change in equilibrium caused by increased
demand. Adapted from Acs and Gerlowski (1996, p. 48).
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employee participation in the organization’s security efforts.
Similarly, having the requisite knowledge to be able to
participate in these security efforts is analogous to having the
means to pay the required price. Such a system is modeled in
Fig. 6. If the management expectations are in perfect equilib-
rium with the employees’ shared tacit assumptions, the
resulting effort employees expended on behalf of the organ-
ization’s information security would be perfectly predictable
(Fig. 6). Should management expect more than employees are
willing to provide, it would be less easy to predict the actual
amount of effort employees would expend towards the overall
security goals (Fig. 7). It should also be clear that employees
who are in fact willing to perform their security related roles
would only be able to do so if they have the requisite
knowledge.
In an information security culture there exists a causal
relationship between the artifact level and the other three
levels. In other words: the visible artifacts or, ‘‘how the
employees actually behave towards information security’’, is
caused by the combined effects of the espoused values, the
shared tacit assumptions and the underlying information
security knowledge. In Fig. 6 the artifact level is represented by
the intersection of the lines. In Fig. 7 the artifact level is rep-
resented by the shaded area between the two possible inter-
section points. This reflects the fact that it would be difficult to
predict how employees will actually behave (artifacts) in
a scenario where management demands (espoused values)
and the effort employees are willing (shared tacit assump-
tions), or able (knowledge), to supply are not in equilibrium. In
such a causal relationship elasticity plays an important role.
More ‘‘demanding’’ espoused values will have an elastic effect
on the artifacts, and will require a matching increase in the
shared tacit assumptions and/or the knowledge level(s). Thus,
if an organization’s management increases the ‘‘strength’’ of
the organization’s security related policies and procedures,
the ‘‘demand’’ (security needed) will increase in Figs. 6 and 7.
Such an increase will in turn require an increase in how much
‘‘security effort’’ employees are willing to give, or an increase
in the security related knowledge of employees, or an increase
in both. Without such matching increases in the other levels
of the security culture, the culture will not be in equilibrium
and it would thus become more difficult to predict the
resulting employee behavior (artifacts).
In order to simplify the representation of the elasticity
concept, it should be noted that the dynamic system repre-
sented in Figs. 6 and 7 currently does not explicitly show the
knowledge level. The knowledge level should, however, be
assumed present in all cases. As mentioned above, this level
can be seen as representing the ability to ‘‘pay’’ the demanded
‘‘price’’, and as such will have an equally important effect on
the resulting employee behavior (artifacts) as the other two
levels. The conceptual framework presented in the rest of this
paper will attempt to clarify this causal relationship between
the artifact level and the other three levels of an information
security culture.
6. Information security culture: a conceptual
framework
The overall effect of an organization’s information security
culture can be seen as an accumulation of the effects of each
of the culture’s underlying levels. Each of these levels can
either positively or negatively influence the information
security culture. In order to clearly demonstrate the interac-
tions between these four levels, and their effects on the
overall security efforts, it is necessary to first provide a basic
reference framework.
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6.1. Basic elements and terminology of the conceptual
framework
The basic elements of this framework are depicted in Fig. 8.
The representation in this and subsequent figures was chosen
over the basic curves used in Figs. 2 and 3, because it is easier
to model all the interactions in this way, rather than adding an
additional dimension to the model used to examine the
concept of elasticity. The elements in Fig. 8 can be described as
follows:
 BL: Minimum Acceptable Baseline – This line indicates what
would be an acceptable minimum security baseline; in other
words, a culture whose net effect would meet the minimum
requirements for some industry standard.
 SL: Nett Security Level – This line indicates the actual nett
effect of the culture on the overall security effort. This
line can be seen as the cumulative effect of the four
underlying levels of the culture. The nett security level (SL)
can either be more secure (to the right), less secure (to the
left), or just as secure (overlapping) as the minimum
acceptable baseline (BL).
 AF: Artifacts – This node represents the relative strength of
the artifact level (AF) of the culture. If this node is to the left
of the minimum acceptable baseline (BL), it indicates that
the measurable artifacts are not as secure as they should be.
A node to the right of the baseline (BL) would indicate arti-
facts that are even more secure than the acceptable
minimum. A node exactly on the baseline (BL) would
indicate artifacts that are just as secure as required by this
baseline.
 EV: Espoused Values – This node represents the relative
strength of the organization’s espoused value level (EV). The
various policies and procedures comprising this level could
be more, less, or just as comprehensive than those recom-
mended as the minimum acceptable baseline.
 SA: Shared Tacit Assumptions – This node represents the
relative strength of the organization’s shared tacit assump-
tion level (SA). The underlying beliefs or values of the
employees could be either more, less, or just as in favor of
good secure practices as required by the minimum accept-
able baseline.
 KN: Knowledge – This node represents how much knowl-
edge the organization’s employees have regarding infor-
mation security. Employees can be more knowledgeable
than a certain minimum level needed to perform their jobs
securely, they could be less knowledgeable, or they could
have exactly the minimum requisite level of knowledge.
As mentioned above, the horizontal alignment of the nodes
representing the various cultural levels, AF, EV, SA and KN, in
comparison to the minimum acceptable baseline, should be
interpreted as an indication of the relative strength of each
level. In a similar fashion, the horizontal alignment of the
nodes in comparison to the same horizontal alignment of the
other levels should be interpreted as an indication of how
stable, or predictable, the culture is. The nett security level line
(SL) is an indication of the average strength of the culture, or
the nett combined effect of all four the levels. The culture
depicted in Fig. 8 should thus, firstly, be interpreted as a strong,
or secure culture. All four levels in Fig. 8 have a strength
greater than the baseline, which also results in a nett security
level that is positive, or greater than the baseline. Secondly, all
four levels are perfectly aligned with each other. This results
in a culture that should be completely stable, or predictable.
One could also say that this would be perfect cultural equilib-
rium. The culture depicted in Fig. 8 could thus be said to be the
ideal culture in terms of information security since it is both
strong and stable.
The terms strong, and stable, as used above, should not be
confused as being indicative of how pervasive or resistent to
change the culture might be. According to Schein (1999, pp.
25–26), corporate culture is always strong in the sense of
affecting every single aspect of daily life in an organization at
a more than superficial level. Culture is also always stable, in
the sense that it resists attempts at changing it. In that sense,
culture is one of the most stable facets in an organization
(Schein, 1999, p. 26). When referring to an information secu-
rity culture, the term strong, as used in this paper, should be
interpreted as a desirable culture that is conducive to infor-
mation security. The term stable, as used in the same context,
should be interpreted as an indication of how predictable the
resulting artifacts, or nett security level of the culture would
be for any specific scenario.
All of the factors mentioned above would contribute to the
overall desirability of an information security culture. How
strong and stable an organization’s information security
culture is, would depend on the interaction between the
various levels of culture.
6.2. Interpreting the conceptual framework
Each of the underlying cultural levels will contribute towards
the overall strength and stability of such a culture. For
example, if an organization has espoused values that are in
line with recommended best practices for security, this would
make the overall security better. Conversely, should the
espoused values fail to address all relevant security related
issues, the overall security would be weaker.
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Fig. 8 – Basic elements of the conceptual framework.
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c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 9 ( 2 0 1 0 ) 4 7 6 – 4 8 6482
The combination of the espoused values, and the ‘‘elas-
ticity effect’’, of the shared tacit assumptions and the user
knowledge on these espoused values, results in the visible,
and measurable artifacts. From a security viewpoint, the arti-
fact level is a very good indication of the overall security of the
organization’s information, since this level reflects what
actually happens in the day-to-day operations. In cases where
the various levels are not in equilibrium this artifact level
becomes more difficult to predict. In such cases the degree of
elasticity in the specific system would determine how long it
would take before the system ‘‘settles’’ into equilibrium. In
infinitely elastic systems this equilibrium might never be
attained, whilst completely inelastic systems would always be
in equilibrium. In terms of the degree of elasticity in a security
culture, the knowledge level also plays a very specific role in
that it can act as an ‘‘inhibitor’’ of the elastic effect. A lack of
knowledge can prevent employees who want to act securely
from doing so. For the specific areas where the necessary
security knowledge is lacking, this lack results in an infinite
degree of elasticity in the security culture. The visible behavior
(artifact level) cannot move towards equilibrium because the
employees lack the means to provide the desired behavior.
Figs. 9–13 show a few possible effects interactions between
the various levels of culture could have on the overall state of
the organization’s information security.
The examples in Figs. 9–13 assume that the desirability of
the various levels can be quantified and normalized to the
same scale. In other words, it is assumed that, for example,
the desirability of the relevant espoused values can be
measured and expressed as a value that indicates the contri-
bution of this level towards the overall security. It is also
assumed that the other levels can be expressed in the same
way, and that the scale of such measurements can be
normalized in such a way that these values will indicate the
relative desirability of that level when compared to the other
levels. The line marked SL(Security Level ) represents the nett
effect of the interactions between various levels of the culture.
The five examples can be interpreted as follows:
‘‘Neutral’’ and Stable (Fig. 9). The desirability of the various
levels of culture is ‘‘neutral’’, or average. In other words the
strength of each level neither exceeds, nor falls short, of the
minimum acceptable baseline standards. The Nett Security
Level (SL) perfectly overlaps the Baseline (BL). Since all the
levels have the same level of desirability, the various levels
will neither negate nor reinforce the effects of other levels on
the overall security. The effects of such a culture would thus
be predictable and stable.
Insecure and ‘‘Mostly Stable’’ (Fig. 10). Both the espoused
values and the shared tacit assumptions in this culture are of
sufficient strength to meet the minimum acceptable baseline
standard. However, in this culture, the employees do not have
the requisite level of information security related knowledge.
It is thus possible for the measurable artifacts to fall short of
the minimum acceptable baseline. For example, either the
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Fig. 9 – ‘‘Neutral’’ and stable culture. (BL[minimum
acceptable baseline, SL[nett security level, AF[ artifacts,
EV[ espoused values, SA[ shared tacit assumptions,
KN[ knowledge.)
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Fig. 11 – Insecure and unstable culture. (BL[minimum
acceptable baseline, SL[nett security level, AF[ artifacts,
EV[ espoused values, SA[ shared tacit assumptions,
KN[ knowledge.)
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policy dealing with a specific control might be lacking because
the person(s) responsible for creating the policy lacks the
necessary knowledge, or the knowledge needed to implement
this control in day-to-day operations might be lacking
amongst the responsible employees. In both such cases, the
resulting artifacts might be weaker than expected. This
misalignment between the various levels also means that it
would be difficult to predict the exact relative strength of the
overall security level. In this case one could probably assume
that the culture will be mostly predictable, hence stable,
because the lack of knowledge would probably not apply
equally to all controls. This culture would also have an almost
infinite degree of elasticity and the artifacts would thus never
perfectly align with the espoused values and shared tacit
assumptions. This is due to the lack of supporting information
security knowledge. The lack of knowledge acts as an
‘‘anchor’’ and prevents the artifacts from aligning with the
other layers. By addressing the lack of knowledge the degree
of elasticity inherent in this culture could be reduced. This
would increase the rate at which a more desirable state is
reached where the artifacts align with the shared tacit
assumptions and espoused values.
Insecure and Unstable (Fig. 11). The various levels contrib-
uting to the culture are not aligned. This would mean that the
nett effects of the culture might be unpredictable, due to the
opposing forces at play in this culture. The espoused values
are very desirable, but the users lack the requisite knowledge
and do not have the desired beliefs and values, resulting in
a measurable artifact level that is not secure. For any specific
security control, a user may, or may not, have the requisite
knowledge to fulfill his/her role in the implementation of that
specific control. That same user could also agree with the
relevant espoused value, or could have beliefs that are
contrary to that espoused value. It would thus be very difficult
to predict the nett security level of this culture. Such a culture
would not be a desirable culture. In order to make this culture
more desirable it would be necessary to address both the lack
of knowledge and the underlying shared tacit assumptions of
the employees. Once these aspects have been addressed the
various levels of the culture will re-align to become more
‘‘stable’’. The rate at which this re-alignment will take
place would be dependent on the degree of elasticity present
in the system.
Secure and Unstable (Fig. 12). The various levels contributing
to the culture are not aligned. The espoused values are
desirable, and the users have adequate knowledge. The high
level of user knowledge in this case somewhat negates the
fact that the users do not have the desired beliefs and values,
resulting in an overall culture that is more secure than the
minimum acceptable baseline. However, this culture should
be considered not desirable, because its effects cannot always
be predicted. It might be possible for the users to behave
insecurely with regards to a specific security control because
the specific control conflicts with their beliefs (Schlienger and
Teufel, 2003). In this culture the knowledge level is already
sufficient to enable employees to behave securely. However,
there is still a gap between the knowledge level and the
espoused values. This gap will have to be addressed before the
culture could possibly align with the espoused values. The
degree of elasticity in this culture could be reduced by
addressing the shared tacit assumptions of employees. If
employees can be convinced of the importance of
their respective roles and responsibilities towards the
organization’s information security the culture should start to
align itself.
Secure and Unstable (Fig. 13). As in Fig. 12 the various levels
contributing to the culture are not aligned. In this case the
figure models the scenario where the organization is small
and all staff are skilled IT professionals who have both the
requisite knowledge levels and the personal belief systems
that enable secure behavior. In such a case it is quite likely to
have a secure artifact level despite the fact that there are little
or no espoused values. This is still not a desirable culture.
Without adequate security policies (espoused values) in place,
there can be no guarantees of desirable behavior. The
appointment of additional staff members who might lack the
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acceptable baseline, SL[nett security level, AF[ artifacts,
EV[ espoused values, SA[ shared tacit assumptions,
KN[ knowledge.)
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KN[ knowledge.)
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underlying security knowledge can easily move the observ-
able artifacts in this model back towards the less secure side.
Unless the organization actively addresses the lack of
espoused values this culture will have an infinite degree of
elasticity. The espoused values will never align themselves
without active intervention.
The above examples only reflect a few possible scenarios. It
should, however, be clear that the nett effect of any infor-
mation security culture can be influenced, either positively, or
negatively, by how ‘‘secure’’ the underlying levels of such
a culture is. In such a model it might also be possible to deduce
the relative state of one or more of the cultural levels. For
example, if the organization has good espoused values, but the
measurable artifacts indicate bad security, it might be inferred
that the employees lack either the required knowledge or the
desired attitude. In the cultures represented by Figs. 12 and 13
the culture can probably be ‘‘improved’’ by involving
employees in the process of creating the espoused values. In
both these cultures involving the employees in a ‘‘negotia-
tion’’ process when creating espoused values could reduce the
‘‘gap’’ between the espoused values and shared tacit
assumption layers. In both cases this would make the culture
more predictable, and thus more desirable. In all cases insight
into the degree of elasticity inherent in the culture can help
guide decisions as to what course would be most appropriate
to help manage the culture. If a system has infinite elasticity it
will never align itself unless the underlying cause for this
infinite elasticity is addressed. If management wants to see
faster changes at the artifacts layer, i.e. how people behave on
a day-to-day basis, steps should be taken to decrease the
degree of elasticity. From a management perspective, the
‘‘perfect security culture’’ would be one that is completely
inelastic. Such a culture will always instantly reflect changes
in the espoused values of the organization.
7. Conclusion
This paper suggested that, for an effective information secu-
rity culture, the requisite information security knowledge
amongst an organization’s users could be seen as a fourth
layer to Schein’s (1999) model for corporate culture. The
various interactions between the layers of such an informa-
tion security culture were then presented conceptually.
The conceptual model presented showed that the nett
overall effect that an information security culture would have
on the organization’s information security efforts would
depend on the relative desirability, or strength, of each
underlying level in such a culture. Furthermore, the alignment
of the strengths of the individual underlying culture levels
relative to the other levels, would to a large extent determine
how predictable, hence stable, the effects of such a culture
would be. The ideal culture would thus be one where all four
underlying levels are stronger than the minimum acceptable
baseline, and are also perfectly aligned relative to each other.
The example in Fig. 8 would be such an ideal culture.
The model also attempted to show that management
demands and employees’ participation are strongly inter-
related. In an information security culture the visible artifacts
are thus dependent on both the supporting knowledge as well
as this relationship between espoused values (management
demands) and shared tacit assumptions (employees’ under-
lying beliefs and values). In any information security culture
a certain degree of elasticity will be present. This elasticity will
determine whether or not the shared tacit assumptions will
over time align itself to the espoused values of the organiza-
tion. It will also determine how fast changes will occur if the
system is not infinitely elastic. The lower the degree of elas-
ticity in the system, the faster it would take for a possible
re-alignment to happen. From a management perspective it
would thus be highly desirable to reduce the degree of elas-
ticity in such a culture as much as possible.
In its current form, the model’s primary contribution is at
a conceptual level where it aids in the understanding of infor-
mation security culture. The current model has limited
‘‘hands-on’’ use. In a scenario where an organization’s
measurable artifacts are undesirable, a manager who is sure
that the organization’s espoused values is of adequate
strength and who is also certain his/her staff members have
adequate knowledge, might infer that the employees’ beliefs
and values are not in line with the espoused values. Based on
the presented model, such a manager will also be able to
deduce that he/she can make the artifacts easier to predict by
addressing the shared tacit assumptions, for example by
trying to convince the employees to buy into the espoused
values. Through campaigns aimed at improving the
employees’ attitude towards security management can
reduce the degree of elasticity inherent in the culture and thus
speed up the pace at which the measurable artifacts become
more in line with the espoused values. Alternatively the
espoused values could be ‘‘relaxed’’ to be more in line with the
shared tacit assumptions, similar to the idea of adjusting the
governing variables in a double-loop learning system (Smith,
2001). This might result in a culture that is slightly less secure
but more predictable.
In either of the above mentioned approaches, use of the
current model would only provide very vague guidance to
someone wanting to manage an information security culture.
In order for this model to become useful as a ‘‘hands-on’’
cultural management tool additional research would be
required. If one could accurately quantify and normalize the
various levels at play in this conceptual model it should be
possible to use the model to manage specific aspects of an
information security culture more precisely. The assumption
made when presenting the example, namely that the desir-
ability of the various levels can in fact be quantified and
normalized to the same scale, should by no means be taken as
an assertion made by this paper. The aim of the paper was not
to present such metrics and normalization processes but
rather to show, at a certain level of abstraction, how this
conceptual model could be used to reason about information
security culture. It should, however, be possible to quantify
and normalize the various factors for certain subsets of
controls. For example, it might be possible to turn the
presented conceptual model into a working model for
a smaller sub-problem such as mapping the relationships
between the four levels for password usage. If the required
processes and metrics are developed, the conceptual frame-
work might also play a valuable role in the management of an
information security culture. For example; a metric that
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quantifies the actual degree of elasticity in an information
security culture would be a very useful tool to have. This type
of usage for the presented model could possibly be addressed
by future research efforts. For the present, the contention of
this paper is simply that the conceptual model presented,
could assist in improving the understanding of an information
security culture. The work in this paper should thus be seen as
an attempt to lay a solid foundation on which future research
could be built.
Appendix. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found
in the online version at doi:10.1016/j.cose.2009.10.005.
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Abstract: Modern humans live in a society that is dependant on information. Information and its 
uses permeate all aspects of modern life. For many organizations, information has become one of 
its most valuable assets. It is thus imperative for organizations to protect their information 
resources. The protection of information, also known as information security, is to a large extent 
dependant on the active involvement of humans in the information security process. Each and every 
user in an organization is supposed to have enough knowledge regarding his/her role(s) in the 
information security processes. Unfortunately this is rarely the case. Employees, whether 
intentionally or through negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, are the greatest threat to 
information security. This paper forms part of an ongoing research project which attempts to 
address this lack of knowledge. This paper presents the rationale and motivation of current work 
which investigates the possible use of e-learning systems, as well as the use of artificial intelligence 
in such e-learning systems to address the needs of corporate information security education. The 
purpose of this paper is to acquire feedback and input from researchers and practitioners in the e-
learning field of study. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In today’s business world, information is a valuable commodity and as such, needs to be protected. 
Information affects all aspects of today’s businesses, from top management right down to the operational level 
[Turban et al., 2002, pp. 3-37]. Modern businesses operate in an emerging global information society. The current 
global economy is increasingly dependent on the creation, management, and distribution of information resources. 
Today, many organizations need information systems to survive and prosper. It is therefore imperative for modern 
organizations to take the protection of their information resources seriously. Information security is typically 
implemented in the form of various security controls [Barnard and Von Solms, 2000, Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 
2003]. These controls are typically selected from an internationally accepted standard. There exist several such 
standards and codes of practice. Some of the better known examples would include the ISO/IEC 17799 [ISO/IEC 
17799, 2005] and ISO/IEC 13335 also known as GMITS [ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004]. 
 
These standards and codes of practice provide organizations with guidelines specifying how the problem of 
managing information security should be approached [Von Solms, 1999]. One of the primary controls identified by 
many of the major IT security standards published to date is the introduction of a corporate information security 
awareness program [ISO/IEC 17799, 2005, ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004]. The purpose of such a program is to 
educate the users about information security or, more specifically, to educate users about the individual roles they 
should play in the effective execution and maintenance of these controls. Most security controls, whether physical, 
technical, managerial or administrative in nature, requires some form of human involvement.  
 
This paper forms part of an ongoing research project at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in 
South Africa. The aim of the project is to address the some of the human factors in information security. This paper 
introduces the educational needs of corporate information security programs, as well as the rationale for attempting 
to use e-learning, and specifically adaptive e-learning, to address these educational needs. It is the author’s hope that 
the background and rationale presented in this paper will form a basis for acquiring feedback and input from 
researchers who specialize in the field of e-learning. It has been suggested that information security, because it 
depends on human behavior, should look at the human sciences when attempting to solve problems relating to the 
roles humans play in information security [Siponen, 2001]. Both the authors of this paper have in the past worked in 
the field of information security as their primary research focus area. This paper should thus be seen as an attempt to 
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gain additional input from e-learning researchers, regarding future research directions, and should not be seen as an 
attempt to present completed, or significantly new, work. 
 
 
 
2. The Human Factors in Information Security 
 
Information security controls can generally be sub-divided into three categories: Physical controls, 
Technical controls and Operational controls [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2004]. Physical controls deal with the 
physical aspects of security, for examp le; the lock on the door of an office containing sensitive documents. 
Technical controls are controls  of a technical nature, usually software based, for example; forcing a user to 
authenticate with a unique username and password before allowing the user to access the operating system. The 
third category, operational controls, collectively including business-, administrative-, managerial-, and procedural 
controls, consist of all controls that deal with human behavior in one form or another. These controls would include 
those that deal with the creation of information security policies and procedures, and administration of other 
controls. Both physical and technical controls, even though they do not deal directly with operational issues, usually 
require some form of human involvement. In an organizational context, these controls would thus have to be 
supported by procedures outlining the employee’s involvement in the use of these controls. 
 
Employees, whether intentionally or through negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, are the greatest 
threat to information security [Mitnick and Simon, 2002, p. 3]. Operational controls rely on human behavior. This  
means that these controls are arguably some of the weakest links in information security. Unfortunately, both 
physical and technical controls rely to some extent on these operational controls for effectiveness. As an example, an 
operational control might state that a user leaving his/her office must logoff from the operating system and lock 
his/her office door. If a user were to ignore this procedure, both the technical control forcing authentication and the 
physical control of having a lock on the door would be rendered useless. Thus, anyone who thinks that security 
products, i.e. technical and physical controls, alone, offer true security is settling for the illusion of security [Mitnick 
and Simon, 2002, p. 4].   
 
Siponen describes this tendency of organizations to settle for the illusion of security as a general human 
tendency to often blindly ignore complications in IT related issues [Siponen, 2001]. Without an adequate level of 
user co-operation and knowledge, many security techniques are liable to be misused or misinterpreted by users. This 
may result in even an adequate security measure becoming inadequate [Siponen, 2001]. Organizations cannot 
protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information in today’s highly networked systems 
environment without ensuring that each person involved understands his/her roles and responsibilities and is 
adequately trained to perform them [NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 3]. 
 
Teaching employees their roles and responsibilities relating to information security requires the investment 
of company resources in a user education program. However, budgetary requirements for security education and 
training are generally not a top priority for organizations [Nosworthy, 2000]. Organizations often spend most their 
information security budget on technical controls and fail to realize that a successful information security 
management program requires a balance of technical and business controls [Nosworthy, 2000]. Business controls in 
this sense refer to operational controls. According to Dhillon, increasing awareness of security issues is the most 
cost-effective control that an organization can implement [Dhillon, 1999]. However, in order to ensure that the 
maximum return on investment is gained, special care should be taken to ensure the success of the user education 
programs used. For educational programs this would mean ensuring adherence to proper pedagogical principles 
when these educational programs are compiled [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2004]. 
  
Most current user education programs fail to pay adequate attention to behavioral theories [Siponen, 2001]. 
The emphasis of user education programs should be to build an organizational sub-culture of security awareness, by 
instilling the aspects of information security in every employee as a natural way of performing his or her daily job 
[Von Solms, 2000]. Recent studies have indicated that the establishment of an information security ”culture” in the 
organization is desirable for effective information security [Von Solms, 2000]. Such a culture should support all 
business activities in such a way that information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activities of every 
employee [Schlienger and Teufel, 2003]. A detailed examination of how such a culture could be established in an 
organization falls outside the scope of this paper. Instead this paper will focus only on user education, one of the 
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cornerstones  required for the establishment of such a culture. The establishment of such a culture has been discussed 
in many recent papers [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2003, Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2005, Schlienger and 
Teufel, 2003].  
 
 
3. Information Security Education 
 
The user education programs needed for information security purposes differ from traditional educational 
programs. Unlike traditional educational programs, these programs will primarily be aimed at teaching adults. 
Adults have well established, not formative, values, beliefs, and opinions [NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 20]. The 
educational methodology used should thus be suitable for adult education. Furthermore, there are several other 
requirements specific to the role that such a program will play in the overall organization’s information security 
efforts. Van Niekerk and Von Solms  [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2004] identified these requirements and 
discussed the pedagogical implications of these requirements in depth. The following is a brief summary of the 
identified requirements  
1. Everyone should be able to ”pass” the course. 
2. Employees must know why information security is important and why a specific policy or control is in 
place. 
3. Learning materials should be customized to the needs of individual learners. 
4. Users should be responsible for their own learning. 
5. Users should be held accountable for their studies. 
 
It has been suggested that information security, because it depends on human behavior, should look at the human 
sciences  when attempting to solve problems relating to the roles humans play in information security [Siponen, 
2001]. Instead of ”re-inventing the wheel” when designing user education programs, information security 
practitioners should thus ”borrow” methodologies from the educational sciences. Researchers who wish to solve 
information security education problems should thus be basing their work on sound pedagogical models. 
 
Van Niekerk and Von Solms [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2004] showed that the same elements required 
for effective information security education, are present in outcomes based education (OBE), an existing, and 
pedagogical sound, methodology. Subsequently, it has been shown how OBE could be effectively incorporated into 
the transformative change processes required to actively manage the introduction of a corporate information security 
sub-culture [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2005]. However, even though OBE has been shown to be pedagogically 
adequate to the requirements of information security education, in practice the cost-implications of some of the 
identified requirements might be prohibitive. 
 
The need to customize learning materials for individual learners can been shown to be central to both the 
requirements of an information security education program, and an outcomes based educational program [Killen, 
2000, Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2004, NIST 800-16, 1998, p. 43]. However, customizing learning material to 
individual learners would be both time -consuming and expensive. Most organizations only spend a very small 
portion of their total IT budget on information security, and only a small portion of this is usually allocated to 
information security education [Ernest & Young, 2004]. It has been found that most organizations can significantly 
improve its information protection with cost-effective awareness and training initiatives [Ernest & Young, 2004]. 
Affordability would thus have to be a major deciding factor in determining the suitability of an information security 
educational program. In most cases, this would mean that an alternative to classroom training would be needed. 
 
4. E-learning for Information Security 
 
Probably the most cost-effective substitute for traditional classroom training is to provide employees with 
intranet based instruction, hence e-learning. Web-based training material has been used to great effect in many other 
areas and has proven to be an extremely cost-effect delivery mechanism for such programs. For example, AT&T 
was able to cut classroom time in half for 4500 customer service reps because they were provided with intranet-
based instruction [O’Brien, 1999, p.361]. Web-based training solutions as an alternative to classroom training also 
have several benefits over other media such as paper. These benefits include: 
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· The web is a very rich media. This means that educational material developed in this media is not restricted 
to simple text and static graphics, but can consist of a mixture of text, graphics, animations and even sound 
or video clips.  
· Web-based training solutions are cheap to distribute organization wide and can easily be administrated 
from a centralized point. This also means that it would be very easy to maintain, manage and update web-
based training materials.  
· Most computer literate users will already be familiar with a web-based interface, which reduces additional 
training overheads that might be experienced should another form of computer based teaching solution be 
implemented. 
· Web-based training materials can include programmatic components.  
 
The fact that web-based training materials can include programmatic components has several important 
implications for its possible use in information security education [Van Niekerk and Von Solms, 2002]. Firstly, it 
would make it feasible to add automated assessment modules to such training materials, which means that learners 
can receive continuous feedback on their progress. Automated feedback, in combination with the fact that web-
based material would be available at all times, means that learners could be made responsible for their own learning. 
This satisfies the fourth requirement for information security education listed above. Automated assessment would 
also enable organizations to hold learners accountable for their own learning, which satisfies the fifth require ment 
for information security education. Finally, the inclusion of programmatic components in a web-based educational 
environment could make it possible to develop content to automatically adapt to the individual preferences of 
learners.  
According to Hentea [Hentea et al., 2003] the key to automation of web-based education lies in the 
effective application of the computer science field artificial intelligence (AI). Automated feedback in the form of 
hyperlinked documents are already available, however, more advanced forms of personalization will require both 
knowledge of educational theory and design, and technical (artificial intelligence) expertise [Hentea et al., 2003]. In 
order to automatically customize learning experiences to individual learners, such an intelligent learning 
environment would have to determine the learner’s intent and detect learner misconceptions [Lester et al., 1997]. 
This diagnosis must be performed as non-invasively as possible [Lester et al., 1997]. This problem, and several other 
issues regarding the creation of automatically adaptive web-learning material, form part of the relatively new field of 
study know as adaptive e-learning.  
 
As a field of study, adaptive e-learning can already demonstrate some impressive results [Brusilovsky, 
2004]. However, very few of these systems are actually being used currently to teach real courses [Brusilovsky, 
2004]. The problem with current systems is not their performance, but their architecture [Brusilovsky, 2004]. In 
addition to this, as far as  could be determined, little or no current knowledge exists regarding the suitability of these 
technologies for use in information security education in an organizational environment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper briefly introduced the educational needs of corporate information security programs. Modern 
organizations must protect their information resources. This protection, known as information security, depends on 
the organization’s employees. Employees must be educated regarding their roles and responsibilities in the 
information security process. They should also be taught the necessary skills they need in order to effectively apply 
this knowledge. In order to be effective, information security educational programs should meet certain basic 
requirements, and should be based on a sound pedagogical model. One of these requirements is the need to 
customize learning material to the needs of individual learners. Web-based information security educational 
programs can contain programmatic components. These components might be used to automatically adapt the 
learning content to the needs of individual learners. Several techniques from the field of artificial intelligence could 
contribute to the creation of such automatically adapting learning material. However, little or no knowledge exist 
regarding the use of such components specifically for information security education. This paper thus proposes a 
new research project that will attempt to answer the question: How can artificial intelligence be used to create 
adaptable learning material for information security education? It is hoped that the presentation of this paper will 
lead to valuable feedback and inputs into this proposed research direction, from e-learning researchers.  
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ABSTRACT
The importance of establishing an information security culture in an organization has become a well
established idea. The aim of such a culture is to address the various human factors that can affect
an organization’s overall information security efforts. However, understanding both the various el-
ements of an information security culture, as well as the relationships between these elements, can
still be problematic. Schein’s definition of a corporate culture is often used to aid understanding of
an information security culture. This paper briefly introduces Schein’s model. It then incorporates
the important role knowledge plays in information security into this definition. Finally, a conceptual
framework to aid understanding of the interactions between the various elements of such a culture,
is presented. This framework is explained by means of illustrative examples, and it is suggested that
this conceptual framework can be a useful aid to understanding information security culture.
KEYWORDS
Information Security, Information Security Culture, Corporate Culture, Organizational Learning,
Schein’s Model.
UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1 INTRODUCTION
Today, most organizations need information systems to survive and prosper. Information has become
a valuable asset to modern organizations. It is therefore imperative for modern organizations to take
the protection of their information resources seriously. This protection of information resources, also
known as information security, consist of many processes. Some of these processes are, to a large
extent, dependent on human co-operated behavior. Employees, whether intentionally or through neg-
ligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, are the greatest threat to information security (Mitnick &
Simon, 2002, p. 3). Without an adequate level of user cooperation and knowledge, many security
techniques are liable to be misused or misinterpreted by users. This may result in even an adequate
security measure becoming inadequate (Siponen, 2001). An organization’s information security strat-
egy should thus comprehensively address this ”human factor”. It is important to note that there are
two dimensions to this ”human factor” in information security, namely knowledge, and cooperation,
or behavior. These dimensions are to a large extend interrelated to each other.
Organizations cannot protect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information in
today’s highly networked systems environment without ensuring that each person involved shares the
security vision of the organization, understands his/her roles and responsibilities, and is adequately
trained to perform them (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 14). In order to assist in ensuring information
security, individual users thus needs knowledge regarding their specific role in the security process.
This knowledge can be provided via education, training and awareness campaigns.
Once these users have sufficient knowledge about their roles in the security process, there is still
no guarantee that they will adhere to their required security roles. It is possible that users understand
their roles correctly but still don’t adhere to a security policy because it conflicts with their beliefs and
values (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). It is therefore imperative to also ensure that the users have the
correct attitude, and thus the desired behavior, towards information security. In order to ensure the
desired user behavior, it is necessary to cultivate an organizational sub-culture of information security
(Von Solms, 2000; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Such a culture should support all business activities in
such a way that information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activities of every employee
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Education of employees plays a very important role in the establishment
of such a culture. It is paramount that the people are educated to want to be more secure in their day
to day operation (Nosworthy, 2000). Such a change of attitude is of utmost importance, because a
change in attitude automatically leads to a subsequent behavioral change (Nosworthy, 2000). Through
the establishment of an information security culture, the employees can become a security asset,
instead of being a risk (Von Solms, 2000).
Many recent studies have shown that the establishment of an information security culture in
the organization is in fact necessary for effective information security (Eloff & Von Solms, 2000;
Von Solms, 2000). However, such a culture must be supported by adequate knowledge regarding
information security (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2005). Without adequate knowledge, users who
want to behave securely, might still apply a security control incorrectly. Conversely, a user who has
adequate knowledge, but believes that secure behavior is unnecessary in his/her specific role, might
still behave in an insecure way. Due to this co-dependence between the knowledge dimension of the
human factor in information security, and the behavioral dimension, it would be beneficial to deal with
both these dimensions holistically. It would thus make sense to have a single conceptual framework
that can be used to reason about both the knowledge, and the behavioral aspects of this human factor
in information security. This paper will briefly adapt the ”generic” definition of corporate culture
to the specific needs of an information security culture. This adapted definition will then be used to
provide a conceptual framework for examining the various aspects of the human factors in information
security.
In examining this adapted definition, it is important to realize that knowledge, and the underly-
ing educational programs needed to impart such knowledge, is often seen as part of corporate culture.
It is not the intent of this paper to dispute this view. In fact, this paper supports the view that knowl-
edge and education will always play a role towards ensuring specific behavior patterns. However, this
paper does attempt to highlight the fact that the knowledge ”dimension” is of particular importance
in an information security culture, and that security knowledge plays a very specific enabling role in
information security. The additional knowledge ”dimension” this paper will present, represents the
knowledge needed to effectively implement, or use, the security measures if the desired attitude can
be assumed. The knowledge that form an underlying part of any corporate culture is still assumed to
be present. In that respect, an information security culture is assumed to be the same as a ”normal”
corporate culture.
2 RESEARCH PARADIGM AND RATIONALE
The work in this paper is based on qualitative, or phenomenological- , research methods, as described
in Creswell (1998). This paper should thus be seen as ”an inquiry process of understanding based on
distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem” (Creswell, 1998,
p. 15). The research presented here does not attempt to define new knowledge, but rather to provide a
more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon described as ”information security culture”. As far
as could be determined, the specific conceptual model, as well as the underlying interactions between
the various levels of information security culture, as presented in this paper, has never been published
before. It is the authors’ belief that the use of this conceptual model could improve the understanding
of the concept of information security culture. Since the concept of organizational culture has been
largely ”borrowed” by information security researchers from the humanities, it was deemed fitting to
also ”borrow” the research paradigm, used in this paper from the humanities.
The model for corporate culture as presented in Schein (1999) has become widely accepted
amongst information security researchers (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). However, this model describes
corporate culture in general, and not information security culture specifically. In order to ensure a
rigorous research approach, even concepts with a seemingly obvious meaning will be revisited in this
paper. The description of these concepts in the presented information security framework is deemed
necessary because there might exist differences between the ontologies commonly adhered to by
information security specialists and researchers from the management sciences.
The aim of this paper is thus to present an holistic, conceptual model of information security
culture, for information security practitioners and students. This model aims to clarify, at a conceptual
level, the interactions between various elements comprising such an information security culture. The
model also attempt to clearly define, in an information security context, concepts such as the strength
and the stability (or predictability) of an information security culture. The model presented in this
paper is intended to clarify, and improve, the understanding of exiting concepts. It is hoped that this
model will be of use to other information security researchers when examining the human factors in
information security. Before the specific concept of an information security culture is examined, this
paper will first explore the existing definition of corporate culture.
3 CORPORATE CULTURE
Every organization has a particular culture, comprising an omnipresent set of assumptions that is
often difficult to fathom, and that directs the activities within the organization (Smit & Cronje´, 1992,
p. 382). Such a culture could be defined as; the beliefs and values shared by people in an organization
(Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 382). Beliefs and values, however, are both concepts that can be difficult to
quantify. It is therefor often tempting to think of culture as just ”the way we do things around here”
(Schein, 1999, p. 15), or that ”something” that makes an organization more successful than others
(Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). However, oversimplifying the concept of culture is the biggest danger
to understanding it (Schein, 1999, p. 15).
A better way to think about culture is to examine the different ”levels” at which culture exists
(Schein, 1999, p. 15). This way of thinking about corporate culture is already widely accepted in
information security (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In order to clarify these levels of culture, each of
the levels will be briefly examined:
• Level One: Artifacts. Artifacts are what you can observe, see, hear, and feel, in an orga-
nization (Schein, 1999, p. 15). Artifacts would include visible organizational structures and
processes. At the level of artifacts, culture is very clear and has an immediate emotional im-
pact, which could be positive or negative, on the observer (Schein, 1999, p. 16). Observing
the artifacts alone, however, does not explain why the members of the organization behave as
they do (Schein, 1999, p. 16). In order to understand the reasons for the behavior patterns of
organization members it is necessary to examine ”deeper” levels of culture (Schein, 1999, p.
16), such as the organization’s espoused values.
• Level Two: Espoused Values. An organization’s espoused values are the ”reasons” an organi-
zational insider would give for the observed artifacts (Schein, 1999, p. 17), for example; that
the organization believes in team work, that everyone in the organization’s view is important
in the decision making process, etc. Espoused values generally consist of the organization’s
official viewpoints, such as mission- or vision-statements, strategy documents, and any other
documents that describe the organization’s values, principles, ethics, and visions (Schein, 1999,
p. 17). However, it is possible for two organizations to have very different observable artifacts
and yet share very similar espoused values (Schein, 1999, pp. 18-19). This is because there
is an even deeper level of thought and perception that drives the overt, or observable, behavior
(Schein, 1999, p. 19). The espoused values are values which the organization wants to live up
to. The interpretation, and application, of these espoused values in the day to running of the
organization depends on the shared tacit assumptions between the employees of that organiza-
tion.
• Level Three: Shared Tacit Assumptions. The shared tacit assumptions in an organization
develop in any successful organization. Often these assumptions are formed in the organiza-
tion’s early years, because certain strategies have proven to be successful (Schein, 1999, p. 19).
If strategies based on specific beliefs and values continue to be successful, these beliefs and
values gradually come to be shared and taken for granted. The beliefs and values become tacit
assumptions about the nature of the world and how to succeed in it (Schein, 1999, p. 19). These
values, beliefs, and assumptions that have become shared and taken for granted in an organi-
zation, form the essence of that organization’s culture. Beliefs, in this sense, refer to a group
of people’s convictions about the world and how it works, whilst values refer to a community’s
basic assumptions about what ideals are worth pursuing (Smit & Cronje´, 1992, p. 383). It is
important to remember that the shared tacit assumptions resulted from a joint learning process.
The corporate culture of any organization, is a result of all three the above levels. At its most
basic, and most difficult to quantify, level, the members of the organization share certain beliefs and
values. These shared tacit assumptions act as a kind of ”filter”, which affects how individuals will
carry out their normal day-to-day activities. It also influences how these individuals interpret the or-
ganization’s policies, and how they implement its procedures. These policies and procedures form
part of the organization’s espoused values. The espoused values can be seen as the ”visible” contri-
bution of the organization’s management towards the organization’s culture. To a degree, espoused
values provide cultural direction. The interpretation of this ”direction”, however, is extremely de-
pendant on the underlying shared tacit assumptions. These three levels of corporate culture could be
seen to correspond closely to the behavioral aspects of the ”human factor” in information security.
As mentioned earlier, this ”human factor” in information security consist of two dimensions, namely
knowledge and behavior, which are very inter-related. Due to the co-dependency between these two
dimensions it is not possible to ignore the impact a lack of information security related knowledge
would have on an organizational sub-culture of information security.
4 INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE
In ”normal” definitions of organizational culture, the relevant job-related knowledge are generally
ignored, because it can be assumed that the average employee would have the needed knowledge to
do his/her job. In the case of information security, the required knowledge is not necessarily needed
to perform the employee’s normal job functions. Knowledge of information security is generally only
needed when it is necessary to perform the normal job functions in a way that is consistent with good
information security practices. It can not be assumed that the average employee has the necessary
knowledge to perform his/her job in a secure manner. If an organization is trying to foster a sub-
culture of information security, all activities would have to be performed in a way that is consistent
with good information security practice. Having adequate knowledge regarding information security
is a prerequisite to performing any normal activity in a secure manner. Information security knowl-
edge, or a lack thereof, could therefor be seen as a fourth level to an information security culture that
will affect each of the other three layers. For example:
Artifacts: Artifacts are what actually happens in the organization. Without the necessary skills and
proficiencies, it would be impossible to perform security related tasks correctly. Thus, for the
day-to-day task to happen in a secure way, the users would have to have sufficient knowledge
of how to perform their tasks securely.
Espoused Values: To create the policy document, the person, or team, responsible for the drafting
of the policy must know what to include in such a policy in order to adequately address the
organization’s security needs.
Shared Tacit Assumptions: This layer consists of the beliefs and values of employees. If such a be-
lief should conflict with one of the espoused values, knowing why a specific control is needed,
might play a vital role in ensuring compliance (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
It should be clear that in an information security culture, knowledge underpins and supports
all three the ”normal” levels of corporate culture. Without adequate knowledge, information secu-
rity cannot be ensured. The co-dependency between the three ”normal” levels of an organization’s
information security culture, and knowledge, the ”fourth level”, implies that each of these four lev-
els will have an impact on how ”secure”, or desirable, the overall information security culture will
be. The first part of the model presented in this paper is thus an adaptation of Schein’s model. This
adaptation incorporates the underlying need for information security related knowledge into Schein’s
model. Knowledge are added as a fourth level of culture that is specific to an information security
culture. This adaptation is necessary because in an information security culture the requisite knowl-
edge cannot be assumed to be present. Figure 1, provides a graphical exposition of this adaptation.
In this presented conceptual model, knowledge is dealt with as an additional level to culture, as op-
posed to viewing knowledge as a sub-component of each of the original three levels. This is done
solely because modeling knowledge as an additional level makes it easier to clearly show the effect
knowledge, or a lack thereof, would have on the overall information security culture.
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Figure 1: Levels of Culture (adapted from Schein, 1999, p. 16)
5 INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The overall effect of an organization’s information security culture can be seen as an accumulation
of the effects of each of the culture’s underlying levels. Each of these levels can either positively
or negatively influence the overall information security culture. In order to clearly demonstrate the
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Figure 2: Basic Elements of the Conceptual Framework. (BL = Minimum Acceptable Baseline, SL
= Nett Security Level, AF= Artifacts, EV = Espoused Values, SA= Shared Tacit Assumptions, KN=
Knowledge)
interactions between these four levels, and their effects on the overall security efforts, it is necessary
to first provide a basic reference framework.
5.1 Basic Elements and Terminology of the Conceptual Framework
The basic elements of this framework are depicted in Figure 2. The elements in Figure 2 can be
described as follows:
• BL: Minimum Acceptable Base Line - This line indicates what would be an acceptable min-
imum security baseline. In other words, a culture whose net effect would meet the minimum
requirements for some industry standard.
• SL: Nett Security Level - This line indicates the actual nett effect of the culture on the overall
security effort. This line can be seen as the cumulative effect of the four underlying levels of
the culture. The nett security level (SL) can either be more secure (to the right), less secure (to
the left), or just as secure (overlapping) as the minimum acceptable baseline (BL).
• AF: Artifacts - This node represents the relative strength of the artifact level (AF) of the cul-
ture. If this node is to the left of the minimum acceptable baseline (BL), it indicates that the
measurable artifacts are not as secure as they should be. A node to the right of the baseline
(BL) would indicate artifacts that are even more secure than the acceptable minimum. A node
exactly on the baseline (BL) would indicate artifacts that are just as secure as required by this
baseline.
• EV: Espoused Values - This node represents the relative strength of the organization’s espoused
value level (EV). The various policies and procedures comprising this level could be more, less,
or just as comprehensive than those recommended as the minimum acceptable baseline.
• SA: Shared Tacit Assumptions - This node represents the relative strength of the organization’s
shared tacit assumption level (SA). The underlying beliefs or values of the employees could be
either more, less, or just as in favor of good secure practices as required by the minimum
acceptable baseline.
• KN: Knowledge - This node represents how much knowledge the organization’s employees
have regarding information security. Employees can be more knowledgeable than a certain
minimum level needed to perform their jobs securely, they could be less knowledgeable, or
they could have exactly the minimum requisite level of knowledge.
As mentioned above, the horizontal alignment of the nodes representing the various cultural
levels, AF, EV, SA and KN, in comparison to the minimum acceptable baseline, should be interpreted
as an indication of the relative strength of each level. In a similar fashion, the horizontal alignment
of the nodes in comparison to the same horizontal alignment of the other levels should be interpreted
as an indication of how stable, or predictable, the culture is. The nett security level line (SL) is an
indication of the average strength of the culture, or the nett combined effect of all four the levels. The
culture depicted in Figure 2 should thus, firstly, be interpreted as a strong, or secure culture. All four
levels in Figure 2 has a strength greater than the baseline, which also results in a nett security level
that is positive, or greater than the baseline. Secondly, all four levels are perfectly aligned with each
other. This results in a culture that should be completely stable, or predictable. The culture depicted
in Figure 2 could thus be said to be the ideal culture in terms of information security since it is both
strong and stable.
The terms strong, and stable, as used above, should not be confused as being indicative of
how pervasive or resistent to change the culture might be. According to Schein (1999, pp. 25-26),
corporate culture is always strong in the sense of affecting every single aspect of daily life in an
organization at a more than superficial level. Culture is also always stable, in the sense that it resists
attempts at changing it. In that sense, culture is one of the most stable facets in an organization
(Schein, 1999, p. 26). When referring to an information security culture, the term strong, as used in
this paper, should be interpreted as a desirable culture that is conductive to information security. The
term stable, as used in the same context, should be interpreted as an indication of how predictable
the resulting artifacts, or nett security level of the culture would be for any specific scenario.
All of the factors mentioned above would contribute to the overall desirability of an information
security culture. How strong, and stable an organization’s information security culture is, would
depend on the interaction between the various levels of culture.
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Figure 3: Possible interactions between the various levels of an Information Security Culture. (BL =
Minimum Acceptable Baseline, SL = Nett Security Level, AF= Artifacts, EV = Espoused Values, SA=
Shared Tacit Assumptions, KN= Knowledge)
5.2 Interpreting the Conceptual Framework
Each of the underlying cultural levels will contribute towards the overall strength and stability of such
a culture. For example, if an organization has espoused values that are in line with recommended best
practices for security, this would make the overall security better. Conversely, should the espoused
values fail to address all relevant security related issues, the overall security would be weaker.
The combination of the espoused values, and the ”filtering effect” of the shared tacit assump-
tions and the user knowledge, on these espoused values, results in the visible, and measurable arti-
facts. From a security viewpoint, the artifact level is a very good indication of the overall security of
the organization’s information, since this level reflects what actually happens in the day to day op-
erations. Fig. 3 shows a few possible effects interactions between the various levels of culture could
have on the overall state of the organization’s information security.
The examples in Fig. 3 assumes that the desirability of the various levels can be quantified and
normalized to the same scale. In other words, it is assumed that, for example, the desirability of the
relevant espoused values can be measured and expressed as a value that indicates the contribution of
this level towards the overall security. It is also assumed that the other levels can be expressed in the
same way, and that the scale of such measurements can be normalized in such a way that these values
will indicate the relative desirability of that level when compared to the other levels. The line marked
SL(Security Level) represents the nett effect of the interactions between various levels of the culture.
The four examples in Fig. 3 can be interpreted as follows:
• A:”Neutral” and Stable. The desirability of the various levels of culture are ”neutral”, or
average. In other words the strength of each level neither exceeds, nor falls short, of the mini-
mum acceptable baseline standards. Since all the levels have the same level of desirability, the
various levels will neither negate nor reinforce the effects of other levels on the overall security.
The effects of such a culture would thus be predictable and stable.
• B:Insecure and ”Mostly Stable”. Both the espoused values and the shared tacit assumptions
in this culture are of sufficient strength to meet the minimum acceptable baseline standard.
However, in this culture, the employees do not have the requisite level of information security
related knowledge. It is thus possible for the measurable artifacts to fall short of the minimum
acceptable baseline. For example, either the policy dealing with a specific control might be
lacking because the person(s) responsible for creating the policy lack the necessary knowledge,
or the knowledge needed to implement this control in day-to-day operations might be lack-
ing amongst the responsible employees. In both such cases, the resulting artifacts might be
weaker than expected. This misalignment between the various levels also means that it would
be difficult to predict the exact relative strength of the overall security level. In this case one
could probably assume the culture will be mostly predictable, hence stable, because the lack of
knowledge would probably not apply equally to all controls.
• C:Insecure and Unstable. The various levels contributing to the culture are not aligned. This
would mean that the nett effects of the culture might be unpredictable, due to the opposing
forces at play in this culture. The espoused values are very desirable, but the users lack the
requisite knowledge and do not have the desired beliefs and values, resulting in a measurable
artifact level that is not secure. For any specific security control, a user may, or may not, have
the requisite knowledge to fulfill his/her role in the implementation of that specific control.
That same user could also agree with the relevant espoused value, or could have beliefs that are
contrary to that espoused value. It would thus be very difficult to predict the nett security level
of this culture. Such a culture would not be a desirable culture.
• D:Secure and Unstable. The various levels contributing to the culture are not aligned. The
espoused values are desirable, and the users have adequate knowledge. The high level of user
knowledge in this case somewhat negates the fact that the users do not have the desired beliefs
and values, resulting in an overall culture that is more secure than the minimum acceptable
baseline. However, this culture should be considered not desirable, because its effects cannot
always be predicted. It might be possible for the users to behave insecurely with regards to a
specific security control because the specific control conflicts with their beliefs (Schlienger &
Teufel, 2003).
The above examples only reflect a few possible scenarios. It should however be clear that the
nett effect of any information security culture can be influenced, either positively, or negatively, by
how ”secure” the underlying levels of such a culture is. In such a model it might also be possible to
deduce the relative state of one or more of the cultural levels. For example, if the organization has
good espoused values, but the measurable artifacts indicate bad security, it might be inferred that the
employees lack either the required knowledge or the desired attitude.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper suggested that, for an effective information security culture, the requisite information se-
curity knowledge amongst an organization’s users could be seen as a fourth layer to Schein’s (Schein,
1999) model for corporate culture. The various interactions between the layers of such an information
security culture were then presented conceptually.
The conceptual model presented showed that the nett overall effect that an information security
culture would have on the organization’s information security efforts would depend on the relative
desirability, or strength, of each underlying level in such a culture. Furthermore, the alignment of
the strengths of the individual underlying culture levels relative to the other levels, would to a large
extend determine how predictable, hence stable, the effects of such a culture would be. The ideal
culture would thus be one where all four underlying levels are stronger than the minimum acceptable
baseline, and are also perfectly aligned relative to each other. The example in Figure 2 would be such
an ideal culture.
The assumption made when presenting the example, namely that the desirability of the various
levels can be quantified and normalized to the same scale, should by no means be taken as an assertion
made by this paper. The aim of the paper was not to present such metrics and normalization processes
but rather to show, at a certain level of abstraction, how this conceptual model could be used to reason
about information security culture. It should, however, be possible to quantify and normalize the
various factors for certain subsets of controls. For example, it might be possible to turn the presented
conceptual model into a working model for a smaller sub-problem such as mapping the relationships
between the four levels for password usage. If the required processes and metrics are developed, the
conceptual framework might also play a valuable role in the management of an information security
culture. This type of usage for the presented model could possible be included in future research
efforts. For the present, the contention of this paper is simply that the conceptual model presented,
could assist in improving the understanding of an information security culture. The work in this paper
should thus be seen as an attempt to lay a solid foundation on which future research could be built.
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ABSTRACT
The importance of educating organizational end users about their roles and
responsibilities towards information security is widely acknowledged. How-
ever, many current user education programs have been created by security
professionals who do not necessarily have an educational background. The
nature of such programs is thus not always properly understood. This lack of
understanding could result in the ineﬀectiveness of security guidelines or pro-
grams in practice. This paper attempts to provide additional understanding
of these programs through an examination of the revised version of Bloom’s
taxonomy. The paper show how this taxonomy could be applied to informa-
tion security education.
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Information Security, Information Security Education, Awareness, Bloom’s
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years information technology has become such an intrinsic part
of modern business that some authors no longer see the use of information
technology as a strategic beneﬁt. Instead, it can be argued that information
technology is a basic commodity, similar to electricity, and that the lack of
this commodity makes it impossible to conduct business (Carr, 2003). It
is therefor vital for organizations to ensure that they have continuous access
to this valuable commodity. The process of ensuring this continuous access
is known as information security.
Humans, at various levels in the organization, play a vital role in the
processes that secures organizational information resources. Many of the
problems experienced in information security can be directly contributed
to the humans involved in the process. Employees, either intentionally or
through negligence, often due to a lack of knowledge, can be seen as the
greatest threat to information security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). It is
thus imperative for organizations that are serious about the protection of its
information resources to be serious about the education of its employees. The
aim of corporate information security education should be to ensure that each
and every employee in the organization knows his/her responsibility towards
information security.
This need to educate organizational users about their roles and responsi-
bilities towards information security is in fact a well established idea. Most
major information security standards address this need in some form. For
example, the ISO/IEC standard 13335-1 states that organizations cannot
protect the integrity, conﬁdentiality, and availability of information in to-
day’s highly networked systems environment without ensuring that each
person involved shares the security vision of the organization, understands
his/her roles and responsibilities, and is adequately trained to perform them
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004, p. 14). In order to assist in ensuring informa-
tion security, individual users thus needs knowledge regarding their speciﬁc
role in the security process. This knowledge can be provided via education,
training and awareness campaigns.
Most current information security educational programs are constructed
1
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by information security specialists who do not necessarily have a strong ed-
ucational background. Puhakainen (2006, pp. 33-56) reviews 59 current
approaches to security awareness, most of which are not based on pedagog-
ical theories. Puhakainen (2006, p. 56) also argues that there is a need for
theory-based security approaches. These approaches should also be practi-
cally eﬀective. The nature of security educational or awareness issues are
often not understood, which could lead to programs and guidelines that are
ineﬀective in practice (Siponen, 2000). A formally trained educationalist
might, for example, raise the question whether or not knowledge is in fact
enough. In Bloom’s taxonomy, which is a well know and widely accepted
pedagogical taxonomy, knowledge only comprises the very ﬁrst, and lowest,
level of education (Sousa, 2006, pp. 248-255). One could argue that this
level of comprehension is in fact not adequate for most humans who play a
role in the information security process. Similarly, the traditional approach
of classifying the requisite information security educational needs as a con-
tinuum consisting of either awareness, training or education, might also be
too simplistic.
This paper will attempt to provide a more pedagogically sound interpre-
tation of the educational needs of humans involved in information security
processes, based on their respective roles and responsibilities towards secu-
rity, through the incorporation of Bloom’s revised taxonomy (Anderson et
al., 2001) as a pedagogical framework.
2 RESEARCH PARADIGM AND RATIONALE
The work in this paper is based on qualitative, or phenomenological-, research
methods, as described in Creswell (1998). This paper should thus be seen as
”an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological tradi-
tions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem” (Creswell, 1998, p.
15). The research presented here does not attempt to deﬁne new knowledge,
but rather to provide a more formalized understanding of information secu-
rity awareness, training and education. As far as could be determined, the
application of Bloom’s Taxonomy, both the original and the revised versions,
speciﬁcally to information security education has never been published be-
fore. It is the authors’ belief that the use of this taxonomy could improve the
understanding of the pedagogical issues that should be considered in any
educational program, amongst information security specialists.
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Since education, as a ﬁeld of study, is normally seen as a ””human sci-
ence” it was deemed ﬁtting to also ”borrow” the research paradigm used
in this paper from the humanities. Most current work dealing with infor-
mation security education see this education as a continuum consisting of
three main levels, namely; awareness, training and education (Schlienger &
Teufel, 2003),(Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004),(NIST 800-16, 1998, pp. 15-
17). This continuum is used by many information security specialists when
constructing information security educational campaigns. These specialists
may not necessarily be educationalists. In order to ensure a rigorous research
approach, this paper will thus revisit even concepts with a seemingly obvi-
ous meaning. The description and discussion of these concepts is deemed
necessary because there might exist diﬀerences between the ontologies com-
monly adhered to by information security specialists and researchers from
the educational sciences. The primary purpose of this paper is to encourage
information security specialists to ”borrow” from the humanities when en-
gaged in activities that deals with humans. It can be argued that for most
security education programs more knowledge of the underlying theoretical
background can help both practitioners and scholars to understand why a
particular information security awareness approach is expected to have the
desired impact on users security behavior (Puhakainen, 2006, p. 139). It is
believed that adherence to sound pedagogical principles when constructing
information security educational campaigns, could improve the eﬃciency of
such campaigns.
3 AWARENESS, TRAINING AND EDUCATION
As mentioned earlier, most current work dealing with information security
education see this education as a learning continuum that ”starts with aware-
ness, builds to training, and evolves into education” (NIST 800-50, 2003, p.
7). NIST 800-16 (1998, pp. 15-17) provides more detail on the various levels
of this continuum and describes these levels as follow:
• Awareness: The main purpose of awareness campaigns is to make em-
ployees ”aware” of information security. In other words, these cam-
paigns focus attention on security. This is normally done using tech-
niques that can reach broad audiences. Awareness campaigns are gen-
erally aimed at all employees in the organization and aims to equip
employees with enough knowledge to enable them to recognize poten-
3
Proceedings of ISSA 2008
394
tial security threats. Awareness is not training.
• Training: Training is more formal than awareness and have the goal of
building employee knowledge and skills to facilitate the secure perfor-
mance of the employee’s normal tasks. Training strives to produce se-
curity skills and competencies that are relevant to the speciﬁc employee
and needed in the performance of the employee’s duties. ”The most
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between training and awareness is that training
seeks to teach skills that allow a person to perform a speciﬁc function,
while awareness seeks to focus an individuals attention on an issue or
set of issues.”
• Education: ”The Education level integrates all of the security skills and
competencies of the various functional specialties into a common body
of knowledge, adds a multi-disciplinary study of concepts, issues, and
principles (technological and social), and strives to produce IT security
specialists and professionals capable of vision and pro-active response.”
In the current information society, educational or awareness issues aﬀect
almost all organizations. Despite this fact the nature of these programs are
still not well understood and this often leads to ineﬀective security guide-
lines or programs (Siponen, 2000). Many organizations have some form of
awareness program but often do not augment these with supporting training
and/or education programs. The terms awareness and education are also
often used interchangeably. It is not uncommon to hear security special-
ists talk about ”awareness campaigns”, when the campaigns actually focus
on the training or education levels of the continuum. The purpose of these
campaigns is often listed as instilling security knowledge, or fostering a cul-
ture of information security amongst organizational end-users (Van Niekerk
& Von Solms, 2006). As mentioned earlier, the term knowledge only de-
scribe the lowest level of Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain. From
an educational viewpoint one could thus argue that the terminology used
lacks rigor. This lack of rigor could contribute to the fact that the nature
of awareness and educational issues is often misunderstood. One model that
could possibly provide such rigor is Bloom’s taxonomy.
4
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4 BLOOM’S TAXONOMY OF THE COGNITIVE DOMAIN
Bloom’s taxonomy is possibly one of the best known and most widely used
models of human cognitive processes. Bloom’s model was originally devel-
oped in the 1950’s and remained in use more or less unchanged until fairly
recently (Sousa, 2006, p. 249). A revised version of the taxonomy was pub-
lished in Anderson et al. (2001). This revised taxonomy has become accepted
as more appropriate in terms of current educational thinking (Sousa, 2006,
pp. 249-260). Both versions of Bloom’s taxonomy consist of six levels which
increases in complexity as the learner moves up through these levels. Figure
1 shows both versions of this taxonomy.
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Figure 1: Blooms Taxonomy, Original and Revised (Adapted from Sousa
(2006) pp. 249-250)
There are two main diﬀerences between the original and the revised ver-
sions of the taxonomy. Firstly, the revised version uses descriptive verbs for
each level that more accurately describes the intended meaning of each level.
Secondly, the revised version has swapped the last two levels of the origi-
nal version around. This was done because recent studies have suggested
that generating, planning, and producing an original ”product” demands
more complex thinking than making judgements based on accepted criteria
(Sousa, 2006, p. 250). The hierarchy of complexity in the revised taxonomy
is also less rigid than in the original in that it recognizes that an individual
may move among the levels during extended cognitive processes. This pa-
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per will focus on the revised version of the taxonomy. Wherever this paper
mentions Bloom’s taxonomy, it should be assumed that the revised version
is intended, unless otherwise stated. The following is a brief explanation of
each of the six levels of this revised taxonomy (Sousa, 2006, pp. 250-252):
• Remember: Remember refers to the rote recall and recognition of previ-
ously learned facts. This level represents the lowest level of learning in
the cognitive domain because there is no presumption that the learner
understands what is being recalled.
• Understand: This level describes the ability to ”make sense” of the
material. In this case the learning goes beyond rote recall. If a learner
understands material it becomes available to that learner for future use
in problem solving and decision making.
• Apply: The third level builds on the second one by adding the ability
to use learned materials in new situations with a minimum of direction.
This includes the application of rules, concepts, methods and theories
to solve problems within the given domain. This level combines the
activation of procedural memory and convergent thinking to correctly
select and apply knowledge to a completely new task. Practice is es-
sential in order to achieve this level of learning.
• Analyze: This is the ability to break up complex concepts into simpler
component parts in order to better understand its structure. Analysis
skills includes the ability to recognize underlying parts of a complex
system and examining the relationships between these parts and the
whole. This stage is considered more complex than the third because
the learner has to be aware of the thought process in use and must
understand both the content and the structure of material.
• Evaluate: Evaluation deals with the ability to judge the value of some-
thing based on speciﬁed criteria and standards. These criteria and/or
standards might be determined by the learner or might be given to the
learner. This is a high level of cognition because it requires elements
from several other levels to be used in conjunction with conscious judge-
ment based on deﬁnite criteria. To attain this level a learner needs to
consolidate their thinking and should also be more receptive to alter-
native points of view.
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• Create: This is the highest level in the taxonomy and refers to the
ability to put various parts together in order to formulate an idea or
plan that is new to the learner. This level stresses creativity and the
ability to form new patterns or structures by using divergent thinking
processes.
Educational taxonomies, such as Bloom’s taxonomy, are useful tools in
developing learning objectives and assessing learner attainment (Fuller et al.,
2007). All well known educational taxonomies are generic. These taxonomies
rely on the assumption that the hierarchy of learning outcomes apply to
all disciplines (Fuller et al., 2007). Bloom’s taxonomy would thus apply
equally to a more traditional ”subject”, such as zoology, as to organizational
information security education.
5 BLOOM’S TAXONOMY FOR INFORMATION SECURITY
EDUCATION
Learning taxonomies assist the educationalist to describe and categorize the
stages in cognitive, aﬀective and other dimensions, in which an individual
operates as part of the learning process. In simpler terms one could say that
learning taxonomies help us to ”understand about understanding” (Fuller
et al., 2007). It is this level of meta-cognition that is often missing in in-
formation security education. According to Siponen (2000) awareness and
educational campaigns can be broadly described by two categories, namely
framework and content. The framework category contains issues that can be
approached in a structural and quantitative manner. These issues constitute
the more explicit knowledge. The second category, however, includes more
tacit knowledge of an interdisciplinary nature. Shortcomings in this second
area usually invalidate awareness frameworks (Siponen, 2000). How to really
motivate users to adhere to security guidelines, for example, is an issue that
would form part of this content category.
It has been shown that even in cases where users have ”knowledge” of a
speciﬁc security policy, they might still willfully ignore this policy because
they do not understand why this policy is needed (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003).
Answering the question ”why” not only increase insight but also increases
motivation (Siponen, 2000). Simply informing employees that ”this is our
policy”, or ”you just have to do it”, which is often the traditional approach, is
not likely to increase motivation or attitudes (Siponen, 2000). Learning is a
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willful, active, conscious, and constructive activity guided by intentions and
reﬂections (Garde et al., 2007). According to most constructivist learning
theories, learning should be learner-centered (Garde et al., 2007). In an
organizational information security educational campaign, the learners must
include each and every employee. It is also important to realize that the
campaign has to be successful for each and every learner (Van Niekerk
& Von Solms, 2004).
In order to ensure successful learning amongst all employees, it is ex-
tremely important to fully understand the educational needs of individual
employees. According to Roper, Grau, and Fischer (2005, pp. 27-36) man-
agers often attempt to address the security education needs of employees
without adequately studying and understanding the underlying factors that
contribute to those needs. It has been argued before that educational ma-
terial should ideally be tailored to the learning needs and learning styles of
individual learners (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2004)(NIST 800-16, 1998,
p. 19). One could also argue that awareness campaigns that have not been
tailored to the speciﬁc needs of an individual, or the needs of a speciﬁc
target audience, will be ineﬀective. It is in the understanding of these
needs, that a learning taxonomy can play an important enabling role.
Information security specialists should use a taxonomy, like Bloom’s tax-
onomy, before compiling the content category of the educational campaign.
The use of such a taxonomy could help to understand the learning needs of
the target audience better. It could also reduce the tendency to focus only on
the framework category of these campaigns. For example, simply teaching
an individual what a password is, would lie on the remember, and possibly
understand level(s) of Bloom’s taxonomy. However, the necessary informa-
tion to understand why their own passwords is also important and should
also be properly constructed and guarded might lie as high as the evaluate
level of the taxonomy. An information security specialist might think that
teaching the users what a password is, is enough, but research have shown
that understanding why is essential to obtaining buy-in from employees. It is
this level of understanding that acts as a motivating factor and thus enables
behaviour change (Siponen, 2000)(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003)(Van Niekerk &
Von Solms, 2004)(Roper et al., 2005, pp. 78-79).
The use of an educational taxonomy in the construction of information
security educational programs requires that both the content and the assess-
ment criteria for this program is evaluated against the taxonomy in order
to ensure that learning takes place at the correct level of the cognitive do-
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Level Terms Sample Activities
Create imagine Pretend you are an information security oﬃcer for a large
ﬁrm. Write a report about a recent security incident.
compose Rewrite a given incident report as a news story.
design Write a new policy item to prevent users from putting
sensitive information on mobile devices.
infer Formulate a theory to explain why employees still write
down their passwords.
Evaluate appraise Which of the following policy items would be more
appropriate. Why?
assess Is it fair for a company to insist that employees never use
their work email for personal matters? Why or Why not?
judge Which of the security standards you have studied is more
appropriate for use in the South African context?
Defend your answer.
critique Critique these two security products and explain why you
would recommend one over the other to a customer.
Analyze analyze Which of the following security incidents are more likely?
contrast Compare and contrast the security needs of banking
institutions to those of manufacturing concerns.
distinguish Sort these security controls according to the high level
policies that they address.
deduce Which of these procedures could derive from the given
policy.
Apply practice Use these mnemonic techniques to create and recall
a secure password.
calculate Calculate how secure the following password is.
apply Think of three things that could go wrong should your
password be compromised.
execute Use the given tool to encrypt the following message.
Understand summarize Summarize the given security policy in your own words
discuss Why should non alpha-numeric characters be used in a
password?
explain Explain how symmetric encryption works.
outline Outline your own responsibilities with regards to the
security of customer account information.
Remember deﬁne What is the deﬁnition of a security incident?
label Label each of the threats in the given picture.
recall What is social engineering?
recognize Which of the pictures shows someone ”shoulder surﬁng”?
Table 1: Bloom’s Taxonomy for Information Security adapted from Anderson
et al., 2001
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main. The reference point for any educational program should be a set of
clearly articulated ”performance objectives” that have been developed based
on an assessment of the target audience’s needs and requirements (Roper et
al., 2005, p. 96). Correct usage of an educational taxonomy not only helps
to articulate such performance objectives but, more importantly, helps the
educator to correctly gauge the needs and requirements of the audience. An
example of how Bloom’s revised taxonomy could be used in an information
security context is supplied in Table 1. This example is not intended to be
a deﬁnitive work, but rather to serve as an example or starting point for
information security practitioners who want to use Bloom’s taxonomy when
constructing awareness and educational campaigns. It should however be
clear that this taxonomy could easily be used to categorize most, if not all,
information security educational needs eﬀectively. Once categorized accord-
ing to a taxonomy like Bloom’s taxonomy, it should also be easier to ﬁnd
related information regarding pedagogical methods suitable to assist learners
in attaining the desired level of cognitive understanding.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper suggested that information security educational programs would
be more eﬀective if they adhered to pedagogical principles. It was speciﬁ-
cally suggested that the common categorization of security educational needs
into the broad categories of awareness, training, and education, is not ideal.
Instead an educational taxonomy, like Bloom’s taxonomy should be used
to accurately deﬁne the security education needs of organizational users.
Through the use of such a taxonomy certain common weaknesses in current
security awareness and educational programs might be addressed.
An example of how Bloom’s taxonomy might be applied to information
security concepts was provided. The primary weakness of this paper is the
lack of empirical evidence to support the suggested use of Bloom’s taxonomy.
Future research in this regard should therefor focus on addressing this weak-
ness. It has been argued before that security practitioners who engage in
research or activities that relate to the human sciences should not re-invent
the wheel, but should rather ”borrow” from the humanities when appropri-
ate. This paper is one such an attempt, to ”borrow” from the humanities.
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Abstract. The importance of educating organizational end users about
their roles and responsibilities towards information security is widely ac-
knowledged. However, many current user education programs have been
created by security professionals who do not necessarily have an educa-
tional background. This paper show how the use of learning taxonomies,
specifically Bloom’s taxonomy, can improve such educational programs.
It is the authors belief that proper use of this taxonomy will assist in
ensuring the level of education is correct for the intended target audience.
1 Introduction
The primary aim of corporate information security education is to ensure that
each and every employee is instilled with the requisite knowledge and/or skills
to perform his or her function in a secure way [1]. Most current information
security educational programs are constructed by information security special-
ists who do not necessarily have a strong educational background. Studies have
shown that the vast majority of current awareness approaches lacks theoretical
grounding [2, pp. 33-56]. The nature of security educational or awareness issues
are often not understood, which could lead to programs and guidelines that are
ineffective in practice [3]. This paper shows how the use of Bloom’s revised tax-
onomy [4], as a pedagogical framework, can assist the creators of information
security educational programs in defining more pedagogically sound learning
objectives for the humans involved in information security processes.
The work in this paper is based on qualitative research methods. This paper
should thus be seen as ”an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct
methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem”
[5, p. 15]. Since education, as a field of study, is normally seen as a ”human
science” it was deemed fitting to also ”borrow” the research paradigm used in
this paper from the humanities. The research presented here does not attempt
to define new knowledge, but rather to show how an existing taxonomy, Bloom’s
taxonomy, could be used to improve information security educational programs.
This paper is an expansion on ideas previously published by the authors in
[6]. It is the authors’ belief that the use of Bloom’s taxonomy could improve
the understanding of the pedagogical, or learning, objectives that should be
considered in any educational program, amongst information security specialists.
The rest of this paper will briefly examine this taxonomy, before discussing its
possible use in information security education.
2 Bloom’s taxonomy of the cognitive domain
Bloom’s taxonomy is possibly one of the best known and most widely used
models of human cognitive processes. Bloom’s model was originally developed
in the 1950’s and remained in use more or less unchanged until fairly recently
[7, p. 249]. A revised version of the taxonomy was published in 2001 [4]. This
revised taxonomy has become accepted as more appropriate in terms of current
educational thinking [7, pp. 249-260]. Both versions of Bloom’s taxonomy consist
of six levels which increases in complexity as the learner moves up through these
levels. Figure 1 shows both versions of this taxonomy.
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Fig. 1. Blooms Taxonomy, Original and Revised (Adapted from Sousa (2006) pp. 249-
250)
There are two main differences between the original and the revised ver-
sions of the taxonomy. Firstly, the revised version uses descriptive verbs for each
level that more accurately describes the intended meaning of each level. Sec-
ondly, the revised version has swapped the last two levels of the original version
around. This was done because recent studies have suggested that generating,
planning, and producing an original ”product” demands more complex thinking
than making judgements based on accepted criteria [7, p. 250]. The hierarchy of
complexity in the revised taxonomy is also less rigid than in the original in that
it recognizes that an individual may move among the levels during extended cog-
nitive processes. This paper will focus on the revised version of the taxonomy.
Wherever this paper mentions Bloom’s taxonomy, it should be assumed that
the revised version is intended, unless otherwise stated. The following is a brief
explanation of each of the six levels of this revised taxonomy [7, pp. 250-252]:
– Remember: Remember refers to the rote recall and recognition of previously
learned facts. This level represents the lowest level of learning in the cognitive
domain because there is no presumption that the learner understands what
is being recalled.
– Understand: This level describes the ability to ”make sense” of the material.
In this case the learning goes beyond rote recall. If a learner understands
material it becomes available to that learner for future use in problem solving
and decision making.
– Apply: The third level builds on the second one by adding the ability to
use learned materials in new situations with a minimum of direction. This
includes the application of rules, concepts, methods and theories to solve
problems within the given domain. This level combines the activation of
procedural memory and convergent thinking to correctly select and apply
knowledge to a completely new task. Practice is essential in order to achieve
this level of learning.
– Analyze: This is the ability to break up complex concepts into simpler com-
ponent parts in order to better understand its structure. Analysis skills in-
cludes the ability to recognize underlying parts of a complex system and
examining the relationships between these parts and the whole. This stage
is considered more complex than the third because the learner has to be
aware of the thought process in use and must understand both the content
and the structure of material.
– Evaluate: Evaluation deals with the ability to judge the value of something
based on specified criteria and standards. These criteria and/or standards
might be determined by the learner or might be given to the learner. This
is a high level of cognition because it requires elements from several other
levels to be used in conjunction with conscious judgement based on definite
criteria. To attain this level a learner needs to consolidate their thinking and
should also be more receptive to alternative points of view.
– Create: This is the highest level in the taxonomy and refers to the ability
to put various parts together in order to formulate an idea or plan that is
new to the learner. This level stresses creativity and the ability to form new
patterns or structures by using divergent thinking processes.
In addition to these levels of the cognitive domain [4] also places major
emphasis on the use of the following categorization of the knowledge dimension
[4, pp. 45-62]:
– Factual Knowledge - The most basic elements the learner must know in
order to be familiar with a discipline. I.e. Terminology or specific details and
elements.
– Conceptual Knowledge - The interrelationships among the basic elements of
larger structures that enable these elements to function together. I.e. Clas-
sification, categories, principles, theories, models, etc.
– Procedural Knowledge - How to do something, methods of inquiry, how to
use skills, apply algorithms, techniques and methods. I.e. Subject specific
skills, algorithms, techniques, and methods as well as knowledge of criteria
for determining when to use appropriate procedures.
– Meta-Cognitive Knowledge - An awareness and knowledge of one’s own cog-
nition. I.e. Strategic knowledge, Self-knowledge, knowledge about cognitive
tasks, including contextual and conditional knowledge.
Activities at these six levels of the cognitive domain are usually combined
with the one or more of the four types of knowledge in a collection of statements
outlining the learning objectives of an educational program. Usually a learning
objective statement will be used to create a set of learning activities. Learning
activities are activities which help learners to attain the learning objectives.
A Learning activity consist of a verb that relates to an activity at one of the
levels of the cognitive domain, and a noun providing additional insight into
the relationship of the specific learning objective to a category of knowledge
[4, pp. 93-109]. The use of a taxonomy often assist educators in gaining better
understanding of learning objectives, and activities. However, it is not always
clear how this increased understanding can help the educators. [4, pp. 6-10]
identifies the following four ”organizing questions” as the most important areas
in which a taxonomy like Bloom’s can assist educators:
– The Learning Question: What is the most important for learners to learn in
the limited time available
– The Instruction Question: How does one plan and deliver instruction that
will result in high levels of learning for large numbers of learners
– The Assessment Question: How does one select or design assessment in-
struments and procedures to provide accurate information about how well
students are learning
– The Alignment Question: How does one ensure that objectives, instruction,
and assessment are consistent with each other.
In most cases, the correct usage of a taxonomy table, like the one given in Table
2, which combines elements from both the cognitive and knowledge dimensions,
will allow educators to answer these question to some extent.
3 Bloom’s Taxonomy for Information Security Education
Learning taxonomies assist the educationalist to describe and categorize the
stages in cognitive, affective and other dimensions, in which an individual oper-
ates as part of the learning process. In simpler terms one could say that learning
taxonomies help us to ”understand about understanding” [8]. It is this level of
meta-cognition that is often missing in information security education. Accord-
ing to Siponen awareness and educational campaigns can be broadly described
by two categories, namely framework and content [3]. The framework category
contains issues that can be approached in a structural and quantitative manner.
These issues constitute the more explicit knowledge. The second category, how-
ever, includes more tacit knowledge of an interdisciplinary nature. Shortcomings
in this second area usually invalidate awareness frameworks [3]. How to really
motivate users to adhere to security guidelines, for example, is an issue that
would form part of this content category.
Level Verb Sample Activities
Create design Write a new policy item to prevent users from putting
sensitive information on mobile devices. (A6)
Evaluate critique Critique these two passwords and explain why you
would recommend one over the other in terms
of the security it provides.(A5)
Analyze analyze Which of the following security incidents involving
stolen passwords are more likely in our company?(A4)
Apply execute Use the appropriate application to change your password
for the financial sub-system. (A3)
Understand discuss Why should non alpha-numeric characters be used in a
password? (A2)
Remember define What is the definition of access control? (A1)
Table 1. Abbreviated example of Learning Activities based on Bloom’s Taxonomy for
Information Security, adapted from Anderson et al., 2001
In order to ensure successful learning amongst all employees, it is extremely
important to fully understand the educational needs of individual employees.
Managers often attempt to address the security education needs of employees
without adequately studying and understanding the underlying factors that con-
tribute to those needs [9, pp. 27-36]. It has been argued before that educational
material should ideally be tailored to the learning needs and learning styles of in-
dividual learners [10][11, p. 19]. One could also argue that awareness campaigns
that have not been tailored to the specific needs of an individual, or the needs
of a specific target audience, will be ineffective. It is in the understanding of
these needs, that a learning taxonomy can play an important enabling role.
Information security specialists should use a taxonomy, like Bloom’s taxon-
omy, before compiling the content category of the educational campaign. The
use of such a taxonomy could help to understand the learning needs of the target
audience better. It could also reduce the tendency to focus only on the frame-
work category of these campaigns. For example, simply teaching an individual
what a password is, would lie on the remember, and possibly understand level(s)
of Bloom’s taxonomy. However, the necessary information to understand why
their own passwords is also important and should also be properly constructed
and guarded might lie as high as the evaluate level of the taxonomy. An infor-
mation security specialist might think that teaching the users what a password
is, is enough, but research have shown that understanding why is essential to
obtaining buy-in from employees. It is this level of understanding that acts as a
motivating factor and thus enables behaviour change [3][10][9, pp. 78-79].
The use of an educational taxonomy in the construction of information se-
curity educational programs requires that both the content and the assessment
criteria for this program is evaluated against the taxonomy in order to ensure
that learning takes place at the correct level of the cognitive domain. The ref-
erence point for any educational program should be a set of clearly articulated
”performance objectives” that have been developed based on an assessment of
the target audience’s needs and requirements [9, p. 96]. Correct usage of an edu-
cational taxonomy not only helps to articulate such performance objectives but,
more importantly, helps the educator to correctly gauge the needs and require-
ments of the audience.
An example of how Bloom’s revised taxonomy could be used in an informa-
tion security context is supplied in Table 1. This example contains learning activ-
ities for a learning objective (LO1) that can be briefly expressed as: ”Learners
should be able to understand, construct and use passwords in the correct con-
text”. This example is not intended to be a definitive work, but rather to serve,
with taxonomy table Table 2, towards clarifying the use of Bloom’s taxonomy
in an information security context.
The The Cognitive Process Dimension
Knowledge
Dimension Remember Understand Apply Analyze Evaluate Create
Factual
Knowledge A1 A6
Conceptual Test1A Test1B
Knowledge A2 A4 A6
Procedural LO1
Knowledge A3 A6
Meta-
Cognitive
Knowledge A5
Table 2. Example Taxonomy Table adapted from Anderson et al., 2001
It was mentioned earlier that answering the four ”organizing questions” is
one of the most difficult things for creators of educational matter to do. The
following sub-section will briefly explain how the taxonomy table, Table 2 could
be used to assist in answering these question for the learning activities, as shown
in Table 1.
3.1 Answering the four ”Organizing Questions”
Each learning activity in Table 1 consist of a verb that relates to one of the
cognitive domain levels in Bloom’s Taxonomy [4, pp 67-68]. Each activity also
has a noun relating to knowledge that could be categorized as one of the four
categories of knowledge. By marking the appropriate spaces in the taxonomy
table for each activity, the educator can derive a lot of useful information about
the ”coverage” provided by the activities. As an example, the activity marked
A1 Lies at the remember level of the cognitive domain and since it deals with
basic subject terminology it deals with the ”factual” category of knowledge.
This is reflected by its positioning in Table 2. Each of the other activities, A2
to A6, as shown in Table 1 has also been appropriately placed in Table 2. A
complete information security educational program will obviously include many
more activities, which would result in many more entries in the taxonomy table.
Such a table do not always have to deal with an entire program, but could, like
the given example, focus on a single learning objective, or even on a few related
objectives.
By examining the taxonomy table the educator can easily identify areas of
knowledge, or levels of the cognitive domain, that has not been covered by the
learning activities. Similarly, areas where multiple activities covers the same
levels of cognition and categories of knowledge can be identified. This can assist
in answering the so-called ”learning question”, i.e. ”are most important activities
receiving the larger share of the available resources?”. In order to design activities
that will result in maximum learning, thus answering the ”learning question”,
one can look for activities that involves more than just one type of knowledge. For
example, in order to create a new policy item (ActivityA6), the learner will need
to know; basic terminology (factual knowledge), how items relate to each other
(conceptual knowledge), and which steps to follow to create a policy (procedural
knowledge). To answer the ”assessment question” the educator could choose to
focus on the learning objective itself, and thus, in the example given, only use
assessment methods that require the learner to apply procedural knowledge. Or
the assessor might decide to focus on one or more learning activities and thus
have a wider range of assessment coverage. By noting assessment activities on
the same taxonomy table, the educator can ensure that the chosen assessments
correspond directly to what he/she intends to assess. For example, that learners
must understand the concept of a password (Test1A) and must be able to
analyze the relative strength of a given password ( Test1B). The table will
also, at a glance, show which areas are not being assessed. Finally, given a
complete taxonomy table, the ”alignment question” should be relatively easy to
answer. In the given example, a clear ”disconnect” between the assessment and
the learning objective itself exist. Instead of focusing on the application, or
use, of passwords the assessments focus on the concept of what a password is,
and how to determine its relative strength. Similarly, other ”miss-alignments”
can be identified with the help of this taxonomy table.
4 Conclusion
This paper suggested that information security educational programs would be
more effective if they adhered to pedagogical principles. It was specifically sug-
gested that an educational taxonomy, like Bloom’s taxonomy should be used to
accurately define the security education needs of organizational users. Through
the use of such a taxonomy certain common weaknesses in current security aware-
ness and educational programs might be addressed.
An example of how Bloom’s taxonomy might be applied to a learning ob-
jective in an information security educational program was provided. The paper
used this brief example, to show how a taxonomy table based on this example,
could assist educators in addressing the four ”organizing questions” faced by
educators. The primary weakness of this paper is the lack of empirical evidence
to support the suggested use of Bloom’s taxonomy. Due to space limitations,
the examples are also by necessity, very brief. Future research in this regard
should focus on addressing the lack of empirical evidence, and on expanding
the examples to be more comprehensive. It has been argued before that secu-
rity practitioners who engage in research or activities that relate to the human
sciences should not re-invent the wheel, but should rather ”borrow” from the
humanities when appropriate. This paper is one such an attempt, to ”borrow”
from the humanities.
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